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Research suggests that foreign affairs analysis is weak—even the best analysts are 
accurate less than 35 percent of the time (Tetlock 2005). To compensate for analytic 
weaknesses, some have called for the use of structured analytic techniques, that is, 
formalized intelligence analysis methods. This imperative was enshrined in the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004), which mandates that analysts 
use these techniques.  This research investigates how the techniques have been applied 
in the U.S. intelligence community (IC) while making a modest attempt to evaluate 12 
core techniques.  
 The investigation of how the techniques are applied is based on semi-structured 
interviews with 5 intelligence experts and a survey of 80 analysts at an IC agency, along 
with follow-up interviews with 15 analysts. Interestingly, 1 in 3 analysts reported never 
using the techniques.  Two factors were related to the use of the techniques: analytic 
training (p=0.001, Cramer's V=0.41) and the perception of their value (p=.049, Cramér's 
V= 0.23). There was not a statistically significant relation between the time pressure under 
which analysts work and their use of the techniques (p=0.74). 
 Questions about the effectiveness of the techniques were answered in part by 
employing a “systematic review,” a novel methodology for synthesizing a large body of 
research. A random sample of more than 2,000 studies, suggests that there is moderate to 
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strong evidence affirming the efficacy of using three techniques: Analysis of Competing 
Hypotheses, Brainstorming, and Devil’s Advocacy. There were three main findings:  face-
to-face collaboration decreases creativity, evidence weighting appears to be more 
important than seeking disconfirming evidence, and conflict tends to improve the quality 
of analysis.  This research also employed an experiment with 21 graduate intelligence 
studies students, which confirmed the first two findings of the systematic review. 
 The findings of the dissertation represent a contribution to “evidence-based 
intelligence analysis,” the systematic effort to develop a robust evidence-base linking the 
use of specific analytic techniques to the improvement of analysis in foreign affairs.  
Future research might build on the evidence-base presented here to improve intelligence 
analysis, one of the most important areas of judgment in foreign affairs. 
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PREFACE 
 
For Beatriz: 
 
“Caminante, son tus huellas el camino, y nada más; caminante, no hay camino, se hace  camino 
al andar…” 
 
We did it. 
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1.0  CHAPTER 1: ADDRESSING THE LIMITS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ANALYSIS 
“Good judgment” wrote Mark Twain “is the result of experience and experience 
the result of bad judgment.” Decades of psychological research suggest Twain was on to 
something: experts excel in domains where they can try, and try again, failing, and then 
learning from their mistakes, to develop expert judgment (Kahneman and Klein, 2009).  
In these domains experts are able to learn by trial and error and develop accurate, 
internalized models of a problem situation upon which they can draw to make judgments 
(Simon, 1965). Consider the chess master who plays game after game, learning from each 
failure and, in the process, stores tens of thousands of distinct move patterns in his mind 
(Chase and Simon, 1973), or the fireman who, after responding to thousands of structure 
fires, intuitively “knows” from his experience that a backdraft is on the other side of the 
door. In each case the decision maker has had enough opportunities to develop expert 
judgment on thousands of chances to make ‘bad judgments.’1  
                                                 
1 Similar findings exist at the organizational-scale. For example Petroski (2008) argues that in order to 
improve performance, engineering should look to past failures rather than successes. For an extended 
discussion with examples, see: Petroski, Henry. Success through failure: The paradox of design. Princeton 
University Press, 2006. 
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1.1  THE LIMITATIONS OF EXPERTISE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS ANALYSIS 
Analysts of foreign affairs, who study issues of war and peace, face a gloomier situation: 
unlike the chess master or firefighter, the foreign affairs analyst has little or no feedback 
because the events of interest rarely occur, or in the case of nuclear war, hopefully never 
occur.2 Even when foreign affairs analysts get feedback, it is all too easy for political and 
ideological reasons for the analysts to ignore or write off their inaccurate judgments 
(Tetlock 2005). Take for example, the foreign policy “hawk" who might view the collapse 
of the USSR not as a moment to recalibrate future predictions about aggressors, but as an 
unlikely “one-off” occurrence.  Complicating matters even further, the foreign affairs 
analysts lack valid indicators (Kaheman and Klein, 2009). While the firefighter has many 
indicators to tell him what is or will happen, such as a weak support beam suggesting 
imminent collapse, the foreign affairs decision maker has almost none. For example, a 
column of armor massing on the Ukrainian border can mean different things: Is a Russian 
invasion is imminent? Or is the armored column just a sign of Russian resolve? In short, 
unlike other professionals with more valid indicators and repetitive and clear feedback, 
the foreign affairs expert has few ways to develop expert intuitive judgment.   
                                                 
2 There are exceptions in political forecasting, most notably the statistical forecasting by Nate Silver in U.S. 
elections. Statistical analysis “works” in these cases for reasons similar to those that enable the chess master 
to acquire precise intuitive judgment: ample and reliable feedback, in the form of survey data, are used to 
draw inferences, rather than expert judgment. For an extended discussion of this issue, see:  Jay Ulfelder 
“Why the World Can't Have a Nate Silver,” Foreign Policy, November, 2012.  
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Researchers have long known that foreign affairs analysts and decision makers 
struggle to make valid judgments, and in the process sometimes commit errors of 
reasoning, such as underestimating or overestimating the aggressiveness of an adversary. 
For example, Jervis (1976) pointed out that leaders often see what they expect and/or 
want to see, and in the process act in unexpected, and dangerous ways.  Janis (1972) 
explored the limitations of expert judgment in foreign affairs at the group-level with his 
influential work on “groupthink,” a term that has since moved into the vernacular for 
undue group consensus. However, it was not until Philip Tetlock’s seminal work Expert 
Political Judgment (2005) that the full extent of judgmental deficiency in foreign affairs was 
systematically laid bare.  Over the course of several years Tetlock asked 280 experts to 
make judgments about foreign events. While Tetlock found his experts outperformed 
undergraduate students, they “were not superior to untrained readers of newspapers in 
their ability to make accurate long-term forecasts of political events” (Kahneman and 
Klein, 2009, p. 520). The experts’ ability to easily outperform undergraduates but inability 
to significantly top observers suggests that there is a diminishing return expertise.  
Further, even the highest performing experts achieved an accuracy rate only slightly greater 
than chance alone. Or, in other words, the forecasts of this elite group were, on average, 
only slightly better than the flip of a coin.  It is here, at the frontier of expert competence 
that the research problem emerges: what can be done to improve foreign affairs 
judgments?  
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1.2 SPANNING THE DIVIDE: IMPROVING DECISION AND ANALYSIS IN 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
Despite the recognition among scholars that foreign affairs judgment is limited, there is 
little work in the international relations literature on how to improve it.3  Most of the 
literature that does address this problem dates back to the 1970s and focuses on 
improving executive decision making.  For example, George (1972) developed “multiple 
advocacy,” a method4 designed to promote diversity of perspectives using an appointed 
arbiter to control discussion in executive decision making.  Another example is Devil’s 
Advocacy, a method that uses a designated individual or group to take an unpopular 
position in order to “combat the problems posed by an excessive tendency” toward 
“consensus-seeking behavior”—Janis’ groupthink (George, 1975, pp. 286–287). Outside 
of the international relations literature there is a much larger body of research on 
techniques to improve judgment in environments as complex as foreign affairs. For 
                                                 
3 Stephen Walt provides an excellent explanation on why research on conducting analysis of foreign 
affairs is limited:  “I think it is partly because scholars in international relations have tended to focus on 
grand theory (realism, liberalism, constructivism, etc.), or on trying to identify recurring laws or 
tendencies between states or other groups…In other words, most scholars stand apart from the policy 
process and treat international affairs as something to be studied from a safe distance.”  Stephen Walt, 
“Policy analysis in global affairs: What should my students read?” ForeignPolicy.com, November 2011, 
available at: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/22/policy_analysis_in_global_affairs_what_should_my
_students_read 
4 Kaplan (1973) defines methods in three ways 1) broad methods that involve broad procedures (e.g. 
induction); 2) mid-range methods sufficiently general to be common to all sciences that have somewhat 
specific procedures (e.g. forming concepts, using research designs); 3) and short-range methods with 
specific procedures and purposes(e.g. factor analysis). This research uses the term technique and method 
interchangeably to refer to short-range methods.  
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example, a technique very similar to Devil’s Advocacy was used to improve the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s planning process (Mitroff et al. 1977). 
Despite the promising literature that sets forth new methods of foreign affairs 
analysis, there is little research that explicitly tests their efficacy, although there are some 
notable exceptions outside the foreign affairs community and international relations 
literature (for example, see Armstrong 2006).  The efficacy question is important from a 
theoretical standpoint as researchers attempt to develop and test theories on foreign 
policy decision making and in a practical sense because of the important decisions that 
are made based on these methods. Consider the empirical evidence for the efficacy of the 
Alternative Futures Analysis, a technique used to identify a set of important drivers that 
can lead to various scenarios that, once reported to the organization’s leadership can be 
used to prevent surprise (Schwartz 1991, p. 3-4). Supporters point to examples of 
effectiveness of scenarios, specifically its use by Royal Dutch Shell in the 1970s. This 
example suggests because Shell used scenarios it was prepared for rising tensions in the 
Arab world after the Yom Kippur War.  Tetlock (2005, p. 192) is less convinced and argues 
that because users of the technique write several scenarios, they virtually ensure that at 
least one will resemble the outcome. Simply stated, it is not possible to know if a 
technique is effective without rigorous empirical tests, tests which we lack for most 
methods. One rebuttal to Tetlock is that the techniques are not designed to forecast 
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specific outcomes, but still, a valid question is whether the scenarios are plausible and 
internally consistent.5  
The question of efficacy of foreign affairs methods is of paramount importance 
because these methods could address the deficiencies of expert judgment and improve 
decisions that drive high stakes decisions.  To situation this dissertation, the inquiry 
focuses on examining perhaps the largest producer of foreign affairs analysis the world 
has ever known, the U.S. intelligence community (IC). 
 
1.2.1 The Theory-Application Gap- Evaluating the Intelligence Reform Act 
Similar to analysts in other domains, such as policy and business analysis, intelligence 
analysts apply their expertise to weight data and compare, contrast, and evaluate 
information concerning important events (Johnston, 2005, p. 3).  This process requires 
that analysts sort through “enormous volumes of data and combine seemingly unrelated 
events to construct an accurate interpretation of a situation and make predictions about 
complex, dynamic events” (Pirolli 2005).  Intelligence analysts produce intelligence 
“products,” documents and presentations of different types.   These products can vary 
greatly with some focusing on providing warning to decision maker of a potential threat 
to providing descriptive research about a particular country or leader.  Intelligence 
                                                 
5 Thomas Barnett argues that the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2030 report lacks of 
internally “consistent logic throughout each of the worlds presented.” Available at: 
http://nation.time.com/2012/12/21/just-how-intelligent-is-the-national-intelligence-councils-global-
trends-2030/ 
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analysts also work in high-stakes environments where intelligence errors can occur, 
factual inaccuracies in analysis (Johnston 2005, p. 6). The avoidance of error cannot be 
overstated as even slight errors--if reproduced and replicated at the organizational level-
-can potentially lead to multi-billion dollar intelligence and policy failures.  
 One such example where intelligence error contributed, at least in part, to an 
intelligence failure is in the lead-up to the Iraq War. In the National Intelligence Estimate, 
the IC’s authoritative assessment of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program, all the 
IC agencies but State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research6 determined Iraq 
had continued its programs (National Intelligence Council 2002). After the invasion 
turned up no weapons of mass destruction, the analytic practices of the IC came under 
tight scrutiny as panels, committees, and commissions initiated investigations. In a 
conclusion typical of these probes, one congressional panel co-chairman argued that the 
IC estimate on Iraq’s nuclear program was “inconsistent” and based on “tortured 
presumptions” (Stout 2005). The resounding message of the investigation was that U.S. 
intelligence analysis needed nothing less than an analytic transformation, and in 2004 the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (henceforth, the “Intelligence Reform 
Act”) laid out a legal framework to accomplish exactly that.  
                                                 
6 The State Department’s Bureau for Intelligence and Research (INR) concluded:  “Saddam continues to 
want nuclear weapons and that available evidence indicates that Baghdad is pursuing at least a limited 
effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapons-related capabilities. The activities we have detected do 
not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be 
an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons.” National Intelligence Council, 
“Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction” (2002), 
http://fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd.html  
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There have been many prior efforts to reform intelligence analysis. What sets the 
Intelligence Reform Act apart from most other IC reforms is that it is a reform of day-to-
day analytic practices to address what Betts (2007) terms an “enemy” of intelligence: the 
inherent limits of human cognition in intelligence analysis. As a result of the focus on 
improving the process of analysis, the Intelligence Reform Act and the initiatives it set in 
motion are sometimes referred to as the “analytic transformation” or “analytic reform 
movement” (Immerman 2011;  Fingar 2011). The added emphasis on analysis, or analytic 
tradecraft as it is called in the IC, is in contrast to previous reforms that focused on 
improving information sharing through greater organizational collaboration, 
restructuring, or a combination of both. In terms of analytic practice, where the 
Intelligence Reform Act arguably makes the biggest impact is the requirement that 
analysts be trained in and use methods called structured analytic techniques (section 
1017, sub-section A).  
While the Intelligence Reform Act mandated structured analytic techniques, their 
implementation has been gaining momentum in the IC for the last three decades. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, the IC experimented with formalizing analysis by exploring 
new analytical methods leading to a focus on techniques designed to avoid certain 
cognitive biases (Heuer 1978).  In the 1990s, changing international threats, a quicker 
intelligence cycle, and data overload, created more interest in implementing “alternative 
 9 
analysis techniques”7 as the techniques were known at that time.  Reformers argued that 
the techniques could improve analysis by encouraging analysts to consider multiple rival 
hypotheses and challenge their assumptions.  After the Intelligence Reform Act the 
impetus to implement the techniques grew and reformers sought to import methods from 
other disciplines including policy analysis, political science, and business. Consequently, 
there are literally hundreds of possible methods that fall under the rubric of “structured 
analytic techniques.”  To reduce this number to a workable set this research focuses on 
the twelve “core” techniques identified in the U.S. Government’s Analytic Tradecraft 
Primer (2009) (see Table 1.1 below).  
Table 1.1: “Core” Structured Analytic Techniques 
  
Key Assumptions Check 
Quality of Information Check 
Indicators of Signpost/Change 
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses 
Devil’s Advocacy 
Team A/Team B 
High-Impact/Low-Probability Analysis 
”What If?” Analysis 
Brainstorming 
Outside-In Thinking 
Red Team Analysis 
Alternative Futures Analysis 
 
As of 2011, more than 4,000 analysts have received training in these twelve 
techniques, representing a quarter of the IC’s analytic workforce (Defense Intelligence 
Agency, 2011).  At the same time, this growth is expected to accelerate as more 
                                                 
7 Alternative analysis techniques were renamed structured analytic techniques  to encourage analysts to 
think of them not as alternatives but mainstay of “good” analysis (Heuer and Pherson, 2010, p. 9).   
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intelligence agencies mandate training programs (Heuer and Pherson, 2010, p. 343) and 
more intelligence analysis education programs train the next generation of analysts. A 
recent analysis of these education programs found at least 13 that have been founded 
since 2001 (Crosston and Coulthart, forthcoming).  
Notwithstanding the push for training, there are serious barriers for reformers to 
implement the techniques. For example, ethnographies of the IC suggest that analysts are 
reluctant to utilize techniques because of the increasing current reporting requirements 
that emerged in the 1990s and accelerated after September 11th (Johnston 2005, pp. 26-27; 
Dixon and McNamara 2008). At same time many techniques require a perceived, 
significant time investment to decompose a problem and externalize the information to 
paper or a screen (Heuer 1999, p. 86). Understanding how to implement the techniques 
is important if they can be shown to leverage expertise and improve analysis.  
1.3 DEVELOPING A THEORY OF STRUCTURED ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES 
Despite the mandate for structured analytic techniques, there is no overall theory 
explaining why the techniques should improve intelligence analysis.  The theoretical 
justification that does exist is rooted in research from cognitive psychology conducted in 
the 1970s and 1980s. This research was based on the heuristics and biases research 
conducted by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. They found that respondents in lab 
experiments used mental shortcuts or rules of thumb to make quick judgments, and that 
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these heuristics led to predictable errors. For example, in a classic study (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1983), respondents were told about a young woman named Linda:  
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations. 
 
 Respondents were then asked which is more probable: a) Linda is a bank teller, or b) 
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. Most respondents chose ‘b,’ 
and in making this choice, respondents used the representative heuristic. People use this 
heuristic to quickly estimate probabilities on the basis of previous experience. Since 
respondents can imagine Linda easier as a feminist bank teller than just a bank teller they 
disregard a simple fact about probability: the probability of two events occurring in 
conjunction is always less than one event.  
Heuer imported Kahneman and Tversky’s findings into intelligence analysis with 
his classic, The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (1999), which was later the basis for a 
justification of structured analytic techniques. Heuer argues that the subjects in 
Kahneman and Tversky’s experiments are similar to intelligence analysts, who also use 
heuristics that increase the likelihood of errors (Heuer 1999). For example, an analyst 
making a judgment about which foreign terrorist group will attack the U.S. might invoke 
the availability heuristic, a mental short-cut based on the last or most memorable event. 
Since al Qaeda is the last perpetrator of a major terrorist attack, the analyst might focus 
only on this group and therefore commit an error of reasoning, thereby ignoring other 
known or emerging groups that may attack.   
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Due to these errors Heuer and Pherson (2014) argue that analysts should use 
techniques that switch analysts’ thinking from quick and intuitive thinking that use 
heuristics to slow and effortful thinking. Kahneman (2011) refers to these two types of 
thinking as systems 1 and 2. A common example of system 1 is the type of effortless, 
intuitive thinking a morning commuter uses to find his way to work, while system 2 
thinking is used in difficult reasoning tasks, such as solving a complex math problem. 
Heuer and Pherson argue that the problem of cognitive biases lays in system 1 because 
they argue that all biases are the result of fast thinking (p. 4).  Therefore, they conclude, 
the answer lies in using more system 2 thinking, specifically through using structured 
analytic techniques, which they claim “help identify and overcome the analytic biases 
inherent in system 1 thinking” (p.5). In short, according to Heuer and Pherson, using 
structured analytic techniques should engender slow analytic thinking that should 
reduce cognitive biases. 
Even with Heuer and Pherson’s notable effort to provide a theoretical justification 
of structured analytic techniques, there are issues with their explanation. One issue is that 
Heuer and Pherson focus exclusively on cognitive biases as the main performance 
standard of the techniques.  This is problematic because it narrows the standard for 
measuring the effectiveness of the techniques. The normative standards in the Linda 
example above, whether the respondent violated the conjunction fallacy—the belief that 
two events occurring is more likely than one-- is illustrative. While certainly it matters 
that analysts not violate rules of formal logic and probability theory, other standards also 
matter in intelligence analysis, perhaps even more so. For example, while adherence to 
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probability theory matter to researchers, managers and intelligence consumers appear to 
view rigor more in line with depth and scope of analysis (Zelik et al. 2009). 
At the same time, there are serious methodological challenges of proving that a 
bias violated formal logic and probability theory, as several psychological research 
studies have demonstrated the difficulty of replicating biases in even highly controlled 
experiments (Hammond 1996, pp-203-213). This latter point is important for theory 
development and testing as any justification for structured analytic techniques should 
show a replicable outcome. In addition, while Heuer and Pherson give the use of system 
2 as a rationale for the techniques, this justification does not explain why the techniques 
might improve analysis because system 2 is as susceptible to biases as system 1 (Kahan 
et al. 2006, pp. 1093-1094). Another problem is that the techniques pull from both systems. 
For example, the use of Alternative Futures Analysis encourages intuitive, imaginative 
thinking to conjure possible outcomes and effortful thinking to identify contextual 
drivers.  The issue does not stop here; many other techniques fit this general description, 
relying on both systems. As a result of these limitations a new causal theory of structured 
analytic techniques is needed.  
 
1.3.1  A Theory of Structured Analytic Techniques 
To address the limitations of Heuer and Pherson’s theoretical justification, a causal theory 
is needed that explains outcomes in terms of prior actions or conditions. In this research 
the causal theory addresses how the use of structured analytic techniques can improve 
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the quality of intelligence. Astute readers might notice that the use of “theory” in this 
context is similar to “method,” however, there is an important distinction. While a 
method implies a procedure of some kind to reach a desired goal (Kaplan 1973), a theory 
sets forth a set of propositions to explain a particular phenomenon. In this context the 
theory was formulated to explain how the techniques improve the quality of analysis.  
For the purposes of this research the quality of intelligence analysis has two 
components: 1) it is sufficiently rigorous and 2) accurate. Analysis can be said to be 
rigorous when it is in-depth, as reflected in intelligence reports. Researchers at the Ohio 
State University (Miller, Patterson, and Woods, 2006; Zelik, Patterson, and Woods, 2007) 
identified eight attributes of rigor in intelligence analysis by observing and surveying 
analysts, thus creating a grounded measure of analytic rigor. These include whether the 
analyst explored a range of hypotheses, questioned the reliability of sources, among 
others (see table 1.2, below). The term “sufficient” is also important because sufficiency 
is dependent on the factors that shape the analytic task:  complexity/breadth of topic, 
data availability, and time (Greitzer 2004; Scholtz and Hewett 2004). Relying on these 
characteristics it is possible to determine basic “rules of thumb” for sufficient rigor. For 
example, a complex task, with available data, and a project length of several months, such 
as a long-term strategic forecast, would require more rigorous analysis than a one day 
project.  It is important to note that this framework subsumes cognitive bias. For example, 
confirmation bias--the error of seeking to confirm rather than disconfirm one’s beliefs—
would be subsumed under “hypothesis exploration” as low hypothesis exploration 
would be related to confirming a favored hypothesis.  In other words, the Ohio State 
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University scale does not replace cognitive biases but provides a reliable measure 
grounded in how analysts evaluate rigor.8   
Table 1.2 Selected Rigor Attributes and Description 
 
Hypothesis 
Exploration 
The construction and evaluation of potential 
explanations for collected data. 
Information Search The focused collection of data bearing upon 
the analysis problem. 
Information 
Validation 
The critical evaluation of data with respect to 
the degree of agreement among sources 
Stance Analysis The evaluation of collected data to identify 
the relative positions of sources with respect 
to the broader contextual setting 
 
In addition to rigor, analysis is high quality when it is accurate, that is, when there 
is a high degree of correspondence between the analytic judgment and what 
subsequently happened in the external world (Tetlock, 2005, p. 10; Hammond 1996).  Or 
in other words, the extent to which an analyst “gets it right.” In intelligence studies, 
accuracy is sometimes conceptualized as a “batting average” (Betts 2007, p. 187). Yet, 
assessing accuracy is not as simple as checking the box scores; many tasks in foreign 
affairs are covert and complex, rendering evaluation of judgment accuracy difficult (e.g. 
did country X build a nuclear weapon?). For this reason great caution should be exercised 
in evaluating accuracy.9 
                                                 
8 Evaluation of the reliability of the Ohio State scale has been positive. In one experiment, intercoder 
reliability across 12 evaluations was strong between two coders (κw = 0.86) (Zelik et al. 2007, p. 11)  
9 For an excellent discussion of the challenges of evaluating tests of accuracy in foreign affairs, see: Jay 
Ulfelder, “Jay Ulfelder on the Rigor-Relevance Tradeoff” The Good Judgment Project, May, 2014, available at: 
https://goodjudgmentproject.com/blog/?p=200 
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The causal theory of structured analytic techniques suggests that each structured 
analytic technique is designed to encourage analysts to engage in broadening checks, 
actions in the analytic process that "slow the production of [an] analytic product and 
make explicit the sacrifice of efficiency in pursuit of accuracy" (Zelik 2007 et al.). One 
broadening check is falsification which requires analysts to challenge status quo thinking 
by searching for rival hypotheses, thus increasing the scope of analysis, and rejecting as 
many of these as possible.  For example, the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) 
is based on the philosopher Karl Popper’s argument that rigorously challenging and 
rejecting hypotheses is necessary for extending knowledge (Popper 1953).  Popper (1972, 
p. 265) summed up this argument when he wrote “whenever a theory appears to you as 
the only possible one, take this as a sign that you have neither understood the theory nor 
the problem which it was intended to solve.” Popper’s point is as simple as it is profound:  
knowledge grows through testing multiple hypotheses and evidence rigorously rather 
than one.  
Another proposition of the theory is that the more broadening checks in the 
analysis, the more that the triangulation of judgments can occur, thus producing a more 
accurate judgment. Underlying this proposition is the theory of triangulation (Campbell 
and Fiske 1959; Campbell et. al. 1966; Denzin 1978; Cook 1985). The basis of triangulation 
theory comes from geodetic survey methods which states that to find a position on a map, 
a surveyor should rely on multiple bearing points to get a closer approximation of where 
the target position falls (Dunn 2012, p.16).  The wider the distance between bearing points 
the better, as each helps the surveyor find the target position. Divergent points let the 
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surveyor know how far away from the target position; convergent points tell him he is 
getting closer. In intelligence analysis, the points are not GPS coordinates, but pieces of 
evidence, hypotheses, and perspectives, which together increase the rigor of analysis. 
With each new piece of information the analyst takes in more information, increasing the 
relative completeness of what is known about the analytic problem.  Increasing relative 
completeness is necessary for achieving greater accuracy, the ultimate target of 
triangulation.  This theory is explained in more detail in Chapter 2. 
1.4  ADOPTING EVIDENCE-BASED INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS TO ANSWER 
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Evaluating the theory of structured analytic techniques in the context of the Intelligence 
Reform Act requires an approach that focuses on “what works,” that is, whether the effort 
to improve analysis by using structured analytic techniques has been effective. One such 
approach is evidence-based practice, which has been implemented in fields ranging from 
medicine (Sackett 2000), policy (Davies et al., 2001), to policing (Sherman, 1998), to 
counterterrorism (Lum et al. 2006). The promise of evidence-based practice has led some 
intelligence practitioners to call for evidence-based intelligence analysis (Marrin 2012; 
Chauvin and Fischhoff 2010; Pool, et al. 2009), however, these researchers have yet to 
define it in the context of intelligence analysis. In this research, I define evidence-based 
analytic practice as the deliberate effort to develop a robust evidence-base linking the use 
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of specific analytic methodologies to quality intelligence analysis. Underlying this 
approach is the goal of building a robust body of evidence through carefully constructed 
evaluations of using analytic techniques.  
 Structured analytic techniques provide one remedy to improving intelligence 
analysis and foreign affairs, generally. However, to determine if the techniques can 
address this problem two issues must be addressed: whether the techniques can be 
implemented and if they are effective, and if so, under what circumstances. To answer 
these questions an evidence-based approach was taken using semi-structured interviews, 
a survey, a systematic review of research on the techniques, and an experimental 
simulation.  
 
1.4.1   Research Question 1: The Implementation of Structured Analytic Techniques 
The first research question addresses implementation:  How often are structured analytic 
techniques used in the IC and what factors affect their use?  There have been several 
attempts to implement structured analytic techniques, such as the Global Future 
Partnership which, brought experts outside of the IC to use the techniques.10  Efforts at 
the National Intelligence Council (NIC) have also introduced the Alternative Futures 
Analysis technique to produce the Global Trends series of reports. However, the Global 
                                                 
10 Interview with Warren Fishbein, June 11, 2014.  
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Future Partnership and NIC are an exception.  Other research suggests that structured 
analytic techniques are rarely used on the job (Johnston 2005). 
Several variables might explain why analysts could be reluctant to use the 
techniques. For example, Moore and Hoffman (n.d.) argue quality of training in the 
techniques—an organizational variable— is important. They assert that the current 
curriculum does not take into account analysts’ individual learning styles and insufficient 
time is given to practice the techniques. Marrin (2007) argues that belief systems of 
analysts are an important variable. Anecdotal accounts from the IC paint a portrait of 
analysts suspicious of the value of the techniques, especially older analysts, which Moore 
and Hoffman (n.d.) attribute to the inability of structured analytic technique proponents 
to “make a convincing case that [analysts] ought to try something new” (Moore and 
Hoffman n.d., p. 2). However, there is no research on how pervasive this view is in the 
IC. At the same time the IC is undergoing a demographic shift, it is also facing a veritable 
‘catch 22’ from tasking requirements: the amount of current reporting has increased 
(Johnston 2005, pp. 26-27; Dixon and McNamara, 2008) while analysts are under more 
pressure to use structured analytic techniques which are perceived to require more time 
(Heuer 1999, p. 86).  
                      In Chapter 4, an attempt is made to answer the implementation question by using 
key informant interviews and a survey of a US intelligence agency with 80 analysts—the 
largest ever attempted.  The informant interviews were held with expert members of the 
IC willing to share their knowledge of the analytic reform movement and intelligence 
methodology. These informants were selected through a purposive and snowball 
 20 
sampling strategy. While the key informant interviews focused on the overall 
implementation of structured analytic techniques in the IC, an in depth field study of INR 
was used to examine the variables hypothesized to affect the use of the techniques.  The 
study included both a survey of 80 intelligence analysts and follow-up interviews with 
15 analysts to probe the interpretation of the study variables. The results of the survey 
were analyzed with descriptive and inferential statistics and integrated with qualitative 
data from the interviews. 
 
1.4.2   Research Question 2: The Effectiveness of Structured Analytic Techniques 
The second research question addresses the effectiveness of the techniques: do structured 
analytic techniques improve the quality of intelligence analysis and, if so, under what 
circumstances? The U.S. Government’s Analytic Tradecraft Primer (2009) lists 12 “core” 
structured analytic techniques (see table above), including scenarios (under the name 
alternative scenarios analysis), Team A/Team B, and red teaming.  This list is significant 
not because it is comprehensive—Johnston (2005) identified more than 190 techniques 
used in the IC— but because it has been used to create the curriculum of the analytic 
reform movement’s seminars and training materials. Therefore, the list is a representative 
sample of techniques promoted in the reform effort.   However, it is unclear to what extent 
these core techniques might improve the quality of intelligence analysis except for some 
scattered anecdotal evidence (Marrin 2012). 
 21 
 To begin to answer the effectiveness research question, a systematic review was 
conducted of the evidence on structured analytic techniques. Defined, a systematic 
review is an “explicit method to identify, select, and critically appraise relevant research” 
(Cochrane Glossary 2014). Such reviews are used in evidence-based policy to sum up the 
best available evidence on a specific question to determine “what works” (Campbell 
Collaboration 2014). While the systematic review is similar to its close relative, the 
literature review, there is an important difference: transparency. Unlike a traditional 
literature review, the researcher conducting a systematic review makes his procedures of 
his review explicit, such as specifying the criteria for why a research study is (or not) 
included. This transparency should decrease the possibility of “cherry picking” evidence 
that fits the researcher’s preconceived notions of the data (Cooper 2009).   For example, 
at the beginning of a systematic review, the researcher must set the inclusion criteria, the 
rules for using research reports.  
Studies for the review were drawn from within the intelligence studies literature 
and outside in numerous disciplines, such as policy analysis and business. Evidence from 
intelligence studies comes from de-classified documents from the IC, such as a use of the 
Team A/Team B exercise during the Cold War (Mitchell 2006) and research conducted 
by students at intelligence training centers and universities. While these sources are 
useful, there is also a large body of evidence outside the intelligence literature. This 
evidence is available in the form of research studies published in peer reviewed academic 
journals.  However, it is important to note that not all evidence is equal; an anecdotal 
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impressions is less credible evidence than a randomized control trial.  Therefore, this 
research also takes into the quality of evidence by assessing each study’s research design.  
To supplement the systematic review, an experiment was conducted to evaluate 
two particular structured analytic techniques: ACH and Indicators or Signposts of 
Change (henceforth: Indicators). The Indicators technique requires analysts to list 
“observable events that one would expect to see if a postulated situation is developing” 
(U.S. Government 2009).  In practice this might mean analysts listing the indicators of an 
upcoming coup, for example (e.g. the presence of rioting, political assassinations). ACH 
differs from Indicators in that it includes Karl Popper’s idea that knowledge should 
advance through a process of conjectures and refutations, a process of “falsification.” The 
use of ACH is fairly straightforward: analysts start by creating a matrix and then insert 
evidence in the rows and hypotheses in the columns. Next, each piece of evidence is 
compared with each hypothesis to attempt to determine what Heuer refers to as 
“diagnosicity”—the extent to which each of piece of evidence is consistent (or 
inconsistent) with each hypothesis. In generating evidence, analysts are encouraged to 
try to disconfirm the hypotheses. Once the matrix is complete, hypotheses that can stand 
up against the evidence remain. It is in this falsification process that ACH differs from 
Indicators. However, an open question is the extent to which ACH helps analysts falsify, 
rather than confirm their own beliefs, a phenomena found in both the psychological 
(Wasson 1968) and intelligence studies literatures (Tolcott et al. 1989).   
The experiment was a forecasting simulation involving 21 foreign graduate 
intelligence studies students from the University of Pittsburgh randomized into two 
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experimental groups, ACH or Indicators group. Within each group were three analytic 
teams made up of 3-5 students.  The task of the simulation was a realistic intelligence 
analysis task: study participants were asked to provide a percentage of chemical weapons 
that would be removed and destroyed from Syria as per the United Nations Security 
Council resolution for that country to destroy its stockpiles. Along with their predictions, 
participants also provided a narrative so that rigor could be assessed, and completed a 
short cognitive reasoning style questionnaire.  To determine what extent structured 
analytic techniques improve over intuition, each group (the experts, students using ACH, 
and students using indicators) made intuitive judgments without using a structured 
analytic technique. However, after their initial intuitive judgment, student teams spent 
three hours analyzing the task using their assigned technique and made another set of 
analytic judgments.  
Research from diverse literatures, such as social psychology (Thompson and 
Wilson 2014) and forecasting (Armstrong 2006) suggests that face-to-face collaboration 
can lead to social conformity which can in turn reduce the quality of analysis. Therefore, 
it was expected that the hypotheses participants generate in aggregate before 
collaborating face-to-face, will be greater than after the number of hypotheses generated 
after face-to-face collaboration, regardless of the technique used. This study hypothesis 
is particularly important for ACH because the technique’s procedures call for analysts to 
collaborate and generate a full set of plausible hypotheses (Heuer and Pherson, 2011, p. 
32).  
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This experiment also addresses how cognitive reasoning style might interact with 
the use of the techniques.  Cognitive reasoning style is important in intelligence analysis 
because if an analyst has a more open style s/he is more willing to collect more disparate 
information and therefore likely to triangulate down to the correct answer in foreign 
affairs analysis (Tetlock 2005; Bar-Joseph and McDermott 2008). However, it is not clear 
to what extent, if at all cognitive reasoning style will interact with techniques on the rigor 
and accuracy of analysis.  
1.5  AT THE FRONTIER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ANALYSIS 
The analytic reform movement presents an opportunity to determine to what extent 
foreign affairs judgment can be improved.  Tetlock’s (2005) finding that expertise has 
clear limitations and a diminishing return on improving judgments of foreign affairs 
confirms what many in political psychology have long suspected: in the complex, chaotic 
international realm experts do little better than well-informed observers in making mid 
and long-term forecasts.  Compounding the problem, foreign affairs is an area of policy 
making where being wrong is costly in both blood and treasure.  Perhaps no other 
institution understands this fact as the world’s largest producer of foreign affairs analysis, 
the United States intelligence community.  
Fortunately, there are possibilities for improving foreign affairs analysis through 
structured analytic techniques. However, there are two important questions.  First, while 
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the techniques hold promise for improving the rigor and accuracy of analysis, anecdotal 
accounts suggest that analysts are wary of using them. The literature provides several 
reasons ranging from increasing time pressure to the availability of training.  Second, 
there are significant knowledge gaps in how the techniques should improve analysis.  
The next chapter synthesizes and reframes the literature on intelligence to set a 
testable standard for quality analysis and a theory of how the techniques might improve 
analysis. With the inquiry framed and structured, Chapter 3 outlines the multi-method 
research design to answer the research questions. The empirical chapters, Chapters 4, 5 
and 6, present results of this research. In the final chapter, the results from the empirical 
chapters are synthesized to develop a set of evidence-based principles for intelligence 
analysis. Additionally, the final chapter sets forth steps to implement the evidence-based 
principles to improve intelligence analysis in the IC.    
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2.0  CHAPTER 2: ASSESSING THE QUALITY OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS: A 
SYNTHESIS AND REFORMULATION  
 
The purpose of the analytic reform movement is to improve the quality of 
intelligence analysis (Immerman 2011, p. 180; Fingar 2008), although defining “quality” 
is  controversial and conceptually difficult (Marrin 2012). Section 2.1 examines the 
standard measure of intelligence and decision quality from the literature, the presence of 
cognitive biases. An examination of the cognitive biases literature suggests that while 
cognitive biases certainly exist in intelligence analysis—or any kind of information 
analysis for that matter--it is a narrow and  unreliable measure. In place of cognitive 
biases, a two componment measure of analytic quality is suggested. This framework for 
evaluating analytic quality takes into account the accuracy and whether analysis 
complies with a set of established rigor standards, including elements related to cognitive 
biases. Using accuracy and rigor as a standard, section 2.1 concludes with a discussion of 
how there is a dimishing returns on expertise. 
In Section 2.2  intelligence analysis is reframed as an “inexact science” (Rescher 
and Helmer 1959) that can be improved through structured analytic techniques which 
leverage expertise and make the analytic process explicit. Next, the section covers the 
theoretical justification for the techniques from Heuer and Pherson (2014) that claims 
structured analytic techniques lead to system 2 (slow thinking) that debias system 1 (fast 
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thinking). However, this account misinterprets a key finding in the psychological 
literature: system 2 can be susceptible to the same unconcious screening and 
manipulation of information as system 1 (Kahan et al. 2006, Kahan 2013).  
In section 2.3 a theory of how structured analytic techniques improve intelligence 
analysis is proposed based on a  theory of triangulation (Campbell and Fiske 1959; Webb, 
Campbell, Schwartz and Sechrest 1966; Denzin 1978; Cook 1985). Specifically, I argue that 
the techniques require analysts to engage in a set of broadening checks that widen the 
scope of the analysis. As the analysis widens, analysts are able to triangulate to make 
more accurate judgments.  It should be noted that while this theory is explanatory it is 
also normative in that it provides potential guidelines for how to improve intelligence 
analysis. In other words, it is a theory of a method.11The final section (2.3) of this chapter 
traces the intellectual history of structured analytic techniques and the eventual wide-
scale implementation of these techniques as a key feature of the analytic reform 
movement.  An important question about the success of the movement centers on the 
extent to which structured analytic techniques have been implemented.  The literature on 
knowledge utilization and intelligence studies is synthesized to identify several 
variables—training, time pressure, and the demographic shift in the IC. 
                                                 
11 A similar example would be game theory. In game theory certain assumptions are made and there is a 
desired goal or end state, to make or foresee another player’s utility maximizing decision. 
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2.1 WHAT IS ‘QUALITY’ INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND WHY IT’S SO HARD 
TO PRODUCE? 
The mission of the intelligence community (IC) is to generate intelligence analysis to 
guide decision makers. However, a critical question is what constitutes analytic quality.  
The common determinant of quality in the international relations and intelligence studies 
literature is whether cognitive biases were mitigated or reduced but follow-up research 
on cognitive biases casts some doubt on this as a reliable measure of intelligence quality. 
Most notably, researchers have been unable to replicate many biases, even in lab settings 
(Hammond 1996, pp-203-213).  
Instead, an alternative measure is a modified version of  Hammond’s (1996) two 
part measure that takes into account whether the analysis was sufficiently rigorous, such 
as the exploration of multiple hypotheses and verification of evidence, and also whether 
the analysis is empirically accurate.12  Applying this measure as a benchmark of analytic 
quality, a probe of the literature suggests that expert judgment provides diminishing 
benefits for reliably generating quality intelligence analysis. In other words, expertise 
matters but not as much as conventional wisdom would lead us to believe. Further 
complicating matters, the use of heuristics in expert judgment, the limitations of an 
                                                 
12 Assessment of empirical accuracy in foreign affairs tasks is undoubtedly difficult but possible. For a 
discussion of the challenges of evaluating empirical accuracy, see:  
Jay Ulfelder, “Jay Ulfelder on the Rigor-Relevance Tradeoff” The Good Judgment Project, May, 2014, 
available at: https://goodjudgmentproject.com/blog/?p=200 
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individual perspective (sometimes referred to as “mental models”), and the sheer 
complexity of international affairs appear to limit the effectiveness of expert judgment.  
2.1.1   Defining Intelligence Analysis Quality 
Each day the (IC) collects enough data to fill the Library of Congress—the largest 
repository of public knowledge in the U.S.—several times over (Aid 2013). This raw data 
is processed by approximately 20,000 government analysts plus a larger but unknown 
number of contractors funded by an estimated 75 billion dollar annual budget (Priest and 
Arkin, 2011).  Central to this process is intelligence analysis, which one of its founders 
called the “[application] of the instruments of reason” to inform national security decision 
making (Kent 1949). To conduct analysis, intelligence analysts apply their expertise and 
reasoning to a myriad of data sources classified under a bewildering array of acronyms, 
such as HUMINT (human intelligence), SIGINT (signals intelligence), OSINT (open 
source intelligence), to name a few (Krizan, 1999). The products of this massive system 
are intelligence reports, disseminated to decision makers in a variety of mediums 
including presentations, briefing papers, and memos. Garst (1989, pp. 5-7) identifies six 
types of intelligence products including research, current, estimative, operational, 
scientific/technical, and warning. These products differ greatly in their purpose with 
some focusing on future or potential events (e.g. estimate and warning), while others can 
focus on short or near-term events (current).  
However, the intelligence analysis process does not always produce “quality” 
intelligence analysis and in fact, even a cursory reading of the literature provides a long 
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list of cases from Pearl Harbor (Wohlstetter, 1962) to the Iraq War (Jervis 2006) where 
intelligence analysis errors—at least in part—led to foreign policy disasters. In analyzing 
these events, intelligence studies and foreign affairs scholars have retrospectively judged 
failure in terms of cognitive biases and errors of reasoning. For example, Jervis (2006) 
concluded the IC failed to question its assumptions about Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction program and did not give due diligence, to invoke the famous Sherlock 
Holmes case, to the “dogs that did not bark.” In other words, Jervis claims the IC fell prey 
to confirmation bias, the error of seeking to confirm rather than disconfirm one’s beliefs.  
Jervis’ and other scholars work on cognitive biases are based on Nobel Prize 
winning research by cognitive psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. 
Kahneman and Tversky used lab experiments to show that subjects do not think 
according to the tenets of rationality—extensive information search and proper 
weighting of utility functions. Instead they used mental shortcuts called “heuristics,” and 
in the process, violated rules of probability theory or formal logic. These violations of 
probability theory and formal logic are called cognitive biases. In the 1970s, this research 
was imported to intelligence analysis (Heuer 1999) and international relations (Jervis 
1976) as a basis for evaluating foreign affairs decision making and intelligence analysis. 
However, in the 1980s, long after Kahneman and Tversky’s cognitive bias framework had 
migrated to the international relations and intelligence literatures, other cognitive 
psychologists began questioning the internal and external validity of their findings, 
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criticisms that are rarely discussed in international relations or intelligence literatures to 
this day. 13   
In the 1980s, after the cognitive biases literature had been imported into 
international relations and intelligence studies, psychologists found that if they slightly 
tweaked experimental conditions many of the cognitive biases would disappear. For 
example, Nisbett (1980) instructed test subjects in basic probability theory and found that 
so-called innate errors of human reasoning melted away. Also, other researchers have 
questioned whether the abstract reasoning tasks that Kahneman and Tversky employed 
to ‘expose’ cognitive biases are generalizable to applied settings such as high-level 
political decision making (Suedfeld and Tetlock 1992) and intelligence analysis (Moore 
and Hoffman n.d.).  Tversky’s and Kahneman (1982) study of representative bias speaks 
to the abstract nature of many of the tasks—in the experiment they asked subjects to: 
“consider the letter R, Is R more likely to appear in the first position of a word or the third 
position of a word?”  To date Kahneman has not addressed these criticisms. This follow-
up research does imply that cognitive biases do not exist—it is undeniably true that 
humans are boundedly rational and make errors in judgment (Simon 1972). Rather, the 
problem is whether using cognitive biases as a psychometric measure based on 
probability theory and formal logic as a benchmark is a reliable measures of analytic 
performance.  
                                                 
13 For an extensive discussion of the methodological foundation of the cognitive biases research, see 
Hammond (1996) pp-203-213. 
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An alternative approach is to examine whether analytic judgments confirm to the 
established rules and norms of analysts and whether they are empirically accurate. Zelik, 
et al. (2010) explored what counts as the norm for quality intelligence analysis by 
surveying and observing analysts and developed a multi-attribute scale of depth 
covering eight attributes, which, when combined, reveal a composite assessment of 
analytic rigor derived from practitioners (see Table 2.1, below).  For example, a key issue 
for attaining analytic depth is the exploration of alternative hypotheses, which subsumes 
elements of the cognitive bias, confirmation bias. Other depth attributes include the 
validation and extent to which diverse information sources were sought out, among five 
other depth attributes.   
 
Table 2.1: Truncated and Reproduced Rigor Attributes from Zelik et. al. (2010) 
 
Rigor Attribute Indicators of Rigor 
‘Shallow’ ‘In Depth’ 
Hypothesis 
Exploration 
Little or no consideration of 
alternatives 
Significant generation and 
consideration of alternative 
explanations 
Information 
Search 
Failure to go beyond routine 
and available data sources 
Collection from multiple data 
types 
Information 
Validation 
General acceptance of 
information at face value, no 
clear establishment of 
underlying veracity 
Systematic and explicit processes 
employed to verify information 
Stance Analysis Little consideration of the 
views and motivations of 
source data authors 
Perspectives and motivations of 
other authors/sources are 
considered 
Information 
Synthesis 
Little insight with regard to 
how analysis relates to the 
broader context or to more 
long-term concerns 
Extracted and integrated 
information in terms of 
relationships rather than 
components and with a thorough 
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consideration of diverse 
interpretations of relevant data. 
 
A more difficult issue is defining what counts as “sufficient” analytic rigor. Due to 
the sheer diversity of tasks analysts undertake, to recommend high rigor in all attributes 
across all is setting the bar unrealistically high (Zelik et al. 2007). Consider an analyst 
working alone on current reporting, an analytic task with short turnaround (less than a 
day): is it realistic for this analyst to achieve high depth across the eight attributes? Most 
likely not.   To make sense of what counts as sufficient rigor, we can factor in the 
characteristics of the analytic task. Greitzer (2004) and Scholtz and Hewett (2004) 
surveyed analysts to provide analytic task characteristics, with two important for 
determining sufficient depth: complexity/breadth of topic and available time. Relying on 
these characteristics it is possible to determine a “rule of thumb” for sufficient rigor. For 
example, a complex task with a project length of several months, such as a long-term 
strategic forecast, would require rigorous analysis across the eight attributes to be 
considered sufficiently rigorous.  
In addition to rigor standards, analytic quality can be evaluated by determining if 
an analyst ‘got it right.’ This measure is referred to as empirical accuracy because it is the 
extent to which an analyst’s judgments correspond with event in the observable world 
(Tetlock 2005; Hammond 1996).  For example, if an analyst concluded the Soviet Union 
would fall in the late 20th century, and foresaw the Arab Spring he would score high on 
the correspondence measure. To date, the largest application of the empirical accuracy 
standard was Tetlock’s (2005) study in which he asked more than 200 foreign affairs 
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experts to make thousands of judgments over several years. In intelligence studies 
literature similar attempts have been made, albeit on a smaller scale. Feder (1995) 
reported a similar study when he disclosed the results of a forecasting model used at the 
CIA called Policon which was reportedly twice as accurate as a team of CIA analysts in 
forecasts of political instability.   In addition to this work, other researchers have assessed 
correspondence by abstracting historical events to hide key details. For example, Folker 
(2000) provided abstracted vignettes of real events, such as the Allied invasion of Nazi 
Europe during World War II, to test how analysts utilizing an analytic methodology fared 
against those who did not. 
 
2.1.2   The Diminishing Returns of Expert Judgment 
The traditional approach to intelligence analysis, expert judgment, is based on the 
intuitive judgments of analysts, often working alone, in a variety of regional and 
functional areas (Johnston 2005). In its purest form, this mode of analysis relies on 
intuitive reasoning on the basis of expertise (Marrin 2012; Khalsa 2009). In addition, the 
traditional form of analysis is also understood to be a solitary activity, with most 
collaboration occurring after or at the end of the analytic process, rather than 
throughout.14 The solitary nature of expert judgment can be problematic because a single 
perspective is unlikely to subsume enough important information to conduct in depth 
                                                 
14 Personal communication with Richards Heuer Jr. (August, 2014) 
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analysis of complex issues (Churchman 1971). This threat is discussed in the intelligence 
literature through the concept of mental models, “the distillation of the intelligence 
analyst's cumulative factual and conceptual knowledge into a framework for making 
estimative judgments on a complex subject” (Davis 1992).  Depending on the mental 
model of the analyst he or she will filter information differently, potentially excluding 
key information, such as hypotheses or pieces of information.  Muller (2007) explores this 
concept through political affiliation and points out conservative and liberal analysts are 
likely to filter information differently because each has a different mental model, giving 
each side an incomplete picture of international threats.  
Nowhere else has the limitations of expert political judgment been more apparent 
than in empirical accuracy.  In one study conducted by the Economist, finance ministers, 
chairmen of multinational corporations, Oxford University economics students and a 
control group of London garbage collectors, were asked to make economic predictions 
from 1984 to 1994. While the number of respondents was low, just a dozen or so, the final 
results were shocking:  the groups were very similar, and surprisingly, the garbage 
collectors were tied with the corporate chairmen. Tetlock’s (2005) study replicated the 
Economist’s experiment on a much larger scale with 200 experts and found that expertise 
matters, but only to a point. Interestingly, the experts easily beat out undergraduates but 
Tetlock found “highly educated and experienced experts…were not superior to 
untrained readers of newspapers in their ability to make accurate long-term forecasts of 
political events” (Kahneman and Klein 2009, p. 520). This result suggests there is a 
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diminishing returns on foreign affairs expertise; being an expert on a region or topic may 
improve accuracy over novices but not well-informed observers.  
Two factors explain why expertise can only take us so far: the complexity of 
forecasting in international affairs and the lack of opportunities to learn (Kahneman and 
Klein 2009). Across disciplines, researchers have long understood that tasks where 
professionals make judgments involving human behavior, empirical accuracy is lower. 
Professionals in these areas include probation officers, counselors, intelligence analysts, 
and many more professions. Shanteau (1992, 1987) noted this distinction by 
differentiating between professionals who judge ‘things’ rather than people, such as the 
rotations of the moon or the change in the tides. Underlying the difference between these 
two types of professions are signposts in the environment that guide decision makers to 
form their judgments.  These can take many forms ranging from cumulus clouds 
signaling an incoming thunderstorm or rioting as a sign of regime collapse.  Common to 
all such signposts is that each gives decision makers a sense of what is or will happen in 
the judgment task: the warm front indicates to the weathercaster rain could be coming; 
reports of civil disorder indicate to the intelligence analyst regime change could be 
coming.  However, not all signposts are created equal; some are more reliable and linear 
than others. This point that has been explored extensively by researchers using 
Brunswik’s (1952) lens model, a theoretical framework that models and measures how 
judges use indicators, informational cues in the environment. Karelaia and Hogarth 
(2008, pp. 415 and 420) summed up a sizable chunk of lens model research in a meta-
analysis of 249 studies and found, not surprisingly, that accuracy is lower when 
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indicators are less reliable and nonlinear. This suggests that in certain intelligence tasks, 
such as determining the intentions of a terror group, where there are few reliable and 
linear cues, accuracy is likely to be low.   
In addition to the casual complexities of intelligence analysis, there are also few 
opportunities for analysts to receive feedback. This point is important because decades 
of cognitive psychology research suggest that tasks with more opportunities for feedback 
will enable practitioners to be more accurate (Kahneman and Klein, 2009). For example, 
Chase and Simon (1973) studied chess players and found that chess masters leverage 
10,000 hours of practice to develop increasingly more accurate judgments, a point 
popularized in Malcolm Gladwell’s Blink (2005).  The underlying factor driving the 
relationship between feedback and accuracy is that a practitioner can learn from their 
mistakes and re-calibrate for the next judgment.15  However, in intelligence analysis there 
are usually few opportunities to get feedback because as Tetlock and Mellers (2009) note, 
while “there are repeated opportunities for learning how to direct Predator-drone 
attacks” there are not many opportunities for “predicting the outcome of the quirky third-
generation dynastic succession in North Korea.” Therefore recommendations to give 
analysts feedback on their judgments might be feasible in some intelligence tasks but less 
so in others (Rieber 2004).   
                                                 
15 Beyond issues of intelligence and foreign affairs judgments, failure and feedback are instrumental in 
engineering and the design sciences. Petroski (2008) argues that in order to improve performance, 
designers should look to past failures rather than successes. For an extended discussion with examples, 
see: Petroski, Henry. Success through failure: The paradox of design. Princeton University Press, 2006. 
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Post-mortems of the most recent intelligence failures related to September 11th and 
the Iraq weapons of mass destruction assessments suggest that, among other factors, the 
traditional approach to analysis based on expert judgment might have contributed to 
these disasters (Finger 2008; Laipson 2005). This traditional approach is certainly not 
always the “wrong” way to conduct analysis (especially depending on the type of 
analytic task), but the literature suggests that while definitive conclusions are not 
possible, there is a need for new thinking about how to improve the quality of intelligence 
analysis.   
2.2  REFRAMING INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AS AN “INEXACT SCIENCE” 
One way to improve intelligence analysis is to re-conceptualize it as “inexact science” 
(Rescher and Helmer 1959) that uses special methodologies called structured analytic 
techniques.  These methodologies could improve analysis by leveraging and structuring 
analysts’ expertise. However, the literature provides few clues as to overall causal 
mechanisms that might lead to an improvement in analytic quality from the techniques. 
One explanation is Heuer and Pherson’s (2014) claim that structured analytic techniques 
lead to system 2 (slow thinking) that debias system 1 (fast thinking). However, this 
argument is based on the incorrect assumption that biases cannot occur in system 2. In 
fact, research shows that the same kind of screening and distorting of evidence 
subconsciously in system 1 occurs in system 2 (Kahan et al. 2006, pp. 1093-1094).   In other 
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words, both heuristic reasoning in system 1 and reflective reasoning in system 2 can 
contain biased thinking.  An alternative theory is the theory of triangulation (Campbell 
and Fiske 1959; Webb, Campbell, Schwartz and Sechrest 1966; Denzin 1978; Cook 1985) 
that states that analysts using techniques will perform broadening checks to consider 
more perspectives, evidence, and hypotheses. Combining this information, analysts 
should be able to triangulate to make more accurate judgments.   
 
2.2.1  Intelligence Analysis as an “Inexact Science” 
Given the limitations of analysis relying mostly on expertise, intelligence analysis 
scholars and practitioners have explored the idea of shifting intelligence analysis from an 
expertise-based “art” to a structured, systematic “science” (Marrin 2012).  However, 
many intelligence scholars and practitioners’ (Khalsa 2009; Kerbal 2008; Marrin 2007) 
reject a binary distinction between “art” and “science,” and instead conclude that 
intelligence analysis ought to be a mixture of both, as both systematic inquiry and 
expertise are necessary (Kerbel 2008). Unfortunately the intelligence literature provides 
little guidance on what the mix of “art” and “science” should look like in intelligence 
analysis. At this point, the literature seems to have hit a dead-end, unable to provide 
further explanation of how intelligence analysis is both art and science. Fortunately, the 
philosophy literature provides a useful conceptual framework.  
An alternative framing of intelligence analysis is to define it as an “inexact 
science.” In their seminal article, “The Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences” Rescher and 
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Helmer (1959) argue there are two broad types of science, the ‘inexact’ type of applied 
disciplines and ‘exact’ type limited to highly abstract fields (Shanteau’s distinction 
between judging static “things” and people comes to mind).  In the exact sciences the 
reasoning process is formalized takes place by formal logico-mathematical derivation of 
the hypothesis from the evidence.16 Consequently, Rescher and Helmer conclude there 
are few truly exact sciences, such as physics and mathematics.  
The social sciences are inexact due to their reliance on a less formalized reasoning 
process and looseness of its predictions. Readers might notice that some areas of social 
science also include formalization. However, there is considerable debate as to whether 
highly formalized work (e.g. rational choice and game theory) has been used to the same 
effect in the social science as it has been in the exact sciences (Walt 1999). In other words, 
the inexact sciences can mimic the exact sciences by formalizing the reasoning process, 
but it is unclear if this improves predictive power.  For example, a political scientist may 
use rational choice theory and statistical modeling to forecast an election, but his forecasts 
are likely more probabilistic than the astronomer estimating the orbit of a distant moon.  
According to Helmer and Rescher, an added distinction of the inexact sciences is 
that expertise can play an important role. Such a pronouncement on the value of expertise 
might seem odd given Tetlock’s (2005) finding that there is diminishing returns in 
                                                 
16 Even in the cases of these so-called exact sciences, and as Rescher and Helmer note, there is likely a 
disconnect between how scientists do their work (called “logic-in-use”) versus how philosophers of science 
and others characterize the work of these scientists (called “reconstructed logic”). For an extended 
discussion of these logics see: Kaplan, Abraham. The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science. 
Chandler Publishing Company, 1964. 
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expertise. However, Rescher and Helmer’s argument still holds water because they argue 
that expertise, if structured and extracted carefully from experts, can make up for a major 
problem in the inexact sciences: the lack of stable and generalizable theory. According to 
Rescher and Helmer, theories in the inexact sciences are “quasi-laws” because they only 
apply to a particular time and place. For example, structural realism may explain well 
interstate conflict in the Western world from the 19th to the end of the 20th century well, 
but have less predictive power to understand conflict in prehistoric societies.  Experts 
hold these quasi-laws as unarticulated background knowledge that can assist in specific 
contexts, but the problem is that this knowledge must be reliably extracted in a structured 
manner. For this reason, Helmer and Rescher conclude an important task for the inexact 
sciences is the development of special methods to leverage expertise, and potentially 
push the boundaries of the inexact sciences.  
While never invoking Helmer and Rescher, a small group of intelligence analysis 
reformers have sought to implement special methods to structure analysis. Beginning in 
the early 1970s early intelligence reformers, such as Richards Heuer and Jack Davis began 
the hard work of introducing methodologies they termed “alternative analysis” designed 
to structure analysis and leverage expertise, just as Rescher and Helmer had suggested 
decades earlier. This new approach differed from the expert judgment approach in that 
it sought to make analysis more transparent, and hopefully, more accurate. To 
accomplish this task, alternative analysis drew techniques from other “inexact sciences”, 
such as operations research and policy analysis. After the Intelligence Reform Act (2004) 
in which alternative analysis was specifically cited, intelligence instructor and researcher 
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Randy Pherson suggested the switch to “structured analytic techniques” as a way to get 
around the “alternative” terminology, which implied that analysts should use the 
techniques an alternative to traditional analysis.  
More than 40 years after Davis and Heuer introduced the techniques to the IC, 
they have proliferated widely, if not thinly, with more than 150 techniques in use  in the 
IC (Johnston 2005). However, in 2009 the IC published a primer of  12 “core” structured 
analytic techniques categorized into the three types of diagnostic, contrarian and 
imaginative.    
 
Table 2.2: Structured Analytic Techniques 
 
 Diagnostic Key Assumptions Check 
Quality of Information Check 
Indicators of Signpost/Change 
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses 
Contrarian Devil’s Advocacy 
Team A/Team B 
High-Impact/Low-Probability 
Analysis 
”What If?” Analysis 
Imaginative  Brainstorming 
Outside-In Thinking 
Red Team Analysis 
Alternative Futures Analysis 
 
The purpose of diagnostic techniques is to assess underlying assumptions, 
information, or hypotheses in an analytic argument. When performing diagnostic 
analysis, analysts should uncover weak components of their arguments. Diagnostic 
techniques were introduced as a way to move beyond analytic “fortune telling,” the 
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disparaging term for uncritical analysis based on unexamined assumptions and beliefs 
(MacEachin 1994). The techniques address assumptions by forcing analysts to consider 
the foundations of their arguments by writing and/or comparing pieces of evidence, 
assumptions, and hypotheses. For example, the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses 
(ACH), discussed in more detail below, assists analysts in disconfirming their favored 
hypothesis.  
While diagnostic techniques assess the strength of arguments by examining the 
underlying structure, contrarian techniques force analysts to break arguments down by 
comparing competing arguments.  For example, in Devil’s Advocacy a designated 
individual argues against the conventional wisdom of a group. The potential benefits of 
contrarian techniques are twofold. First, challenging arguments and beliefs may 
encourage analysts to focus on weak areas to improve or clarify, similar to the diagnostic 
techniques. Second, contrarian techniques can be useful to “weed out” weak arguments.  
In imaginative techniques, analysts are encouraged to consider new perspectives, 
futures, and ideas. Unlike diagnostic or contrarian techniques that attempt to converge 
on a more accurate answer, imaginative techniques generate several possible answers. In 
red team analysis, for example, analysts try to put themselves in the mind of an 
adversary.  Considering how a dictator or terrorist plotter is thinking brings new 
perspectives to the table and can inform analysis. The purpose of imaginative techniques, 
such as Alternative Futures Analysis, is not to predict the future but provide the decision 
maker with multiple plausible scenarios, which can hopefully, lead decision makers to 
prepare for multiple futures. For example, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) use 
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the technique to produce the Global Trends reports which extrapolate key drivers, such as 
demographics, technology,  and political issues, to guide strategic-level decision making.  
 
2.2.2   A Justification for Structured Analytic Techniques: System 1 and 2 Thinking 
While each of the techniques should improve the rigor and accuracy of analysis, the 
current justification for structured analytic techniques provided by Heuer and Pherson 
(2014) does not provide a coherent justification. Heuer and Pherson (2014) base their 
justification of structured analytic techniques on dual process theory from cognitive 
psychology. This theory suggests that cognition uses two systems: system 1 and system 
2 (Kahneman 2011). System 1 covers the intuitive processing and as such it is extremely 
fast and unconscious, extracting information from easily accessible information stores 
containing knowledge. A common example of system 1 thinking is the intuitive reasoning 
used by a morning commuter; the commuter intuitively takes the same route to work 
each day. System 2 covers more slow and deliberative conscious thinking, such as that 
required to solve a difficult math problem. Heuer and Pherson argue that the problem of 
cognitive biases lies in system 1 because they argue that “system 1 is usually correct” but 
that all biases are the result of fast thinking (P. 4).  Therefore, the answer lies in the usage 
of system 2. According to Heuer and Pherson: “structured analytic techniques are a type 
of system 2 reasoning designed to help identify and overcome the analytic biases inherent 
in system 1 thinking” (p.5). In short, using structured analytic techniques should 
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engender slow analytic thinking that should cause analysts to make fewer errors of 
reasoning or cognitive biases.  
However, the distinction between system 1 and system 2 for debiasing might not 
be as clear as is commonly believed.  Research suggests that the same kind of screening 
and distorting of evidence subconsciously in system 1 also occurs in system 2 (Kahan et 
al. 2006, pp. 1093-1094).  In fact, a concept known as “defense motivation” can lead to 
subconscious screening of evidence and information that threatens one beliefs in both 
system 1 and system 2.  As Kahan et al. state, “in effect, defense motivation biases 
individuals’ use of System II reasoning, causing them to use deliberate, calculating, and 
methodical analysis to support beliefs dominant within their group and to debunk 
challenges to those beliefs” (p. 1094).  As a result analysts can use techniques to trigger 
reflective system 2 thinking, but there is reason to believe that this type of thinking will 
consistently debias. 
A related problem for using the system 1 and 2 distinction is that structured 
analytic techniques use both systems, with some techniques relying more heavily on one 
than the other (Martin et al., 2011).  For example, some techniques rely on extremely 
formalized rule based processes that require system 2, such as ACH, among others.  These 
are the techniques Heuer and Pherson seemed to have in mind when they make the claim 
about system 2 thinking debiasing. However, many structured analytic techniques “are 
not calculative in nature [and] instead rely on mental simulation [and] past experience” 
(Martin et al., 2011, p. 33), thus relying on system 1. Examples of these techniques include 
many imaginative and contrarian techniques—all of which are in Heuer and Pherson’s 
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book (2010; 2014)—such as Red Teaming, Devil’s Advocacy, Team A/Team B, to name a 
few.  Given that both systems are equally susceptible to biases and the techniques draw 
from both, the distinction between system 1 and 2 is not useful for explaining why the 
techniques improve analysis. To explain how intelligence analysis is improvable as an 
inexact science, a new theory is needed.  
 
2.2.3   A New Theory of Structured Analytic Techniques 
As discussed above, measuring the quality of analysis has two components: 1) it is 
sufficiently rigorous and 2) accurate. Analysis can be said to be rigorous when it is in-
depth. Rigor is measured by attributes identified by Miller, et al. (2006) and  Zelik, et al. 
(2007), such as the extent to which the analyst focused on a favored “pet hypothesis,” 
questioned the reliability of sources, among others. Analysis is also high quality when it 
is accurate, that is, when there is a high degree of correspondence between the analytic 
judgment and what happened in the external world (Tetlock, 2005, p. 10; Hammond 
1996).  Or in other words, the extent to which an analyst “gets it right.” An important 
prerequisite for effective use of structured analytic techniques is that analysts avoid 
premature cognitive closure. Cognitive closure is defined as the stopping rule at which 
an analyst will no longer consider new pieces of evidence, hypotheses, and so on (Wastell 
et al. 2014; Kruglanski 2004). 17    If analysts reach closure early in the analytic process then 
                                                 
17 A major question is determining at what point an analyst can stop searching for new hypotheses and 
evidence. Dunn (1997)  addressed this problem by defining a stop rule or limit to rival hypotheses as a 
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the techniques will not have the intended effect of broadening the analysis.  Along with 
this important precondition this causal theory includes two propositions:   
Proposition 1: Structured analytic techniques increase the rigor of analysis through ‘broadening 
checks’ 
Each structured analytic technique is designed to encourage analysts to engage in 
broadening checks, actions in the analytic process that "slow the production of [an] 
analytic product and make explicit the sacrifice of efficiency in pursuit of accuracy" (Zelik 
et al.). Such checks might include checking for multiple alternative hypotheses or 
validating information. Regardless of the check, each adds new information, increasing 
the scope and complexity of the analysis. The result of more broadening checks is 
potentially more rigorous analysis.  
Each technique has strengths in different broaden checks so while some techniques 
might be more useful for considering novel perspectives, such as Red Teaming, others 
are more useful for testing hypotheses, such as ACH. According to Heuer and Pherson 
(2010, p. 34) “each technique may provide only one piece of a complex puzzle…multiple 
techniques can be used to check the accuracy and increase confidence in the analytic 
conclusion.” Underlying this statement is the main assumption of multi-method inquiry: 
because each technique has its own strengths and weaknesses, analysts should select 
techniques with non-overlapping strengths (Diesing 1991, p. 90; Kaplan 1964). For 
                                                 
means to avoid premature closure as well as unlimited openness. For more information, see: Dunn, 
William N. "Pragmatic eliminative induction: proximal range and context validation in applied social 
experimentation." PHILOSOPHICA-GENT- (1997): 75-112. 
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example, an analyst might use an imaginative technique, such as Brainstorming to gain 
convergent hypotheses and a hypothesis testing technique, such as ACH to whittle down 
the possibilities.  
 
Proposition 2: The more broadening checks in the analysis, the more that the triangulation of 
judgments can occur, thus producing a more accurate judgment 
The theory of triangulation states that in inexact sciences like intelligence analysis, 
inferences will be more valid—that is, more accurate— if investigators triangulate among 
multiple data sources, perspectives, rival hypotheses, and hypotheses(Campbell and 
Fiske 1959; Webb, Campbell, Schwartz and Sechrest 1966; Denzin 1978; Cook 1985).  In 
order words, the more broad and diverse the analysis, the more likely the inferences 
drawn from it will be accurate.  
The first writings on triangulation come from Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) 
discussion of measurement. Since there is not a 1:1 correspondence between a construct 
and measure, it is difficult to accurately measure with a single measurement. For 
example, measuring a complex construct like “terrorism” would require not only 
measuring the number of attacks and deaths, but also financial impact and psychological 
impact on the target audience.  Underlying Campbell and Fiske’s idea is the assumption 
of geodesic survey methods; if trying to find a particular point or position on a map, the 
surveyor relies on multiple bearing points to get a closer approximation of where the 
target point lies. (Dunn 2012, p. 16).  In triangulation theory, the multiple points are not 
GPS coordinates, but bits of information; each new convergent or divergent piece of 
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information helps the analyst “zero-in” on the empirical reality. Two examples, multiple 
perspectives and hypotheses illustrate this point.  
“One might recognize” write Heuer and Pherson (2010) that “accuracy is best 
achieved through collaboration among analysts who bring diverse viewpoints to the 
table” using the techniques (p. 6).   Triangulation among multiple diverse perspectives 
echoes this statement as each perspective yields insights are not attainable with the others 
(Allison 1971; George 1975; Linstone 1989) and then combining each to determine where 
assumptions and arguments converge. Francis Galton provided the first empirical 
demonstration of triangulation of multiple perspectives while recording participants’ 
guesses of how much an ox weighed at a county fair. Galton aggregated the guesses and 
found that each successive estimate converged towards the true weight of the ox.  
Triangulation was driving this outcome: some guesses (“perspectives”) were higher, 
others lower, but the aggregate of guesses, the “wisdom of the crowd” converged on the 
true weight of the ox (Surowiecki 2004).   
In addition to perspectives, structured analytic techniques allow analysts to test 
and triangulate multiple hypotheses. Chamberlin (1890, p. 756) noted that researchers 
must find a way to temper their “intellectual affections” by the testing of multiple rival 
hypotheses, plausible explanations for the data. While other researchers had addressed 
the need to test multiple rival hypotheses in the more exact sciences, such as geology 
(Chamberlin 1890; 1964), physics (Platt 1964), and the sciences, generally (Popper 1959), 
hypothesis testing in the applied, inexact sciences, such as intelligence analysis, is more 
troublesome due to little experimental control (Kerlinger and Lee 2000, p. 567). For 
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example, an investigator in a laboratory setting running mice through a maze, through 
careful research design, can immediately rule out many conditions that could explain the 
observed outcome, such as selecting (nearly) identical mice (e.g. age, sex, size, etc.).  
However, investigators in the inexact sciences lack the ability to control, a problem that 
Donald T. Campbell and Julian Stanley (1963) addressed using multiple rival hypotheses 
in another inexact science, policy analysis and evaluation. They argued that when 
studying complex phenomena where experimental control is low, investigators must take 
measures to account for external and internal validity.  Within each type of validity are 
threats, which stand as potential rival hypotheses or explanations for the data.  For 
example, an analyst might focus only a narrow set of cases of revolution that bias the 
analysis. This threat is called “selection” and occurs when systematic conditions in the 
case (or respondent) cause the observed effect.   
This theory of structured analytic techniques based provides an alternative to 
Heuer and Pherson’s explanation.  However, it also explains why the techniques might 
be difficult to implement: each additional technique, perspective, or hypothesis entails 
greater costs in time and resources (Cook 1985). In some areas of the IC, such as the 
National Intelligence Council, some techniques have been implemented. However, it is 
still unclear to what extent the techniques are being implemented and what variables 
affect their use.  
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2.3 IMPLEMENTING STRUCTURED ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES IN THE IC 
Since the 1970s, the IC has sought to implement structured analytic techniques, although 
under different terminology (e.g. alternative analysis). Large-scale implementation has 
been unsuccessful but with each decade more emphasis has been placed on training 
analysts in the techniques.  What is unclear is how certain factors might now be affecting 
the use of structured analytic techniques. Several potential barriers exist, such as the 
mixed quality of training analysts receive and perceived time investment of using the 
techniques. At the same time, another factor might be assisting in implementation: the 
demographic factor. As more Baby Boomers retire, more young analysts might be more 
willing to use the techniques.  
 
2.3.1   The Answer is in the Head, not the Numbers 
The implementation of structured analytic techniques can be traced to a CIA internal 
memo to explore how quantitative methods developed in academia during the 1960s 
could be applied to intelligence analysis. The result of this probe led to a volume, 
Quantitative Approaches to Intelligence Analysis (1978), edited by Richards Heuer. In the 
introduction Heuer (p.9) states that the quantitative methods in academia focus on  “the 
kinds of problems that can be quantified” and therefore quantitative methods place a 
“rather severe and intractable limits on its applicability to the needs of government 
agencies concerned with foreign affairs, since most of the variables of interest simply 
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cannot be quantified.” O’Leary et al. (1974) conducted a similar probe to Heuer to 
determine the usefulness of quantitative methods for foreign affairs analysis. The authors 
were granted access to 545 documents from the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence 
Research classified at “secret” or below and found after coding each of these documents 
for type of data used, such as categorical and continuous, the authors found that less than 
twenty percent contained quantitative data. As with Heuer, the investigators came to the 
same conclusion: quantitative methods, such as regression analysis, play a limited role in 
intelligence analysis. It was with this less than sanguine view that Heuer presented the 
results of the CIA study at the 1977 International Studies Association convention. After 
his presentation, Heuer was approached by Zvi Lanir, a senior officer in Israeli military 
intelligence. Similar to Heuer, he too was studying the role of quantitative methodologies 
for improving intelligence analysis, but Lanir was closely following the scholarship of 
Israeli-American scholars Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Lanir suggested “the 
answer is in the head, not the numbers,” that is, to improve analysis the IC should focus 
on understanding psychological factors (Heuer, 2009). After this chance encounter, Heuer 
began studying the then-blossoming fields of behavioral economics and cognitive 
psychology research and formed the cognitive biases framework.  
A few years after his chance encounter with Lanir, Heuer developed ACH in the 
mid-1980s while teaching courses on counterintelligence. In the course Heuer asked his 
analysts if they had considered adversary deception and each time analysts would reply 
they saw no signs of deception. The problem, as Heuer pointed out to his analysts, was 
that they must focus on what is not readily apparent, because by definition deception 
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should not present tell-tale signs.  (Heuer 2009).  Given this problem, Heuer created ACH 
to encourage analysts to think about rival hypotheses, especially the deception 
hypothesis. Soon after teaching the technique in his counterintelligence courses, Heuer 
realized the technique was applicable to other forms of analysis. Today, ACH is probably 
the most utilized structured analytic technique and has seen many modifications (Pool 
2010, p. 19). For example, Stech and Elsaesser (2005) automated ACH with Bayesian logic. 
Others have made broader refinements, such as Wheaton and Chido (2006) who created 
structured ACH, which allows analysts to simplify technique.  
During the 1980s initial interest and use of structured analytic techniques 
remained low, although leadership by Robert Gates, the CIA Deputy Director of 
Intelligence from 1986-1989, brought greater attention to the analytic process, which in 
turn kept structured analytic techniques alive in the form of training materials. From his 
inaugural speech as DDI, Gates sought to make clear that he would not accept weak 
argumentation that did not differentiate between analysts’ opinion and fact. In addition, 
Gates sought to bring in multiple perspectives to the intelligence process by bringing in 
outside academics and other non-CIA specialists (Davis 1999). However, Gates greatest 
impact on the analytic process was creating a stringent review process that increased the 
standard of evidence in analysis (Davis 1999) 
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2.3.2   New Era, New Analysis 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union dramatically affected intelligence analysis, 
particularly the types of problems that analysts grappled with. Treverton (2009) argues 
the breakdown of the 2-bloc international system changed the composition of intelligence 
analysis problems from simpler “puzzles” to harder “mysteries.” While puzzles can be 
solved with more information, mysteries are difficult to solve even with information 
saturation. For example, a puzzle is how many nuclear weapons does North Korea have, 
but a mystery is what Kim Jung Un’s intentions are.  As a result of a shift in problem 
types, the role of the quantitative methodologies Heuer examined in his 1978 lessened. 
One CIA analyst interviewed for this research who began his career in the 1980s 
corroborates this point: while he initially used mainly quantitative methods his work in 
the 1990s onward shifted to semi-quantitative and collaborative methods.18  
As security threats changed from more puzzles to mysteries, the analytic process 
itself was transformed by shifting policy maker demands and advances in data collection. 
The speed at which analysis was conducted quickened during the 1990s as intelligence 
analysis went from more general analyses to being tailored for specific decision makers. 
For example, Davis (1997, p. v) notes the long analytic papers focused on the worldwide 
Soviet threat that were standard in the 1970s and 1980s gave way to a “combination of 
briefings and short but insightful written and multimedia products covering a broad 
                                                 
18 Interview with a CIA methodologist, June, 2014.  
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range of regional and transnational issues.” Second, new digital collection systems in the 
1990s increased the volume of data so that the IC is now capable of collecting it on the 
scale described in the introduction of this chapter. The result is an IC under data 
“overload” at an ever increasing pace (Fishbein and Treverton 2004).  
Against the background of changing international threats, a quicker intelligence 
cycle, and data overload, the IC suffered from several intelligence failures that 
engendered greater scrutiny of how the IC conducted analysis, and ultimately led to 
greater implementation of structured analytic techniques (or as it was known at the time, 
alternative analysis). One such failure was the IC’s inability to foresee the 1990 Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. According to Davis (2002) the central problem was analysts and 
policy makers held tightly to the assumption Iraq was still recovering from its bloody 
war with Iran, and that not challenging this belief led to shallow analysis, and ultimately, 
an inaccurate judgment. Concerned by this failure, Deputy Director of Intelligence 
Douglas MacEachin personally reviewed a large number of the CIA’s analytic products 
and found 1/3 had no discernable argument (Davis 1999, p. xviii). Echoing Heuer’s 
arguments in the 1970s and 1980s, MacEachin concluded the mind held unchallenged 
assumptions, that if not identified could lead to error.  
To address the problem of implicit assumptions, MacEachin developed linchpin 
analysis, a diagnostic technique for checking assumptions. Since social science 
vocabulary was not favored among analysts, MacEachin gave alternative terms to the 
technique’s components: hypotheses were termed “linchpins” and assumptions 
“drivers.” The technique worked by analysts listing all underlying drivers and linchpins 
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on a piece of paper. Then the analyst could conduct a form of sensitivity analysis by 
examining how changing the assumptions might impact linchpins. If executed properly 
the benefits of linchpin analysis were a clarified chain of logic for the decision maker and 
examination of implicit assumptions. To implement linchpin analysis, MacEachin created 
“Tradecraft 2000,” a course that ran in the early 1990s with components that are still part 
of the Sherman Kent School’s curriculum, the CIA’s in-house intelligence training center 
that opened in 2000 (Marrin 2003).  
In addition to the inaccurate estimates of Iraq’s willingness to invade Kuwait, the 
IC and how it conducted analysts faced withering criticism in the late 1990s. In 1998, the 
Indian government conducted a nuclear test, much to the surprise of the IC. At the time 
the strongly held assumption was that the current administration in New Delhi had little 
interest in following through with the test, despite campaign promises suggesting 
otherwise. In an IC review of the intelligence failure, the chair of the commission 
concluded that analysts failed to foresee the nuclear test because they assumed the ruling 
Indian party strategy was the same as Western party: make promises in the campaign 
and renege once in power (Select Committee on Intelligence 1998).  
Little more than a year later, the IC was again faced criticism, this time accused of 
an inaccurate appraisal of the world-wide weapons of mass destruction threat. An 
outside commission run by Donald Rumsfeld concluded that analysts paid insufficient 
attention to denial and deception (Davis 2002). In particular, the commission argued that 
analysts should search for multiple hypotheses and seek to disprove the widely held 
hypothesis that challenger states such as North Korea were behind in their inter-
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continental ballistic missile programs.  However, Mitchell (2006) argues that the 
Rumsfeld commission, instead of representing a sincere attempt to critique IC analysis, 
reflects a wider effort by conservative hardliners to manipulate the intelligence analysis 
process to support the Republican position. Regardless of political motivations, the 
combined effect of the Rumsfeld commission with the Jeremiah report was an increase in 
the use of structured analytic techniques and the inclusion of more outside experts, 
(Davis 2002), a trend that would only accelerate after the September 11th attacks.  
 
2.3.3   Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and Large-Scale 
Implementation 
While shifting requirements of the post-Cold War world and intelligence failures spurred 
greater interest in structured analytic techniques, the 1990s were but a prelude to what 
was to come. After the Iraq invasion turned up no weapons of mass destruction, the 
analytic practices of the IC came under tight scrutiny as panels, committees, and 
commissions initiated investigations and urged reform.  The impetus for reform led to 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (henceforth: the 
Intelligence Reform Act). The sections relevant to structured analytic techniques in the 
Intelligence Reform Act (sections 1017 and 1019) set forth a mandate for the use of 
alternative analysis techniques --the earlier term for structured analytic techniques-- 
through the creation of an Integrity and Standards and Analytic Ombudsman positioned 
in the newly created Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).  Richard 
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Immerman, a professor of history at Temple University was tapped for the position and 
tasked with ensuring that high standards of analysis are maintained throughout the IC, 
including the use of alternative analysis, as structured analytic techniques are termed in 
the legislation.  
One of the first tasks for Immerman and his staff was creating common analytic 
standards across all of the IC’s diverse 16 agencies through Intelligence Community 
Directives (ICDs), memoranda designed to provide guidance on policy and regulations 
to the IC.  ICD 206 (2007) can be traced to the deficiencies in analysis found in the Iraq 
weapons of mass destruction estimate estimate, specifically the lack of sourcing. The 
directive requires that analysts consistently provide sourcing for their judgments.  ICD 
203 (2007) was formulated to “sharpen the critical thinking that underlay intelligence 
products” and included seven analytic standards, such as Objectivity, Independent of 
Political Considerations, Timeliness, Based on All Available Sources of Intelligence, and 
Exhibits Proper Standards of Analytic Tradecraft (Immerman 2011, p. 170).  This directive 
provided the framework for a new class called “Analysis 101” for new intelligence 
analysts.  At one level the purpose of the course is organizational, as it brings together 
analysts from all IC agencies to develop a common analytic vocabulary, but at a deeper 
level it is, of course, about improving how analysts draw inferences.  For example, 
analysts “learn not to lock on to one hypothesis and then collect evidence that supports 
it but to brainstorm on the whole range of possibilities” (Kelly 2007).  Towards the goal 
of improving analysis, Analysis 101 contains lessons on various types of structured 
analytic techniques (Immerman 2011).  
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2.3.4   Factors Affecting the Implementation of Structured Analytic Techniques  
As of 2011 approximately 4,000 analysts, nearly a quarter of the IC workforce, have taken 
the Analysis 101 course (Defense Intelligence Agency 2011). Yet it is unclear if the 
coursework has led to greater use of structured analytic techniques. Additionally, it is not 
known what variables might affect the use of the techniques. These include 
organizational elements generally (Richard and Oh 1993) such as the existence of analytic 
training (Moore and Hoffman, n.d.) and the role of individual and organizational belief 
systems (Weiss and Bucuvalas 1980). For example, Marrin (2012) argues that in order for 
analysts to use the techniques they must be convinced they are effective for improving 
analysis.  
Intelligence researchers and trainers, David Moore and Robert Hoffman (n.d.), 
argue the training has had little effect on how analysis is conducted because the 
curriculum does not take into account analysts’ individual learning styles and insufficient 
time is given to practicing the techniques. For this reason Moore and Hoffman conclude 
that the IC’s approach to instruction might reduce or “hinder the development of the 
skilled use (or even any use)” of structured analytic techniques.  For Moore and Hoffman, 
the training regime itself must be overhauled if analysts are to use the techniques.  
In addition to the issue of training, another factor affecting the implementation of 
structured analytic techniques is the role of time pressure. One anonymous analyst 
interviewed by Moore and Hoffman (n.d., p. 2) claimed "practitioners are likely to be 
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punished for critical thinking”  and presumably using structured analytic techniques, 
“because it takes longer and looks and feels like academic dithering in an atmosphere 
heavily weighted toward fast-paced "production" using computerized tools rather than 
gray matter." This point has been backed up by unclassified ethnographies in the IC.  Both 
Dixon and McNamara (2008) and Johnston (2005) suggest analysts are reluctant to utilize 
techniques because of the increasing current reporting requirements that emerged in the 
1990s and accelerated after September 11th (Johnston 2005, pp. 26-27).  A survey by the 
Rand Corporation supports these findings: of three dozen analysts and managers, 30 
percent identified time pressure as a threat to conducting quality analysis (Treverton and 
Gabbard 2008). At same time many techniques require a perceived, significant time 
investment to decompose a problem and externalize the information to paper or a screen 
(Heuer 1999, p. 86).  However, Heuer and Pherson (2011)—both proponents of the 
techniques--argue that the time investment in techniques is well worth it, and in fact, can 
shorten the turnaround time for analysis over the long-term. For example, according to 
some FBI analysts, ACH saves time because it acts as a written record of important facts 
about a case that can be retrieved quickly by pulling up the matrix.19  
At a more fundamental level, an implementation factor is the perceived value of 
the techniques. Anecdotal accounts from the IC paint a portrait of analysts wary of the 
value of the techniques, especially amongst older analysts, which Moore and Hoffman 
(n.d., p. 2) attribute to the inability of structured analytic technique proponents to “make 
                                                 
19 Private communication with Richards Heuer (August 2014)  
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a convincing case that they ought to try something new.”  However, it is not known how 
widespread this view is held in the IC because there is no study or survey including a 
question directly addressing the perceived value of structured analytic techniques, 
although two studies present related information.  Treverton and Gabbard’s (2008) 
survey of an unreported number of analysts and managers found that almost a quarter 
of respondents identified inadequate “tools” as a major problem, however, the term 
“tools” is ill-defined and may include information technology tools, such as databases. 
Marrin (2012) conducted an informal survey via the International Association for 
Intelligence Education’s list-serv of more than 30  intelligence studies scholars, including 
some former practitioners, and found that most respondents were wary of the value of 
structured analytic techniques. In short, there seems to be a suspicion that structured 
analytic techniques do not improve intelligence analysis, which Marrin (2007) argues 
“can change if the use of structured methods can be demonstrated to provide clear 
benefits to the practitioner...” 
Despite the training difficulties, time pressure, and low perceived value of the 
techniques, the implementation effort might be gaining a boost from a greening IC. Since 
the early 2000s the IC has reflected the wider demographic trends of the US workforce 
with Baby Boomers retiring in ever large numbers. In addition, the growth of the IC after 
the September 11th attacks has increased the number of new hires, and presumably, 
younger analysts to fill entry-level positions. Whatever the cause, the numbers suggest 
an IC in transition: approximately 11,000 analysts of the total 20,000 were hired after 
September 11th.  This trend is important because some observers, such as Immerman 
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(2011) argue ‘Generation Y’ is more “comfortable with, and open to, new techniques that 
enable collaboration and integration.” Fingar (2011, p. 24) reflects this optimism by noting 
that persuading new analysts to “adopt new techniques and to work differently than the 
generations they are succeeding is easy.”  The intellectual flexibility and collaboration of 
young analysts is frequently juxtaposed against the more senior, “grey beards” in the 
upper management who received different training and were enculturated in an IC 
oriented towards Cold War threats.   
2.4  SUMMARIZING THE ARGUMENT 
Evaluating intelligence analysis requires a reliable and appropriate measure of analytic 
quality. In this chapter, a new two part measure of quality focusing on analytic rigor and 
accuracy was proposed. Applying this standard to intelligence analysis, the expert 
judgment model of intelligence is unlikely to reliably produce high quality analysis.  
Decades of research suggests that two factors, the limitations of analysts’ mental 
machinery and the complexity of the international affairs, limit the role of expertise in 
foreign affairs intelligence analysis. Perhaps the best illustration of the diminishing 
returns of expertise in foreign affairs was demonstrated by Tetlock (2005) who found that 
the best experts are as likely to be accurate as the flip of a coin.  
One approach to improve intelligence analysis is to re-frame it as an inexact 
science requiring structured analytic techniques to leverage and reliably extract the 
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expertise of analyst. While this reframing provides a general rationale, there is a lack of 
theoretical grounding for the techniques overall. Heuer and Pherson’s (2014) theoretical 
justification, while notable as a first attempt to provide a justification for all structured 
analytic techniques, is flawed because it assumes that slow calculative thinking is a 
superior to intuitive thinking. In fact, research suggests that both types of thinking are 
just as susceptible to screening and distorting evidence (Kahan et al. 2006, pp. 1093-1094). 
Additionally, Heuer and Pherson’s rationale for the techniques overlooks the fact that the 
techniques use both types of thinking. To address the gap, a causal theory of the 
techniques was forwarded. According to this theory, structured analytic techniques 
deepen and expand intelligence analysis by getting analysts to consider more 
perspectives, evidence, and hypotheses through the use of techniques of varying 
strengths and weaknesses. 
Synthesizing and reframing the literature on how the techniques might improve 
analysis is useful, but it does not address how they might be implemented in the IC. A 
brief review of the history of the techniques in the IC presents promise for 
implementation but also serious obstacles. On the positive side, there is increasing 
interest from reformers to implement the techniques on a wider scale with each successful 
high-profile intelligence failure over the last 25 years.  The Indian nuclear tests and the 
Iraq War brought greater scrutiny on analytic practice and calls to formalize analysis. 
However, the watershed moment thus far is the Intelligence Reform Act, which 
mandated the training and use of the techniques.  Still, these hopes have been tempered 
 64 
with the everyday limitations of analysis in the IC, including time pressure and the 
reticence of some analysts to try a new approach, among other obstacles.  
Turning the inquiry to applying the framework developed in this chapter to 
evaluate the implementation and effectiveness of the techniques is the subject of the next 
chapter. Doing so presents a formidable but not insurmountable challenge. 
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3.0  CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 The eminent baseball statistician Bill James once wrote “Every form of strength is also a 
form of weakness.” (Lewis 2004, p. 257).  In James’ quote are the core assumption of multi-
method inquiry: each method’s strength is also its weakness.  For example, statistical 
methods might increase generalizability of the inference through probability theory, but 
generalizability is purchased at the steep cost of depth of understanding. The opposite 
could be said of ethnographic methods; the depth of understanding provided by the 
method reduces its generalizability.20  This research project incorporated the logic of 
multi-method inquiry by leveraging the strength of numerous methods to build 
“interlocking patterns of converging evidence” (Tetlock (2005, p. 7). 
This chapter lays out a blueprint for addressing the implementation and 
effectiveness of the techniques (see Table 3.1). Several variables have been identified that 
might impact the use of the techniques including the perception of the techniques (Marrin 
2007; Heuer and Pherson 2011, p. 337), and demographic characteristics of analysts, such 
as age (Immerman 2011; Fingar 2008), and training (Moore and Hoffman, n.d.). To 
address this question, semi-structured interviews were conducted with intelligence 
experts, and a survey and follow-up interviews were conducted at an intelligence agency 
(Section 3.1). The second research question addresses the effectiveness of structured 
                                                 
20 For an explanation of the methodological costs of various methds, see William N. Dunn, Public Policy 
Analysis: An Introduction. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2012, pp. 18-19. 
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analytic techniques. To answer this question, a systematic review and field experiment 
were conducted (Section 3.2). 
Table 3.1: Research Questions 
Issue Question 
Implementation How often are structured analytic techniques used in the 
intelligence community and what variables affect their use?   
Effectiveness Do structured analytic techniques improve the quality of 
intelligence analysis and, if so, under what circumstances? 
 
3.1  FIELD STUDY: IMPLEMENTING STRUCTURED ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES 
To answer the implementation question, a field study design was conducted, a 
nonexperimental inquiry to “systematically pursue relations and test hypotheses” 
without manipulating the study variables (Kerlinger and Lee 2000, p. 585). Previous field 
research in the IC has brought insights on a variety of topics such as analytic culture 
(Johnston 2005), the use of intelligence sharing tools (Dixon and McNamara 2008), 
analytic tradecraft (Treverton and Gabbard 2008), and civilian intelligence education 
(Spracher 2009). Building on this tradition, in the field study three methods were used: 
semi-structured interviews with intelligence experts, a survey of an IC agency, the State 
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), and follow-up interviews with 
INR analysts. Each method was selected on complementary strengths. For example, since 
the strength of semi-structured interviews is in gaining in depth understanding, this 
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method was supplemented with a survey to gain greater measurement precision (Dunn 
2008, pp. 18-19).  
 
3.1.1   Semi-structured Interviews with Intelligence Analysis Experts 
The focus of the semi-structured interviews were “key informants,” reflective members 
of the IC willing to share their knowledge of structured analytic techniques and the 
analytic reform movement (Bernard 2006, Campbell 1955).   In this study, informants are 
termed “intelligence analysis experts,” defined by their experiences and knowledge. For 
example, informants had to have significant time in the IC (10+ years) during the years 
of the analytic reform movement (2004 onward).   
Informants were selected through purposive and snowball sampling strategies.  
These strategies were used because of the focus of the inquiry on accessing expertise in 
the population rather than generalizability (Bernard 2006). The first step in the sampling 
strategy was to generate a list of approximately 10 intelligence experts in consultation 
with the assistance of Dr. Phil Williams, one of the committee members. Next, each expert 
was contacted to set up interviews either in person or over the telephone.  Since most 
respondents were in the Washington, D.C. area, two trips were made there in February 
and June of 2014.  Upon interviewing informants, each was asked to identify other 
intelligence experts so as to ‘snowball’ the sample, adding more informants. After both 
purposive and snowball sampling strategies, a total of five intelligence experts were 
identified. The remaining five did not respond to inquiries for interviews.  
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The main research instrument was a semi-structured interview protocol (see Table 
3.1).  This instrument was used to focus the conversation on variables related to 
implementation of the techniques while allowing for the freedom to examine emerging 
concepts (Lee 1999, p. 62). For example, one question asked “How often do you believe 
analysts are utilizing structured analytic techniques on the job?”  Another question 
addressed how training impacts implementation of the techniques (“How well prepared 
do you believe analysts are for using structured analytic techniques?”). The approximate 
length of the interviews was 30-60 minutes during which detailed field notes were taken. 
Due to the sensitivity of the topic, I did not record the interviews. 
Table 3.2: Selected Interview Questions and Variables 
 
Variable Question 
Training How well prepared do you believe analysts are for using structured 
analytic techniques? 
Perceived Value In your opinion, what is the perceived value of structured analytic 
techniques among the “average” analyst? 
Time Pressure What effect do you think increasing time pressure has on the use of 
structured analytic techniques? 
Demographics  The intelligence community appears to be seeing a demographic 
shift, with an influx of younger analysts. Do you think this will have 
an impact on the use of structured analytic techniques? Why or why 
not? 
 
3.1.2   Survey and Interviews at the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
The semi-structured interviews with intelligence experts provide a good overall snapshot 
of the implementation of the techniques and the analytic reform movement, but the 
comparative advantage of interviewing over other methods is in depth of understanding, 
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not measurement precision. This weakness is especially pronounced in understanding 
the extent to which analysts use structured analytic techniques on the job as key 
informants’ impressions can be highly fallible. To compensate for this weakness, a survey 
was conducted.   However, conducting a survey in the IC is no easy task, as evidenced 
by the fact that, there is only one survey in the unclassified domain. Spracher (2009) 
conducted a survey of 30 new analysts at the Defense Intelligence Agency.  The difficulty 
of conducting a survey in the IC stems from the fact that intelligence-related research 
problems are examples of “difficult to access” problems (Maravic 2012). These types of 
problems involve actors who seek to “guard their secrecy, conceal their activities, decide 
who is allowed (not) to know, and have no interest in being observed or understood by 
others” (Maravic 2012, p. 153). Common examples of difficult to access problems include 
corruption, terrorism, international crime, and, of course, intelligence agencies.  
Consequently, a gatekeeper was needed, an individual who could “vouch” for this 
research and provide access to areas and people otherwise denied to outsiders (Kenney, 
2013, pp. 29-30).  For this research I was fortunate—and grateful—to gain access to INR 
through another committee member, Dr. Shawn Bird. 
The 80 respondents included in the final survey were intelligence analysts 
currently employed at INR or other employees who were formerly analysts, such as 
intelligence managers. For this research, an analyst is defined as an INR employee who, 
in his or her current or previous work, applies or applied their expertise to weight data 
and test hypotheses about important international events (Johnston, 2005, p. 3).  To 
construct the survey, the tailored method was used. This approach uses “multiple 
 70 
motivational features in compatible and mutually supportive ways to encourage high 
quantity and quality response to the surveyors request” (Dillman et al. 2011, p. 16). 
Underlying the tailored design approach is the belief that both researcher and respondent 
are engaged in an exchange relationship where each party seeks a benefit (Blau 1964).  
Flowing from this exchange relationship is the implication that the key to getting high 
quantity and quality responses lies in constructing surveys that increase benefits, while 
decreasing the costs of participation.  For example, to increase the benefits of taking the 
survey, the invitation to participate for this survey, as well as the opening script, offered 
the respondent the opportunity to get the final results of the survey. To keep the costs of 
participation low, the survey was designed to be completed quickly, with the average 
response time for the survey ranging from 2-3 minutes.   
The survey instrument contains 10 questions with 6 focusing on the main variables 
(see Table 3.2 below). These questions and the format of the questionnaire went through 
several revisions, with close consultation of the dissertation committee to increase 
validity and clarity. Another important issue is reliability, the extent to which different 
respondents understood question items similarly. Reliability of the survey was calculated 
using a test-retest reliability by having six respondents retake the survey two months 
later. Reliability of an instrument is high if there is a strong correlation between the 
question items between the first and second occasion the respondent took the survey. A 
strong correlation is 1 while no correlation is 0. The correlation between the questions 
regarding the use of the techniques was low-moderately strong (.42).   While the survey 
question provided examples of structured analytic techniques, analysts might have been 
 71 
unsure what counted as using a technique. Fortunately, other questions, such as whether 
the analyst received training, were perfectly correlated (1.0).  In short, the survey 
instrument is moderate to highly reliable.  
Table 3.3: Survey Variables and Questions 
 
Variable Question Scale Reliability 
(0-1) 
Use of Techniques 
(Dependent Variable) 
“How often do you use 
structured analytic 
techniques on the job?” 
-Occasionally/ 
Rarely 
-Never 
.42 
Preparedness/Training  “Several kinds of 
‘structured analytic 
techniques’ are used by 
analysts.  These include 
Analysis of Competing 
Hypotheses (ACH), link 
analysis, and red teaming, 
among others. Have you 
received any training in 
any of these structured 
analytic techniques? 
-Yes 
-No 
1 
Perceived Value of 
Techniques: Rigor  
“To what extent, on 
average, do you think  
structured analytic 
techniques help analysts 
think in a more effective 
way (e.g. consider new 
perspectives, challenge 
mental models, etc.)?” 
-A great deal 
-A fair amount 
-A little 
-Not at all 
1 
Perceived Value of 
Techniques: Accuracy  
To what extent, on average, 
do you think  structured 
analytic techniques help 
analysts be more accurate 
or "right" in their analytic 
judgments? 
-A great deal 
-A fair amount 
-A little 
-Not at all 
.86 
Time Pressure “On average, how long 
does it take you to 
complete an analytic 
project?” 
-A day or two 
-A week or two 
-A month or two 
-Three months or 
more 
1 
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Age Cohort “How many years have 
you been an analyst?” 
N/A 
(continuous)  
N/A 
 
The survey was distributed over email to provide a useful and cheap medium for 
accessing respondents (Dillman et al. 2011, p. 44).  Respondents were identified via an 
internal email list of 350 INR employees which included analysts and non-analysts (to 
screen out individuals not meeting the respondent criteria, a question was included that 
asked the respondent for his or her job title). While the exact number of analysts at INR 
is not known, there are approximately 200.21  Implementation of the survey was done 
through two rounds, with the first running July 29-August 5, 2014 and the second 
running August 8- August 15, 2014.  Over the two rounds, 137 surveys were initiated, 
including 95 with at least 80 percent or more of the questions completed.  Of the 95 
responses, 80 respondents could be described as analysts under their current or former 
job titles. The remainder included other non-analyst job titles, such as “office director” 
and “foreign affairs officer.”   
An important consideration is whether the sample can be generalized to the 
remainder of INR analysts. One potential obstacle to generalizing to the rest of INR is if 
the analysts that did not respond were different in meaningful ways from those that did 
respond; this is called nonresponse error (Dillman et al. 2011, p. 17).  Perhaps the most 
important way that analysts responding could differ from those that did not, is in their 
use of the techniques. For example, only those who use the techniques might have been 
                                                 
21 Personal communication with INR analyst (January 23, 2015). 
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interested in responding to the survey. However, the results of the suggested this type of 
nonresponse error was avoided because those who reported not using the techniques are 
well-represented as approximately 30 percent of respondents reported never using the 
techniques.   
Another issue is whether the sample size of 80 is sufficient to generalize to the 
remaining 200 analysts.  To determine this number requires calculating the appropriate 
sample size for a population of 200 (see equation 1).  The appropriate sample size (Ns) 
based on a set of parameters, such as the acceptable level of sampling error (B), the 
amount of confidence desired in estimates (C), the level of variation in the main 
characteristic (p), and size of the population from which the sample is drawn (Np).  
Figure 3.1: Formula for Estimating Sample Size (Dillman et al. 2011) 
 
 
Ns =                 (Np) (p) (1-p)____ 
          (Np – 1) (B/C)2 + (p) (1 – p) 
 
 
For this research, the acceptable level of sampling error was set at ± 10 percentage 
points and the confidence was held at the 90 percent confidence level.  Prior to 
implementation of the survey, the expected variation on the main variable of interest, the 
use of the structured analytic techniques, would be a roughly 50/50 split between users 
and non-users. Compiling this information into the formula (see equation 2) provides the 
appropriate sample size of 65, which is well below the 80 that completed survey, therefore 
allowing the use of statistical procedures to generalize to INR’s entire analytic cadre, the 
first time a survey has been generalizable to an IC agency.  
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Figure 3.2: Calculation of Appropriate Sample Size 
 
                                          
               65=                    (200) (.5) (1-.5)                
                           (200-1) (.10/ 1.65)2 + (.5) (.5) 
 
 
 The survey data was analyzed using chi square tests to determine if the study 
variables were related. The test is useful in two situations: when the data is categorical 
and the researcher is interested in testing the hypothesized relation between two 
categorical variables. Given the focus of the first research question on determining the 
link between categorical variables hypothesized to affect the use structured analytic 
techniques, the chi square test was the most appropriate for analysis of the survey data.  
In addition, a strength of this statistical test is that it does not assume normality; however, 
it does require that cell counts are not less than five.  In order to keep cells above the five 
threshold, each of the chi square tests necessitated combined categories. For example, 
there was a low number of analysts who served during the Cold War era and interim 
period between the end of the Cold War and September 11th. Therefore these categories 
were collapsed into Pre-September 11th.  
Survey respondents were asked if they would be willing to be interviewed for a 
follow-up interview.  Of the 20 analysts that indicated that they would be willing to 
participate in a follow-up interview, 9 agreed to a 15 minute phone follow-up interview.  
Respondents were asked open-ended questions similar to those in the survey to gain 
more description of the study variables (see table 3.3). During the interview, detailed 
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notes were taken and uploaded into NVivo then analyzed using a grounded theory 
approach to understand the underlying processes affecting analysts’ use of the 
techniques (Glaser 1978).  Grounded theory is helpful when there is inadequate or little 
theory to explain a particular phenomenon (Creswell 2013).  This is the case with theory 
on the implementation of structured analytic techniques; beyond some scattered 
literature and anecdotal accounts there is little available information. The data from the 
interviews, contained in a set of digitized field notes, were uploaded to the qualitative 
data analysis program NVivo (QSR International 2013).  Next the data was analyzed 
through the method of ‘constant comparison’ (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Lincoln and Guba 
1985). To use constant comparison researchers engage in a sorting process identifying 
specific ideas called “codes” and then through an iterative process aggregate these codes 
to more general “themes.”  For example, one informant stated that “you will find a lot of 
haters in the older generations” concerning the use of structured analytic techniques.  
This snippet of text was coded under the broader code, “A graying IC” and aggregated 
under the theme “individual-level factors.” This process was repeated to generate a series 
of themes describing the interviews (see Methodological Appendix A for the complete 
coding tree). 
 
Table 3.4 Follow-up Interviews Questions 
 
Variable Question 
Age Cohort The intelligence community appears to be seeing a demographic 
shift, with an influx of younger analysts. Do you think this will have 
an impact on the use of structured analytic techniques? Why or why 
not? 
Preparedness How well prepared do you believe analysts are for using structured 
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analytic techniques? Have you received training in structured 
analytic techniques? 
Perceived Value of 
Techniques: Rigor 
In your opinion, what is the perceived value of structured analytic 
techniques among the “average” analyst at INR? 
Time Pressure What effect do you think increasing time pressure has on the use of 
structured analytic techniques? 
 
3.2  EVALUATING STRUCTURED ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES: A SYSTEMATIC 
REVIEW AND FIELD EXPERIMENT 
 
Evaluating the techniques in the IC is difficult due to the secrecy surrounding intelligence 
analysis.  Therefore, addressing the question of if structured analytic techniques improve 
the quality of analysis required a careful selection of multiple methods and research 
designs.  The assumption of the design is that if multiple sources of evidence from data 
sources converge that are similar to how intelligence analysis is practiced in the IC, then 
a strong inference can be drawn.  A systematic review and an experiment were chosen to 
complement the strengths of the other. The systematic review synthesized the evidence 
on all the techniques but this wider perspective is purchased at the cost of specificity as 
looking at all the techniques in aggregate makes detailed observation of each difficult.  To 
address this weakness, the experiment evaluates two specific techniques—Analysis of 
Competing Hypotheses (ACH) and the Indicators of Change or Signposts technique.  
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3.2.1   A Systematic Review of Structured Analytic Techniques 
To generate a consolidated body of evidence on structured analytic techniques, a 
systematic review was conducted. Defined, a systematic review is an “explicit method to 
identify, select, and critically appraise relevant research” to determine “what works” 
(Cochrane Collaboration 2014).  The power of compiling and synthesizing research was 
first grasped in medicine (Cochrane Collaboration 2014), and has extended to other areas, 
such as public policy, most notably in the form of the Campbell Collaboration.  For 
example, a Campbell Collaboration systematic review by Lum et al. (2006) on 
counterterrorism policy research from 1971-2002, found that of the approximately 14,000 
reports only 7 had moderately rigorous research designs.  
What differentiates the systematic review from its close relative, the literature 
review? The answer is in the transparency of the method, beginning with how studies 
are selected and concluding with the synthesis of findings.  In a literature review, the 
selection of studies is idiosyncratic and often unclear to the reader, which is problematic 
because the researcher may inadvertently—or even advertently—omit studies, and 
consequently, bias their results.  In addition, the lack of clear procedures also makes 
reproducing the results of a literature review difficult, if not impossible. Yet, the problems 
with literature reviews do not stop there: they also lack the ability to determine what level 
of effect (if any) one variable had on another (Cooper 2010, p. 7) while taking into account 
the quality of the study design and therefore the strength of the inference that can be 
drawn about what was found.  
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Still, there are also considerable weaknesses that limit the applicability of 
systematic reviews as they are traditionally conducted, most notably the reliance on 
quantitative data. This limitation is especially problematic in fields where quantitative 
data is hard to come by as is the case in intelligence studies (Zegart 2007). To address this 
limitation, an alternative form of systematic review was used in this research, the case 
survey method (Lucas 1974; Dunn and Swierczek 1977; Pawson et al. 2005).   While known 
by numerous names, this approach has been used to study a variety of different 
phenomena, ranging from urban policy (Yin and Heald 1975) to organizational change 
(Dunn and Swierczek 1977). Instead of a traditional systematic review that extracts only 
numerical data, the case study method extracts narrative descriptions of outcomes and 
converts them into numerical data using a coding instrument. In this way, the case study 
method overcomes the reliance on quantitative data. 
The first step in a systematic review is the specification of the population of 
research studies, the unit of analysis. In this research, studies included both intelligence 
and non-intelligence analysis studies. The decision to include both of these study types 
was based on the assumption that intelligence analysis does not differ significantly from 
other forms of information analysis, such as business and policy analysis.  While analysis 
in other fields is not identical to intelligence analysis, owing to the secrecy of sources and 
methods (Warner 2002), the general process is similar. For example in intelligence 
analysis, as with other forms of analysis, it occurs in complex, high stakes environments 
often under time pressure (Johnston 2003, pp. 62-63).  For example, financial analysts 
might have to forecast highly uncertain outcomes—perhaps a high-impact low-
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probability event, such as a market crash--where their analyses could sway a multi-
million dollar decision. This argument and example is suggests non-intelligence studies 
are sufficiently similar to be generalized and useful to intelligence practitioners.   
The data source for the systematic reviews was Google Scholar because it has 
extensive coverage of peer-reviewed research. According to one empirical study, “Google 
Scholar covers 98 to 100 percent of scholarly journals from both publicly accessible Web 
contents and from subscription-based databases” (Chen 2010). Gehanno et al. (2013) 
corroborated this claim and found that Google Scholar covered 100 percent of a sample 
of medical studies. In addition to published research, Google Scholar also covers non-
published, or “gray” literature in the form of technical reports and dissertations (Google 
Scholar 2014). 
Search terms were generated using the names of the 12 structured analytic 
techniques from the Tradecraft Primer (2009. Other search procedures included: searching 
for keywords in the title only to focus on the most relevant studies, excluding non-English 
studies, patents, and citations listings.  Six of the techniques did not return any results: 
Key Assumptions Check, Quality of Information Check, High-Impact/Low-Probability, 
Indicators of Signpost/Change, “What If?” Analysis, and Outside-In Thinking.  The other 
techniques varied greatly in the number of search hits:  Alternative Futures Analysis (753 
hits), ACH (20), Red Teaming (21), Team A/Team B (17), Brainstorming (838), and Devil’s 
Advocacy (31).   
Since it was logistically difficult to examine all studies from Alternative Futures 
Analysis and Brainstorming, a random stratified sample was conducted, a sampling 
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strategy that involves the division of a population into smaller groups (known as strata) 
to ensure equal representation of an important attribute (Kerlinger and Lee 2000, p. 179-
180).  In this study, an important attribute was “study relevance,” and therefore strata 
were divided into high ranking and low ranking studies in the search results.  To 
determine high-low ranking and define the strata, Beel and Gipp’s (2009) study was used. 
Beel and Gipp (2009) reversed engineered the Google Scholar search algorithm (it is a 
trade secret) and found that the search results conform to the Matthew Effect: 20 percent 
of articles consistently appear at the top of the search results. Therefore, to sample high 
and low ranked articles equally, the population was divided, into a high (top 20%) and 
low strata (bottom 80%).  The sample size was determined by setting the confidence level 
at 95 percent confidence interval and a margin of error at ± 10 percentage points. For 
example, Brainstorming returned 838 hits and the sample size calculation at 95 percent 
confidence interval and a margin of error at ± 10 percentage points was 87 studies. Broken 
into the two stratum, there were 17 high ranked articles (the top 20%) and 70 low ranked 
articles (the bottom 80%) downloaded.22   This process was repeated for Alternative 
Futures Analysis and for the other techniques all studies were downloaded (and did not 
require sampling). The sampling and downloading process yielded 259 studies (out of a 
total 1,724 search hits) and required approximately 10 hours. 
                                                 
22 To randomly sample, the following procedure was followed: Using a random number generator to 
select two sets of numbers page number and study position. For example, if there are 20 result pages 
possible and there are 20 studies per page, the randomly generated number 0220 would require 
downloading the study from the 20th position on page 2. 
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Next, the intelligence and non-intelligence research reports were downloaded and 
abstracts read to determine if the study provided some report, verbal or numerical, of the 
technique’s effect on rigor or accuracy. Studies also had to make an attempt to evaluate a 
specific, identifiable instance of a technique. As a result, hypothetical reports (e.g. “ACH 
could be helpful to intelligence analysts…”) were excluded. Studies were also excluded 
for several other reasons. For example, 95 studies described how to use a technique in a 
particular application but provided no explicit evaluation and 36 studies discussed 
conceptual issues related to using a technique (see Table 3.4). The exclusion process 
yielded 46 evaluative studies and required approximately 10-12 hours to carefully read 
through the abstracts.  
Table 3.5: Excluded Studies 
 
 Was a book—only articles and short manuscripts were considered for logistical 
reasons (2 studies) 
 Describes how to use the technique in an application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness (95 studies) 
 Only discusses issues related to the use of the technique (36 studies) 
 Duplicates a previous observation (e.g. multiple studies covered the IC Team 
A/Team B exercise from the 1970s).23 (4 studies) 
 Excluded studies looking at educational outcomes, such as creative writing 
skills.24 (6 studies) 
 Proposes an improvement or modification of the technique-but no evaluation 
(13 studies) 
 In another language (not available in English) (1 study) 
                                                 
23 In these cases, the study with the stronger design (operationalized by the study’s MSMS score) was 
selected, if designs were identical the first sampled study was included, if there was still a tie, then the 
newest study was included  
24 While these outcomes are of partial interest, they are not closely related to outcomes related to 
intelligence analysis 
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 Was the comparison of one variation of a technique against another (28 studies 
compared one variation of a technique against another ) 
 Technique addressed in study was not one of those included in this study as 
defined in the Tradecraft Primer  (28 studies) 
 
 
In this systematic review, the relevant information was extracted from the studies 
and transformed into numerical values for analysis. For example, relevant information 
included, the research design of the study and the reported effectiveness of the technique 
on rigor and accuracy. Effectiveness was determined by coding each study according to 
the reported effectiveness of the technique on four levels: 1) the technique had a negative 
effect; 2) no effect; 3) mixed effect; and 4) positive effect. 
To assess credibility, the internal validity of the 46 studies were assessed with the 
Maryland Scientific Methods Scale (MSMS) (Sherman 1998) which was modified to add 
a sixth level to include studies using meta-analysis (see figure 3.5 below). The least 
credible studies fall into MSMS levels 1 and 2. These studies either are a correlation 
between the use of a technique and a reported effect on rigor and accuracy (level 1) or are 
a simple pre-test and post-test design (level 2). More than half of all the evaluative 
studies, 24 in total, had low credibility. Moderately credible studies fall into levels 3 and 
4. These studies build on level 2 research by adding a comparison group (level 3) and 
controlling for variables that might explain the outcome in the study (level 4); 7 studies 
were coded as moderately credible. Highly credible studies are those that either use 
random assignment or were systematic reviews employing meta-analysis, a statistical 
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technique used in traditional systematic reviews to synthesize the impact of the 
intervention. 15 studies were coded as highly credible.  
Figure 3.3: The Maryland Scientific Methods Scale 
 
 
To analyze the data, the relation between study quality and reported effect, 
Rosenthal and Rubin’s (1982) binary effect size display (BESD) was used. The purpose of 
BESD is to determine “the effect on the success rate (e.g., survival rate, cure rate, 
improvement rate, selection rate, etc.) of the institution of a certain treatment procedure” 
displayed as the “change in success rate (e.g., survival rate, cure rate, improvement rate, 
selection rate, etc.) attributable to a certain treatment procedure (Rosenthal and Rubin 
1982, p. 166). The BESD is particularly useful for demonstrating in simple terms the 
impact of an intervention or, in this case, an analytic technique. Effectiveness data was 
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analyzed by generating a table containing the BESD for each technique. An example is 
presented below to illustrate how the BESD is displayed with simulated results.  In the 
left-hand column selected techniques are listed and in the middle two columns, reported 
effectiveness of those techniques. In the far right column, the number of research reports 
for each technique. For example, in the simulated results, the evidence for red teaming is 
mixed (50 percent effective, 50 percent ineffective), but this result is based on only 5 
research reports.  
 
3.2.2   An Experiment of ACH and Indicators 
While the systematic review provided a general snapshot of “what works,” an 
experiment was also conducted to take a closer look at two techniques, ACH and 
Indicators.  However, developing an experiment for structured analytic techniques 
needed to be generalizable to intelligence contexts and internally valid. To accomplish 
this lofty task, graduate security and intelligence students worked on a real-world 
intelligence task to determine if the techniques improve the rigor and accuracy of 
analysis.  
Study participants were graduate students from the Security and Intelligence 
Studies (SIS) program at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA) 
at the University of Pittsburgh. While it would be ideal to conduct the evaluation with 
actual analysts,  the students provided a useful proxy since they are developing the same 
core competencies analysts hold, such as domain (e.g. area studies expertise) and 
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procedural knowledge (e.g. critical thinking skills).25 Students were recruited through 
three methods: an email on the student list-serv, flyers posted around GSPIA, and class 
announcements.  In total, 21 students volunteered for the experiment and in exchange 
were provided a small financial incentive ($20).   
To increase the generalizability of the results, an intelligence task was used with a 
moderate level of complexity and structure: estimating the percentage of chemical 
weapons the Assad regime would destroy before a UN Resolution deadline.  Treverton’s 
(2008) conceptual framework is instructive for classifying this experimental task (see 
Figure 3.4). Simple intelligence tasks are ‘puzzles’ with clear solutions and strategies. 
Locating where Osama Bin Laden is located, for example, has a fairly straight-forward 
solution strategy (e.g. analyze human intelligence and satellite imagery). ‘Mysteries’ are 
complicated by some rare discontinuities, but generally have some key variables with 
some level of predictability. An example is the Pakistani government’s reaction to the Bin 
Laden raid: the U.S. government probably expected there would be some diplomatic fist 
shaking, but knew it was unlikely Pakistan would retaliate militarily. Lastly, complexities 
lack any clear solution strategy consensus. The reaction of potential lone-wolf terrorist to 
the Bin Laden killing is an example of a complexity because it is difficult to determine 
how to even begin to answer this question. Of the potential hundreds of thousands or 
                                                 
25 According to the GSPIA website, the security and intelligence studies major “prepares students for 
careers in the security or intelligence fields with various think tanks or intelligence agencies, such as the 
FBI or CIA.” “Major in Security and Intelligence Studies” Graduate School of Public and International 
Affairs, accessed 7 May, 2015. Available at: 
https://www.gspia.pitt.edu/Academics/DegreePrograms/MasterofPublicInternationalAffairs/MajorIn
SecurityIntelligenceStudies/tabid/95/Default.aspx 
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millions of potential radicalized individuals, it is hard to know where to begin looking 
for the proverbial needle in the haystack. The Syrian chemical weapons task falls in the 
middle of the continuum closer to the “puzzle” pole because definitive answers are 
possible (the percentage of weapons destroyed) and key variables are identifiable to assist 
in the analysis, yet rare discontinuities are possible (e.g. the war escalates and rebels steal 
chemical munitions). 
Figure 3.4: Intelligence Task Complexity 
 
Less Complex                                                                                                     More Complex         
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
      Puzzles 
*Definitive answers 
*Product: solution 
*Example:  
Locating Bin Laden 
        Mysteries  
*Some key variables 
assist 
*Product: forecast 
*Discontinuities rare 
*Example: Pakistani 
government’s response to 
Bin Laden raid 
           Complexities  
*Changing circumstances 
*Product: sensemaking  
*Discontinuities common 
*Example: Muslim public’s 
reaction to Bin Laden killing  
 
To the increase internal validity of the experiment, a pretest-posttest design was 
used (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002). Student participants were randomized into 
two experimental groups: one using ACH and the other using the Indicators and 
Signposts of Change technique (henceforth: “Indicators”). The Indicators technique 
requires analysts to work as a team to list “observable events that one would expect to 
see if a postulated situation is developing” (U.S. Government 2009, p. 12).  For example, 
analyst could list indicators of an upcoming coup, for example (e.g. the presence of 
rioting, political assassinations). ACH based on the falsification logic of Karl Popper that 
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knowledge should advance through a process of conjectures and refutations. The use of 
ACH is fairly straightforward: analysts start by creating a matrix and then insert evidence 
in the rows and hypotheses in the columns. Next, each piece of evidence is compared 
with each hypothesis to attempt to determine what Heuer refers to as “diagnosicity”—
the extent to which each of piece of evidence is consistent (or inconsistent) with each 
hypothesis. 
Both experimental groups participated in the experiment during the final week of 
March 2014 and first week of April 2014 to minimize any advantage one group might 
have as the destruction process progressed.  One week prior to the start of the main 
experiment, a pilot test was run to check the experimental procedures and instruments 
with three doctoral students.  The Indicators groups, 3 in total with 3-4 students in each, 
participated in the experiment during the final week of March.  Student participants 
reported to a small conference room and were read the informed consent script as per the 
Institutional Review Board requirements. Next, each participant was given three 
documents: the UN chemical weapons resolution, a map of Syria showing chemical 
weapons sites and areas controlled by the rebels, and a timeline of the weapon disposal 
process.  Participants were given 5-10 minutes to review these documents and then 
provided a judgment sheet and cognitive reasoning style test.  Upon completion of the 
judgment sheets, participants were led through the two steps of the Indicators technique 
exercise.  
Students first provided possible indicators that might affect the speed at which 
weapons were removed and destroyed (see a truncated example below in Table 3.6). 
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Second, each indicator was assessed on 3 point scale for importance on the destruction 
process (1=very important, 2=somewhat important, 3=not important) and likelihood of 
the indicator occurring (1=very likely/happening now, 2=somewhat likely, and 3=not 
likely). For example, one group determined that a major earthquake would have a 
moderate impact on the destruction process, but determined such an event was unlikely. 
All of this information was recorded on a whiteboard. Upon completion of the technique, 
participants were provided with a blank version of the same judgment sheet they 
completed at the beginning of the exercise. To avoid biasing the answers of other groups, 
participants were asked to not provide any information or their answers to their 
colleagues. The entire process required approximately three hours.  
Table 3.6: Truncated Indicators Grid 
 
Indicator Importance Likelihood 
Participant 
#1  
Participant 
#2 
Participant 
#1 
 
Participant  
#2 
 
Anti-regime forces blocking 
routes out of country 
2 2 2 3 
OPCW can’t find sites 3 3 3 3 
Acts of God (weather/natural 
disaster) 
2 2 3 3 
Rebel groups obtain chemical 
weapons 
1 2 2 3 
OPCW comes under attack 2 1 1 1 
Escalation of violence makes 
areas unsafe  
1 1 1 1 
OPCW ability to verify and locate 
all sites 
1 1 2 1 
Assad regime may delay 1 1 1 3 
International incident may draw 
attention away 
3 3 3 3 
Assad regime overthrown 2 2 3 3 
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Assad regime becomes totally 
uncooperative 
1 1 2 3 
Another party gets draw into the 
conflict 
2 2 3 3 
 
While the Indicators was relatively simple to implement without training 
participants, ACH requires training to implement effectively (Heuer and Pherson 2011, 
p. 315). The average length for instruction for new analysts in the IC to learn a battery of 
analytic techniques is two weeks (Defense Intelligence Agency 2011), therefore, the 
assumption was made that several hours are spent learning each technique. Interviews 
with State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research confirmed this assumption—
each technique requires 2-3 hours of instruction.26 To simulate this level of training and 
ensure that participants understood how to use ACH, a four hour workshop was 
conducted. The curriculum included the rationale for the technique and a full length 
practice example using a digital version of ACH. After the workshop each participant 
was provided a short quiz to determine how well they understood the rationale and use 
of ACH.  Across all students, the score was 82 percent on the quiz.  
The ACH groups—4 in total containing 4 students in each—followed nearly the 
same procedures as the Indicators group with the exception that a different technique 
was used. As with the Indicators groups, the ACH groups were provided with the same 
documents—the UN resolution, timeline, and map—and asked to make estimative 
judgments. Next, a facilitator led the use of structured ACH, a simplified version of the 
                                                 
26 Interview with INR analysts, Washington, D.C., February 24-26, 2014. 
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technique that requires analysts to start with the simplest set of hypotheses (Wheaton 
and Chido 2006). For example, the two working hypotheses in the experiment were either 
the weapons would be destroyed or not before the June 1st deadline. This form of ACH 
was used to reduce the amount of time that is required with a standard ACH which 
allows for expansive set of hypotheses.  To conduct the exercise, participants were first 
asked to generate pieces of evidence that would disconfirm the two hypotheses then 
asked to determine if pieces of evidence could be combined or eliminated. In Figure 3.5, 
below, the pieces of evidence are listed along the left side of the matrix. Next, each piece 
of evidence was assessed for whether it had a positive or negative bearing on the 
hypotheses. Where there was disagreement over a simple vote was taken and a flag 
placed to indicate disagreement, visible as on small flag on the right of Figure 3.5.  Then 
students were asked to consider the sensitivity of each piece of evidence to consider what 
effect changing a piece of evidence might have on the hypothesis. Lastly, students were 
provided the judgment sheets and asked to record their answers. 
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Figure 3.5 An Example ACH Matrix 
 
 
Accuracy was determined by using UN and OPCW reports on the destruction 
process.  The final update before June 30th 92 percent of the weapons were destroyed or 
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removed (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 2014). Therefore, 
judgments closer to the 92 percent mark were considered more accurate.  A factorial 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to compare the judgment means between the 
experimental groups to determine if there was a statically significant difference. The 
ANOVA tests was also used to determine if there was any significant change in 
judgments before and after using a technique. While robust to the normality assumption, 
ANOVA requires that variances be relatively equal between groups--homogeneity of 
variance assumption. To test for this assumption, a Levene’s test was used and it was 
determined for the comparisons between groups (Levene Statistic= .054, Sig.=.947) and 
within groups, including the comparison of pretest and posttests of ACH (Levene 
Statistic= .238, Sig.=.629) and Indicators (Levene Statistic= .160, Sig.=.695), the 
homogeneity of assumption was not violated.  
Rigor was determined by coding the narratives of the study participants to 
determine how well each experimental group explored hypotheses (Miller, et al. 2006;  
Zelik, et al. 2007). In the example below (Figure 3.6), two hypotheses were stated that 
could affect the implementation of chemical weapons agreement (both highlighted), the 
former to speaking to the rationality of Assad and the latter to the perceived calculus of 
destroying the weapons.  Unique hypotheses were coded for participant and aggregated 
for each experimental group.  
Figure 3.6: Snippet of Narrative with Hypotheses 
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Assad has shown his willingness to use chemical 
weapons, and the consequences thus far have not 
outweighed the benefits.  
 
Next the hypotheses were enumerated and combined for each group and put on a 
distribution (see Figure 3.7). ) and a logarithmic curve fitted to the distribution.  The 
logarithmic curve approximates a distribution of hypotheses that fits most knowledge 
systems where the ratio of trust to doubt favors the former (Campbell 1977, Dunn 2001, 
p. 6).  Visually, this means the more positively skewed the distribution to the left the more 
trust there is in a set of favored hypotheses; the less skewed to the right, the less trust and 
agreement in the hypotheses.  For example, below in Figure 3.8 are the hypotheses for the 
Indicators participants before using the technique. Before using Indicators, participants’ 
judgments closely fit a logarithmic curve of R2= .950, suggesting agreement on the main 
hypothesis, time was insufficient for the removal process and therefore it was unlikely to 
occur.  
Figure 3.7: Example of Distribution of Hypotheses 
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3.3  CONCLUSION 
Evaluating structured analytic techniques is no easy task. The secrecy of the IC 
and methodological challenges of evaluation creates multiple obstacles. However, 
through employing multiple methods to build interlocking evidence, it is possible to 
gauge and draw strong inferences. This chapter laid out five methods to evaluate the two 
research questions. The implementation question was addressed by combining semi-
structured interviews with intelligence experts and a survey including follow-up 
interviews at an IC agency. Each method has complementary strengths: the interviews 
provide contextual description and the survey allows for the use of statistical procedures 
to generalize to the rest of INR.  
 Answering the effectiveness question required combining a systematic review 
with an experiment. While the systematic review provided a broad overview of all known 
research studies on the techniques, the experiment examined particular techniques and 
mechanisms. Combined, these two methods yield credible evidence on whether the 
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techniques are effective for improving analysis and under what circumstances. The 
following chapters put these methods into practice with the aim of determining if the IC’s 
efforts to improve foreign affairs judgment have been successful.   
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4.0  CHAPTER 4: WHO USES STRUCTURED ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES AND 
WHY?: A SURVEY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
 
An open question is how often analysts actually use the techniques. Anecdotal accounts 
suggest analysts are reluctant to use the techniques on the job (Moore and Hoffman n.d.; 
Folker 2000). Scholars and practitioners posit several possible explanations why this 
might be the case, including the perception of the techniques (Marrin 2007; Heuer and 
Pherson 2011, p. 337), and demographic characteristics of analysts, such as age 
(Immerman 2011; Fingar 2008), and training (Moore and Hoffman, n.d.). Yet, the most 
cited reason why analysts do not use the techniques is time pressure (Heuer 1999, p. 85-
86; Folker 2000; Khalsa 2009).  As explained in Chapter 2, the techniques are perceived to 
entail significant costs in time and resources. However, beyond anecdote there is little 
empirical support for this explanation. 
This chapter addresses this gap by presenting the result of a survey of 80 analysts 
at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and interviews with 
20 intelligence analysts and experts. The purpose was to understand: 1) how often 
analysts use the techniques; and 2) what factors are related to their use. The results of the 
study confirm anecdotal accounts that analysts do not use the techniques on a regular 
basis. The more important question, however, is why analysts might not use the 
techniques. In this study, one variable proved most important: whether an analyst 
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received training or had been exposed to the techniques through previous employment 
or education. To a lesser extent, perceived effectiveness of the techniques was also 
correlated. Importantly, there is no correlation between the average length of analysts 
projects—a measure of time pressure--and their preference to use the techniques. This is 
an important finding because it goes against common wisdom that time pressure is the 
main reason analysts do not use the techniques.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: in section 4.1 the study hypotheses are re-stated, 
some background on INR provided, and the descriptive statistics from the survey 
presented. In section 4.2, the finding that training is the most important variable is 
presented. In section 4.3, three other variables are explored: perception of the techniques, 
time pressure, and analyst age. The chapter closes with a re-statement of the central 
arguments and findings. 
4.1  FRAMING THE STUDY: TESTING THE VARIABLES AT STATE 
DEPARTMENT INR 
Exploratory interviews conducted for this research with intelligence experts suggested 
that there is increasing openness to structured analytic techniques over the last decade. 
Warren Fishbein, an intelligence expert and facilitator of an early effort to implement the 
techniques in the 1990s, noted that there is greater recognition in the IC that a purely 
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expertise-based approach to analysis is insufficient.27 Similarly, a CIA analytic 
methodologist noted that the daily life of analysts has changed over the last two decades, 
with a greater willingness to collaborate among analysts and “to do the thinking 
beforehand and use structured discussion before pen goes to paper.”28 Paul Johnson, 
former Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence at the CIA, echoes this change 
in priorities by noting that what constitutes a “good analyst” has changed from mainly 
regional and functional expertise to include procedural knowledge of how to use 
structured analytic techniques.29 Despite these anecdotal accounts, it is not clear to what 
extent structured analytic techniques are used on the job and what variables affect 
whether an analyst decides to use them.  
 
4.1.1   Study Hypotheses 
Moore and Hoffman( n.d.) and Folker (2000) have identified the role of training as an 
important variable for explaining the adoption of the techniques  
Hypothesis 1: There will be a statistically significant (p=<.05) and positive relation between 
whether analysts have training in the techniques and use them on the job.  
 
                                                 
27 Interview with Warren Fishbein, June 11, 2014. 
28 Interview with Warren Fishbein, June 11, 2014. 
29 Interview with Paul Johnson, June 9, 2014 
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The role of belief systems (Weiss and Bucuvalas 1980), in particular, how analysts 
perceive the usefulness of the techniques (Marrin 2007) was expected to be a determinant 
of whether analysts use the techniques on the job.  
Hypothesis 2: There will be a statistically significant (p=<.05) and positive relation between how 
effective analysts perceive the techniques and their use of them on the job.  
 
Another variable is the time pressure an analyst is under. The focus on fast paced 
production of intelligence is claimed to reduce the ability of the analyst to use the 
techniques (Johnston 2005; Dixon and McNamara 2008). 
Hypothesis 3: There will be a statistically significant (p=<.05)  and negative relation between 
analysts’ average analytic project and their use of the techniques. 
 
 The demographic shift in the IC towards a younger workforce has led some observers to 
note that younger analysts will be more comfortable using structured analytic techniques 
(Immerman 2011; Fingar 2008). 
Hypothesis 4: There will be a statistically significant (p=<.05) and negative relation between 
analysts’ age and their use of the techniques on the job. 
 
4.1.2    State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
The study hypotheses were tested through a survey and interviews with analysts at one 
of the oldest agencies in the IC. Originating from World War II, INR was formed from 
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the wartime intelligence agency, the Office of Special Services’ (OSS) analytic division 
and later transferred to the State Department (incidentally, the clandestine wing of OSS 
became the institutional basis of today’s CIA). Today, the agency’s mission is to support 
U.S. diplomacy through all-source intelligence analysis and serve “as the focal point in 
the State Department for ensuring policy review of sensitive counterintelligence and law 
enforcement activities around the world” (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). Even with this 
important mission, INR is tiny both in manpower and resources compared to larger 
intelligence agencies.  In the words of one INR official, its budget is “decimal dust” 
compared to larger agencies, such as the NSA and CIA (Rood 2006).  
These limitations notwithstanding, INR has received significant attention in the 
past decade. The most notable example occurred in the lead up to the Iraq War when INR 
gave the sole dissenting opinion in the IC’s overall assessment—called the National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE)--of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear program. Instead of making a 
firm positive or negative judgment on the existence of Iraq’s program, INR stated there 
was not enough evidence to draw an inference. While INR’s success has drawn further 
interest, little is known of its analytic practices, a gap this research explored through a 
survey and interviews at the Bureau.30 
 
                                                 
30 For example, see: Justin Rood, “Analyze This: Inside the one spy agency that got pre-war intelligence 
on Iraq--and much else--right.” Washington Monthly, January/February 2005. To my knowledge the only 
in-depth study INR’s analytic practices is an older study by O’Leary (1974): O'Leary, Michael K., et al. 
"The Quest for Relevance: Quantitative International Relations Research and Government Foreign Affairs 
Analysis." International Studies Quarterly (1974): 211-237. 
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4.1.3  Gauging the Use of Structured Analytic Techniques at INR 
The survey responses suggested that structured analytic techniques are not regularly 
used at INR. In fact, approximately a third of analysts report never using the techniques 
on the job. The remaining two thirds of analysts are split between those that rarely (33 
percent) or sometimes (21 percent) use the techniques (see figure 4.2). The extent to which 
these numbers reflect the wider IC is only partially known. Interviews with INR analysts 
suggest that analysts working in larger agencies such as the CIA, DIA, and NSA do use 
the techniques, although the exact number is not available.31  
 A skeptic could argue that structured analytic techniques are not needed at INR 
because it is already punching well above its weight without using the techniques. This 
argument, however, makes an unstated assumption. Specifically, that INR could not 
improve its performance further through using the techniques. Given the promise of the 
techniques, which is explored in depth in Chapters 5 and 6, it is worth exploring what 
circumstances might be related to whether an analyst chooses to use them. The following 
sections address these questions at the individual and institutional-level by examining 
training, demographics, time pressure, and perceptions of the techniques. 
 
Figure 4.1 Use of Structured Analytic Techniques at INR 
                                                 
31 Interviews with INR analysts, Washington, D.C., November 2014. 
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4.2  STUDY HYPOTHESIS 1: ANALYST TRAINING 
There is little institutional support for training analysts in structured analytic techniques 
at INR. As one analyst stated, “INR has no formal training program” and another noted, 
“I have had training in structured analytic techniques, but not a lot, it was the equivalent 
of hearing someone talk about it for 30 minutes.”32 As these statements suggest, new INR 
analysts are not required to take the 4-week “Analysis 101,” a course designed to provide 
common analytical methods to the IC (Kelly 2007). While the interviews did address why 
INR is exempted, perhaps one reason is is that the agency maintains a certain level of 
autonomy from the rest of IC. 
                                                 
32 Interviews with INR analysts, Washington, D.C., November 2014. 
21%
Sometimes
46%
Rarely
33%
Never
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 Given the limited opportunities for INR analysts to learn the techniques, the 
results of the survey were not surprising: approximately three-quarters of analysts 
reported having no training. In the place of training in the techniques, INR analysts 
receive training in the traditional paradigm which the Intelligence Reform Act sought to 
augment. This training, or as it is better described, “mentoring,” was detailed in 
Johnston’s (2005) ethnography of the analytic culture of the IC. He found that new 
analysts were brought into the profession as “journeymen” studying under a “master” 
with decades of experience (Johnston 2005). During this process the analyst learns in the 
basic “ins and outs” of their agency with most analytic training focused on analytical 
writing skills, rather than learning more formal methodologies, such as structured 
analytic techniques.  
 Beyond training, INR analysts reported they had limited assistance for using 
structured analytic techniques. At larger agencies, such as CIA and DIA, there are 
“tradecraft cells” including a variant called “red cells” that attempt to challenge the 
prevailing wisdom of analysts.33   
These analytic teams are staffed by methodologists who assist analysts in selecting 
and implementing methods.34 At INR there is some analytic support in the form of an 
analytic tradecraft office, although the office is staffed by a single methodologist.35  
                                                 
33 For one analyst’s experiences working in a red cell unit, see: “Global Agenda: Red Cell 
Intelligence analyst describes his role as 'devil's advocate' in the CIA,”  University of Delaware Daily, 
April 5, 2012, available at: http://www.udel.edu/udaily/2012/apr/global-agenda-red-cell-040512.html 
34 Interview with CIA Methodologist, Washington, D.C., June 20, 2014. 
35 Interview with INR analyst, Washington, D.C., November 11, 2014. 
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 Analysts interviewed for this study reported that there are other routes for gaining 
experience with the techniques.36  For example, several analysts reported that interagency 
discussions with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council (NIC) sometimes involve 
the use of collaborative techniques to mediate analytic disputes, such as structured 
Brainstorming and an informal version of Analysis of Competing Hypotheses.37 A couple 
of analysts received training through previous employment at other agencies. For 
example, one analyst stated that whether analysts use the techniques depends “on where 
[the analyst was] educated before they came to INR and on what experience they are 
bringing to the job.”38 Not surprisingly, the analysts interviewed for this study that came 
from larger agencies such as the DIA, reported using the techniques on the job at INR 
because of their previous training.39  
 Opportunities to get exposure to the techniques through training appears to be 
strongly related to whether analysts use them on the job. This point was confirmed by 
the survey data: the relation between whether an analyst reported receiving training and 
if they use the techniques was highly significant (chi square=13.593, p=.001). The high 
level of significance of the results (p=.001) suggested that there is less than a one percent 
chance that this relation is invalid in a normally-distributed population. Or in other 
words, the observed results are extremely unlikely to occur by chance alone. In addition, 
the strength of the relation between training is moderately strong with a Cramér's V value 
                                                 
36 Interviews with INR analysts, Washington, D.C., November 2014. 
37 Interviews with INR analysts, Washington, D.C., November 2014. 
38 Interview with INR analyst, Washington, D.C., November 10, 2014. 
39 Interview with INR analyst, Washington, D.C., November 10, 2014. 
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of .412. This result is notable because a 0 indicates no association and a 1 perfect 
association between training and use of the techniques.  
 The results of the survey suggested exposure to the techniques through training 
matters and, possibly, the quality of training. Of the 29 INR analysts reporting some 
training in the techniques, the 20 that reported quality training also reported they use 
structured analytic techniques on the job; only a single analyst that reported quality 
training did not report using the techniques on the job. However, caution should be taken 
in assessing this finding as respondents were not asked to clarify in follow-up interviews 
what constitutes “quality training.” Future research will need to address this gap and 
explore quality training.   
 If training is a key variable at the analyst-level, but what explains the lack adoption 
or promotion of the techniques at the institutional-level?   The short answer is analytic 
culture. There are two competing, but non-exclusive analytic cultures in the IC: the 
traditionalist culture focused on deep subject matter expertise and the “generalist” 
culture focused on the use of explicit methodologies, such as structured analytic 
techniques.  Since the beginning of the analytic reform movement the generalist culture 
has gained more adherents at larger agencies such as the CIA and NSA. In the generalist 
culture, analysts are prized for their “organizational flexibility and value in producing 
current intelligence ...” (Marrin 2013, p. 326). The generalist is able to rotate between 
research areas focused on specific regions and functional areas (e.g. small arms, 
terrorism), in theory, applying a “toolbox” of methodologies to different types of analytic 
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problems. Since 2001, there are more civilian intelligence studies programs built to 
prepare more generalist analysts for the IC (Crosston and Coulthart, forthcoming).  
 INR is again, an exception to the rule. While the generalist culture appears to be 
becoming dominant in other agencies, INR is a stronghold for the traditionalist culture. 
For example, instead of regular rotations, INR analysts are typically assigned to analyze 
one region or functional area for the duration of their career. After several years on 
assignment, INR analysts are expected to gain deep subject matter expertise, if they have 
not already done so--INR also recruits experts from academia and the private sector 
(Rood 2006). Adding to the emphasis on subject matter expertise, Foreign Service Officers 
(FSOs) are rotated through the Bureau to bring firsthand knowledge and area expertise 
with them.  According to one such FSO working at INR: “…by being out there in the field 
I can begin to read situations... FSOs leaven INR analysis with ground truth.”40   It is 
probably due to traditionalist culture that INR eschews analytical training in the 
techniques which may in turn explain the results of the survey. 
4.3 PERCEPTIONS OF THE TECHNIQUES, TIME PRESSURE AND 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
While not as strong as the relation between training, perceptions of the techniques appear 
to be correlated with adoption (study hypothesis 2). This result speaks to the importance 
                                                 
40 Interview with Foreign Service Officer, Washington, D.C., November 25, 2014. 
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of convincing analysts that there is value in using the techniques. Other variables such 
as, demographics (hypothesis 3) and time pressure (hypothesis 4) were not supported by 
the survey data.  
 
4.3.1  Perception of Structured Analytic Techniques 
Study results suggested INR analysts perceive the techniques as fairly effective in 
improving rigor and to a lesser extent, accuracy.  Most survey respondents reported that 
the techniques improved accuracy either a fair amount (17 percent) or a little (60 percent). 
Interestingly, 20 percent reported that the techniques had no effect on accuracy.  
However, respondents seemed to have more faith in the techniques for improving rigor. 
Rigor was described to respondents as the extent to which analysis incorporates multiple 
hypotheses, viewpoints, and encourages creative thinking (for an extended description 
of analytic rigor, see Chapter 2).  Among the survey respondents, 32 percent believed the 
techniques improved analysis “a great deal” and 44 percent “a fair amount.”  One analyst 
echoed the importance of improving rigor through exploring multiple hypotheses by 
noting that some structured analytic techniques, such as the Analysis of Competing 
Hypotheses (ACH), would have been useful in the Iraq weapons of mass destruction 
case.41  Still, among analysts this view was tempered by the belief that analysis should 
not be “tool-centric.”  A small number of analysts—5 percent—reported the techniques 
                                                 
41 Interview with INR analyst, Washington, D.C., November 11, 2014. 
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were not effective in improving rigor, versus the 20 percent that believed they had no 
effect on accuracy. Two analysts interviewed reported the techniques were a “waste of 
time” and “not useful,” although these results suggest these analysts are in the minority.42 
 While not as strong as the relation between training, perceptions of the techniques 
effect on rigor appears to be correlated with use (chi square=3.83 p=.049). The strength of 
the relation between perception and use of techniques is not strong, but still notable 
(Cramér's V= .225).  Accuracy was not statistically significant (chi square=1.241, p=.265). 
These results suggest that there is a relation between perception of the techniques and 
their use by analysts, although this variable appears to be weaker than an analyst’s 
exposure to training. These results also speak to an important and obvious point that 
without a convincing case that analysts ought to try something new, they resist using the 
techniques (Moore and Hoffman n.d.; Heuer and Pherson 2011, p. 337).  Additionally, the 
responses on perceptions of accuracy suggest analysts have more faith in the techniques 
to improve the rigor.  
Figure 4.2: Perception of Techniques43  
 
Response Rigor Accuracy 
A great deal 5% 3% 
A fair amount 32 17 
A little 58 60 
Not at all 5 20 
 
 
                                                 
42 Interviews with INR analysts, Washington, D.C., November 2014. 
43 Survey questions: “To what extent, on average, do you think  structured analytic techniques help 
analysts think in a more effective way (rigor); To what extent, on average, do you think  structured 
analytic techniques help analysts be more accurate or "right" in their analytic judgments? (accuracy) 
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 The INR study presents an interesting puzzle: if most INR analysts believe the 
techniques are useful, why do they not use them on the job?  Two possible explanations 
emerged in the analyst interviews that might explain the gap between perceived value 
and adoption: the role of subject matter expertise and problem type.  As the discussion 
above makes clear, traditionalism is the dominant analytic culture at INR.  Several 
analysts reported that their focus on subject matter expertise made structured analytic 
techniques redundant. “The general belief at INR,” stated one analyst, is that “at this level 
of expertise you should be doing rigorous thinking that structured analytic techniques 
make you do.”  This view was typically expressed through the idea of thinking “outside 
the box”: junior analysts were perceived to need help thinking outside the box or they 
might miss a key piece of information or hypotheses.  As another analyst put it, “When 
you are better versed [in the subject area] you don’t need the techniques to think this 
way.”44 This belief among INR analysts was unexpected because a rationale for using the 
techniques is to assist all analysts, including subject matter experts (Heuer and Pherson 
2010, pp. 5-6). In contrast to the traditionalists’ belief, there is some support from the 
cognitive psychological literature that experts might not only be susceptible to the same 
errors as novices, but also that experts make their own unique analytic errors, such as 
having unwarranted confidence in their judgments. 45  
                                                 
44 Interview with INR analyst, Washington, D.C., November 24, 2014. 
45 For a discussion of the limits of expertise in intelligence analysis see:  Hal R. Arkes and James Kajdasz, 
“Intuitive Theories of Behavior” in Intelligence Analysis: Behavioral and Social Scientific 
Foundations, Baruch Fischhoff and Cherie Chauvin (eds.), Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 
2011 
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 Another explanation is that the types of analytic problems that INR analyzes.  One 
analyst noted that the type of problems INR analyzes are qualitatively different from 
agencies such as the DIA. The analyst noted that the types of analytic problems at these 
types of agencies appear to be well-structured, especially those dealing with military 
logistics and planning (“e.g. where the tanks are moving”) versus those at INR dealing 
with leader’s intentions and beliefs.46 Another analyst concurred on this point stating, 
"linear techniques” which presumably include structured analytic techniques, are “more 
appropriate for linear problems and sometimes we have linear problems and sometimes 
we don’t. But my work is a mixed bag—sometimes I can use [the] techniques.”47  This 
belief suggests that some INR analysts are not familiar with the broad range of structured 
analytics, many of which are useful for diverse tasks including well-structured and ill-
structured problems.  For example, the Indicators or Signposts of Change technique can 
assist analysts in structuring problems, which could include identifying drivers that 
affect a leader’s intentions (see Chapter 6 for an experiment evaluating this technique).  
 
4.3.2  Time Pressure 
Since September 11th and the beginning of the “War on Terrorism,” the demand for 
analysts to produce analysis has increased, while the intelligence production has sped up 
(Johnston 2005, pp. 26-27; Dixon and McNamara, 2008). However, the survey and 
                                                 
46 Interview with INR analyst, Washington, D.C., November 14, 2014. 
47 Interview with INR analyst, Washington, D.C., November 14, 2014. 
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interviews from INR suggested that the amount of time pressure, measured by the 
average project an analyst works on, is not related to whether they use the techniques.  
 In this study time pressure was operationalized by analysts’ answer to the 
question: “On average, how long does it take you to complete an analytic product?” 
Analysts were asked about their average analytic product rather than asking about how 
much time pressure they felt, to gain a fairly objective measure of how pressed they are 
for time. Analytic products can come in the form of presentations, reports, and memos 
for intelligence consumers. There were 11 analysts under heavy time pressure with their 
average analytic product taking 1-2 days of work. Of these analysts 7 reported using the 
techniques. This result is unexpected given the claim busy analysts do not have time to 
use the techniques. The largest groups were those reporting a moderate amount of time 
pressure, a week to two weeks for their average product. Of the 45 analysts under this 
category, 32 reported using techniques versus 13 that do not. As for the 24 analysts that 
face the least time pressure, a month or more, the results again are not in the expected 
direction: 15 report using techniques versus 9 that do not.  The statistical analysis suggests 
that there is not a relation between time pressure and the use of structured analytic 
techniques (chi square= .616, p=.735). It is important to note that INR might be different 
than other agencies in terms of time pressure. One analyst reported that she had been at 
INR for several years and reported that when she worked at another IC agency the time 
pressure was considerable. Future research will need to delve into whether the time 
pressure factor is more important at other agencies.  
Figure 4.3: Analysts’ Self-Reported Average Analytic Product at INR 
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4.3.3   Demographics: Age 
 Former Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, Thomas Fingar (2008, p. 
24) argues that persuading younger analysts to “adopt new techniques and to work 
differently than the older generations” is easy.  Immerman (2011) echoes Fingar, by 
noting that ‘Generation Y’ is more “comfortable with, and open to, new techniques that 
enable collaboration and integration” than previous generations. If these commentators 
are correct, younger analysts should report using the techniques more than their older 
colleagues (study hypothesis 3). The results of the survey and interview data tell a 
different story.  
 Analysts were asked to report how long they have worked in the IC, as a proxy 
for their age. Based on the years of service, analysts were divided into three “cohorts”:  
14%
A day or two
45%
A week or two
23% 
A month or two
8% 
3+ months
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the Cold War (pre-1991), post-Cold War (1992-2001), and post-9/11 (2002-onward).  For 
example, an analyst with 25 years in the IC would be counted in the Cold War cohort 
because they began their career in the late 1980s. The survey results at INR are reflective 
of this wider demographic shift in the IC; more than half of analysts joined after 
September 11th (See figure 4.5, below). In fact, almost three quarters of INR analysts 
surveyed joined INR after the commencement of the War on Terror; 25 percent higher 
than the average in the rest of the IC (Fingar 2008).  The remaining 17 percent of analysts 
at INR are evenly split between those that joined during Cold War or the interim period 
between the Cold War and September 11th.  In short, if the results are representative, INR 
is a young agency. 
 
Figure 4.4: Age Cohorts at INR 
 
 
14%
Cold War
13%
Post-Cold War
73% 
Post-9/11
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 Of the 59 post-9/11 analysts, 40 report some use of the techniques. In other words, 
almost two thirds of these analysts report using the techniques. The results for the pre-
9/11 analysts are less clear: of the 21 analysts that joined before September 11th, 12 report 
using the techniques.  These data seem to show a weak trend, as post-9/11 analysts do 
seem to use the techniques more than their older colleagues; however, a chi-square test 
of the survey results erases any doubt that there is relation between an analyst’s age and 
whether they use the techniques (chi square= .009 p=.924). The Cramer’s V score of .011 
indicates a very weak correlation, as a 0 indicates no association and a 1 perfect 
association.  The intelligence reformers appear to be wrong, at least as far as INR is 
concerned. 
 These results are puzzling: how can age not play a role, especially since newer INR 
analysts are more likely to be exposed to training, the most important variable identified 
in this study?  The answer seems to loop back to the issue of institutional support: there 
are few opportunities for young INR analysts to gain familiarity and expertise with the 
techniques.  A young analyst entering INR is unlikely to be very different in analytic 
training and culture than a senior analyst who joined the Bureau twenty years ago.  In 
short, youth probably matters less at INR than at larger agencies such as the CIA, where 
the analytic culture has shifted to a more generalist paradigm in the last ten years and 
techniques are mandated more widely at the institutional level. As one analyst noted, “If 
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[the techniques] were mandated above and if our leadership made a push the techniques, 
they would be implemented.”48 
4.4  SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The survey and interviews of INR yielded answers to the research question: How often 
are structured analytic techniques used and what variables affect their use? In particular, 
three key findings emerged. First, the survey responses suggested that 1 in 3 analysts do 
not use structured analytic techniques. While these results can only be cautiously 
generalized beyond INR, they are the first comprehensive reporting of the 
implementation of structured analytic techniques.  
 Second, the main variable that is related to the use of structured analytic 
techniques at INR is the existence of analytic training. The survey and interviews suggest 
training is at least moderately correlated with the use of the techniques. Another variable 
positively correlated with the use of the techniques, although to a lesser degree, was 
whether analysts perceive the techniques to be effective for improving the rigor of their 
analysis. Interestingly, while most INR analysts see benefits of using the techniques, 
many do not use them on the job because either they believe they are more appropriate 
for novices or consider the techniques inappropriate for their analytic tasks.   
                                                 
48 Interview with INR analyst, Washington, D.C., November 14, 2014. 
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 Finally, other variables cited in the literature, such as age cohort and time pressure 
had no statistically significant relation with the use of the techniques.  The latter finding 
is of great importance because time pressure is the most cited reason why analysts cannot 
use the techniques on the job (Heuer 1999, p. 85-86; Folker 2000; Khalsa 2009). As an 
outlier in size, culture, and performance, INR is quite different than other agencies. 
Therefore, future research will need to determine the extent to which these variables 
affect the preference to use structured analytic techniques at other, larger agencies such 
as the CIA and NSA.  
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5.0  CHAPTER 5: “WHAT WORKS?” A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF STRUCTURED 
ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES 
 
 
Research on intelligence analysis appears to have changed little in the last several 
decades. Mangio and Wilkinson (2011, p. 19) discuss the cognitive bias, mirror imaging 
and conclude that since the 1960s the intelligence literature has discussed it repeatedly. 
Providing little or no evidence, the research community nevertheless has repeated the 
basic message: “mirror imaging is bad and an analyst shouldn’t do it.” A similar situation 
is true for structured analytic techniques:  over the last decade the literature exhorts 
analysts to use the techniques but provides little or no proof of which techniques are 
effective and under what circumstances.  This observation has not been lost on the wider 
scientific community.  In 2010 and again in 2011, the National Academy of Sciences 
convened special conferences to assess intelligence and methodologies.  The finding of 
the conferences is clear:  “many methods used by or proposed to the Intelligence 
Community (IC) have not been formally evaluated” (McClelland 2011, p. 95). 
 As the above quote makes clear, beyond some isolated attempts to examine 
specific methodologies and issues,49 no systematic review of structured analytic 
                                                 
49 For an example of validation of intelligence methodology, see: Mandel, David R. "Canadian 
perspectives: Applied behavioral science in support of intelligence analysis." Invited paper presented at 
the Public Workshop of the National Research Council Committee on Behavioral and Social Science 
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techniques has ever been conducted—until now. This chapter presents the results of a 
systematic review of structured analytic techniques to address this gap. A systematic 
review is a method to sum up the best research on a specific question. As opposed to a 
traditional literature review, a systematic review is a transparent method to find, 
evaluate, and synthesize, the results of relevant research (Campbell Collaboration n.d.). 
This chapter presents the results of a systematic review of the 12 structured analytic 
techniques from U.S. Government’s Analytic Tradecraft Primer (2009), covering more than 
200 studies sampled from a population of thousands of research studies.  
 The 46 evaluative studies were identified from 261 studies on 6 of the 12 structured 
analytic techniques.  Each of the 46 evaluative studies was assessed for credibility by 
examining its internal validity using the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale (MSMS) 
(Sherman 1998) and whether a technique was reported in the study as effective for 
improving rigor or accuracy.  Studies with higher MSMS scores were deemed more 
credible than those with lower scores. The review found a low credibility evidence base 
for three techniques—Alternative Futures Analysis, Red Teaming, and Team A/Team 
B—and no evaluative studies for six techniques (Key Assumptions Check, Quality of 
Information Check, High-Impact/Low-Probability, Indicators of Signpost/Change, 
“What If?” Analysis, and Outside-In Thinking). Regrettably, there is low credibility or no 
evidence for 9 out of the 12 techniques. This gap will need to be addressed by future 
                                                 
Research to Improve Intelligence Analysis for National Security. Washington, DC: The National 
Academies. 2009. 
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research, some initial steps of which are taken in Chapter 6 by evaluating the Indicators 
of Signpost/Change technique.  
 Despite the evidentiary gaps in our knowledge of the efficacy of most structured 
analytic techniques, three techniques did have a robust evidence-base: Devil’s Advocacy, 
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) and Brainstorming. Brainstorming, which 
had a moderately credible evidence-base, was effective in only 40 percent of the studies. 
Interestingly, collaborative Brainstorming led consistently to a negative effect on the 
quality and quantity of ideas generated. Evaluative studies of ACH suggest it assists 
analysts in seeking disconfirming evidence, although it did not assist analysts in properly 
weighting disconfirming evidence across three high credibility studies. Although many 
studies suggest there is no link between seeking disconfirming evidence and judgment 
accuracy, there is a possible link between evidence weighting and judgment accuracy. 
This result is consistent with previous research on the importance of weighting and 
updating beliefs for improving foreign affairs judgment accuracy (Tetlock 2005, p. 217). 
Devil’s Advocacy was found to be effective in challenging and validating assumptions 
and improving accuracy over consensus-seeking groups, especially in tasks where 
groups must select one optimal solution.  
 Section 5.1, presents the descriptive results of the systematic review, the sources, 
subject matter, reported effectiveness, and credibility of the studies analyzed in the 
review.  The second half of 5.1 provides a broad outline of the overall results of the 
systematic review.  Section 5.2 presents findings regarding three techniques with at least 
moderately strong evidence. These findings are helpful in understanding the conditions 
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under which the techniques are effective. The chapter closes with a summary of the main 
findings and their implications.  
5.1  OVERVIEW: “WHAT WORKS?” 
The systematic review identified 46 evaluative studies of 6 of the 12 techniques: 
Alternative Futures Analysis, ACH, Brainstorming, Devil’s Advocacy, Red Teaming, and 
Team A/Team B.  After analyzing the studies for a reported effect of the techniques, and 
assessing the strength of the research design to determine the credibility of the studies, 
the results suggested there is moderately credible evidence to suggest that the 6 
techniques, in aggregate, are effective in improving the rigor and accuracy of analysis in 
just over half of the studies (skip ahead to figure 5.4 for the overall snapshot of “what 
works”). However, beyond this overall snapshot, the evidence-base for some techniques 
are not equally credible as some have stronger research designs than others. Three 
techniques, ACH, Brainstorming, and Devil’s Advocacy, have at least a moderately 
credible evidence base.  Interestingly, there was a moderately negative correlation (-.49) 
between study credibility and the reported effect size of the technique. In other words, 
the lower the credibility of the study the more likely the technique will be reported 
effective. 
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5.1.1   Selecting and Describing the Evaluative Studies 
Of the 261 studies sampled (see Chapter 3 for the identification and selection procedures) 
there were 46 evaluative studies identified. To be included the study had to provide a 
report, either verbal or numerical of the effect of a technique on analytical rigor or 
accuracy. Hypothetical reports (e.g. “ACH could be helpful to intelligence analysts…”) 
were excluded. The remaining studies were excluded for a variety of reasons. For 
example, 95 studies described how to use a technique in a particular application but 
provided no explicit evaluation and 36 studies discussed conceptual issues related to 
using a technique. For a full list of exclusion criteria and procedures, see Chapter 3 and 
Methodological Appendix B.   
 The 46 evaluative studies came from diverse sources. In terms of format, most 
studies came from journals (30) with the remainder from conferences (6), 
theses/dissertations (5), monographs (4), and other (a blog entry) (1). The focus on 
journals is not surprising, but the inclusion of studies from non-published, “gray 
literature” in this review reduces publication bias (Easterbrook 1991), and potentially 
increases the validity of these results.  In terms of subject areas, most evaluative studies 
came from business and management (18 studies), followed by security studies (7), 
psychology (7), conservation (6), and other subjects (8).  
 The review included 12 techniques from the Tradecraft Primer (2009) (see figure 5.1, 
below). Among these techniques there were 6 that had no evaluative research: Key 
Assumptions Check, Quality of Information Check, High-Impact/Low-Probability, 
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Indicators of Signpost/Change, “What If?” Analysis, and Outside-In Thinking.  Upon 
closer examination, most of these techniques have one trait in common: each was 
developed specially for the Tradecraft Primer (2009) by intelligence trainer, Randy 
Pherson, and therefore are probably not old enough to have research traditions to 
produce evaluative studies.   
Figure 5.1: Techniques Included in this Study 
 
Key Assumptions Check 
Quality of Information Check 
Indicators of Signpost/Change 
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses 
Devil’s Advocacy 
Team A/Team B 
High-Impact/Low-Probability Analysis 
”What If?” Analysis Brainstorming 
Outside-In Thinking 
Red Team Analysis 
Alternative Futures Analysis 
 
 Other techniques, some from security and intelligence studies, such as ACH, Red 
Teaming, and Team A/Team B, have a longer history, and therefore, had a few evaluative 
studies (8 in total).  The remaining three techniques—Alternative Futures Analysis, 
Devil’s Advocacy, and Brainstorming—have the longest research traditions and most 
evaluative studies (38), much of which comes from disciplines outside security and 
intelligence studies. The only chronological and discernable pattern is that there are 
decades where more evaluative research was conducted for certain techniques. For 
example, Brainstorming included 5 studies from psychology from the late 1990s and early 
2000s, but after this point there were less evaluative studies. 
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Figure 5.2: Number of Evaluative Studies 
 
 
5.1.2   Assessing the Credibility of Evidence 
 From the description above, some techniques have more evaluative research than others, 
however, not all studies are created equal and vary greatly in terms of the believability 
of the reported findings. Scholars of methods and research design term this believability 
as “credibility”; the more credible a study, the greater confidence the intervention (in this 
case, a technique) had the reported effect (Cook and Campbell 1979; Shadish et al. 2002).  
To assess credibility, a MSMS score was determined for each study (see Figure 5.3).  
 
 
Figure 5.3: Modified Maryland Scientific Methods Scale 
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 Placing the evidence alongside the reported effectiveness of the techniques 
provides an overall snapshot of “what works” (see figure 5.4). Effectiveness was 
determined by coding each study according to the reported effectiveness of the 
technique: 1) the technique had a negative effect; 2) no effect; 3) mixed effect; and 4) 
positive effect. Techniques that were listed as having a positive effect on rigor or accuracy 
were considered “effective.” Evidence credibility for each technique was calculated by 
averaging the MSMS score for all of a technique’s studies and coded into high (5-6), 
medium (3-4), and low (1-2) after rounding up to the nearest whole number. For example, 
if a set of studies had an average of MSMS score of 3.8, then it would be rounded to 4 and 
fall into the moderate credibility range (3-4).  
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 Overall, there is moderately credible evidence for the 6 techniques with evaluative 
studies (the average is 2.8 on the MSMS scale)  (See Figure 5.4).  The technique with the 
strongest evidence base (a MSMS score of 4.5 across all studies) is Devil’s Advocacy. 
Compared to consensus forms of analysis and decision making, Devil’s Advocacy is 
effective more than 70 percent of the time. While a relatively small literature, the ACH 
studies are highly credible (4.4) and suggest that the technique improves analysis over 
control groups in half of the reports. The technique appears to partly address 
confirmation bias but not improve forecast accuracy. Brainstorming had mixed 
effectiveness and a moderately credible evidence-base (3.8). Nominal or noninteracting 
brainstorming groups produced more and better quality ideas than collaborative 
brainstorming groups. The studies from the remaining techniques, Alternative Futures 
Analysis, Red Teaming, and Team A/Team B, all have low credibility evidence.  
Figure 5.4: What Works?: A Display of the Overall Results 
 
 126 
 The results of the Alternative Futures Analysis studies are of particular note 
because while the technique has the most evaluative studies and appears to be highly 
effective, it had one of the least credible evidence bases.  Similarly, Red Teaming appears 
to also be highly effective in the studies, despite having low credibility evidence.  Many 
researchers including Pillemer and Light (1984, p. 47) have observed similar results in 
systematic reviews. They have found a negative relation between research quality and 
the strength of effects, that is, studies with weak designs are associated with high 
effectiveness.  It is worth noting that the Team A/Team B technique also had a weak 
evidence base although the technique was not found to be effective because partisans 
used it as a way to push their political views (Mitchell 2006). Researchers have observed 
similar results in systematic reviews and found a relation between studies with weak 
designs and reports of either very high or very low effectiveness.  
 
Table 5.1: Binary Effect Size Display of Study Quality and Reported Effectiveness 
 Low Medium+High Total 
Ineffective 3 (15%) 16 (64%) 19 (42%) 
Effective 17 (85%) 9 (36%) 26 (58%) 
Total 20 (100%) 25 (100%) 45 (100%) 
 
 A Binary Effect Size Display (BESD) was used to calculate the relation between 
study quality and effectiveness. The BESD is useful because it visualizes the relation 
between the two variables in the table and provides a simple correlation. A calculation of 
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the cells suggests that there is a moderate negative effect of -0.49. This result is notable 
because the statistic ranges from between -1.0 and + 1.0.  A value of 0.0 indicates no 
association and a value of 1.0 perfect association, whether positive or negative. The 
implication of this finding is that as long as evaluative designs are weak, we can expect 
that the techniques will be reported as effective when in fact a stronger design might yield 
mixed or negative effects.   These results paint an overall picture of the evidence for 
structured analytic techniques, but it is necessary to determine under what conditions the 
techniques are effective or may lead to negative results. The next section delves into these 
specific issues. 
5.2  UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS ARE THE TECHNIQUES EFFECTIVE? 
As the above section detailed, there are 25 evaluative studies with moderate to strong 
designs; these studies cover 3 techniques. Three findings emerge for creativity, 
hypothesis testing, and competitive analysis.  The four ACH studies suggest how analysts 
weight evidence might be more important than whether the analyst sought out 
disconfirming evidence. Another unexpected finding is that Brainstorming in face-to-face 
groups consistently reduces the quality and quantity of ideas. Instead, it appears that 
analysts should first brainstorm individually and then combine their ideas. Devil’s 
Advocacy appears to improve the accuracy of judgments and strengthen assumptions, a 
finding not present in control groups. However, to ensure that the technique is effective, 
 128 
it appears that analysts should use it in tasks where groups must select one optimal 
solution from an array of solutions. The next sub-sections describe the research from the 
moderate and high credibility studies and then provide a synthesis of the main findings.  
 
5.2.1   Analysis of Competing Hypotheses Studies 
In total, there were four ACH studies that had at least moderately strong designs.  
 
5.2.1.1  Brant A. Cheikes, Mark J. Brown, Paul E. Lehner, and Leonard Adelman (2004)  
In this study, 24 participants from a large research and development corporation 
volunteered to participate in an experiment evaluating ACH. The experiment was 
conducted over email. Participants were randomly assigned to an ACH condition and a 
non-ACH condition. ACH did not reduce availability bias in either group. The authors 
also examined the distortion effect in confirmation bias (e.g. whether participants 
misinterpreted evidence as confirming when it should be disconfirming) and a weighting 
effect of confirmation bias (e.g. giving more importance to support evidence versus 
providing similar evidence for a non-preferred hypothesis).  ACH did assist participants 
in avoiding the distortion but only participants with intelligence analysis experience 
avoided the weighting effect.  
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5.2.1.2  Gregorio Convertino, Dorrit Billman, JP Masur, Peter Pirolli, Jeff Shrager (2006)   
The study compared collaborative vs individual (Nominal) use of a digital version of 
ACH, as well as groups made of members with diverse (Heterogeneous) beliefs vs 
Homogeneous beliefs. 33 participants were recruited from Stanford University and the 
Palo Alto Research Center. The results suggest that heterogenous collaborative groups 
working alone experience a decrease in confirmation bias while using ACH versus 
homogenous collaborative groups that actually saw confirmation bias accentuated while 
using ACH.  
 
5.2.1.3 Andrew Brasfield (2009)  
70 undergraduate and graduate intelligence studies students attempted to forecast the 
2008 Washington State gubernatorial election winner. Study participants were organized 
into ACH and non-ACH groups controlling for the political affiliation.  All groups 
worked independently for a week and ACH groups used a digitized version of the 
technique. The ACH group had a slightly higher accuracy at a non-significant level 
(P=.421). The technique was highly effective at addressing confirmation bias (P=.000). 
 
5.2.1.4   Kristan Wheaton (2014)  
In this study 115 intelligence studies students were assigned to a control group and 
groups with variations of ACH, including a group without the ability to weight evidence, 
a group with the ability to weight evidence, and a group with the ability and training to 
weigh evidence. The groups were given an hour to forecast the winner of a Honduran 
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presidential election. The most accurate group was the control group followed by the 
ACH group with training and ability to weigh evidence. Wheaton concludes that 
“accurate estimates came from analysts who either a) intuitively weighted evidence 
without the help of a decision tool or b) were instructed how to use the decision tool with 
special focus on diagnosticity and evidence weighting.”. Also of note, was that “the more 
accurate groups were also more biased, and while ACH generally helped mitigate bias, 
it did not improve forecasting accuracy.” 
 
5.2.2   Analysis of Competing Hypotheses Discussion 
Since the 1980s, the cognitive biases framework has been one of the main frameworks of 
intelligence analysis, ushered in through Heuer’s collected essays made public in the late 
1990s.  As a result of applying the heuristics and biases framework to intelligence 
analysis, discussion of how to improve analysis typically involves ways of mitigating 
cognitive biases, in particular, confirmation bias which is “the tendency to seek 
information…that confirm the tentatively held hypothesis…and not seek (or discount) 
those that support an opposite conclusion… [emphasis added]”  (Wickens and Hollands 
1999, p. 312).  As this definition suggests, there are two properties of confirmation bias: 
seeking confirming evidence of a favored hypothesis and discounting evidence against 
the analyst’s favored hypothesis.   
 Results from the systematic review suggest that weighting evidence accurately 
might be more important than simply seeking disconfirming evidence for a favored 
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hypothesis. For example, Cheikes et al. (2004, p. 15) found that there was little evidence 
to support the claim that their participants distorted negative evidence into positive 
evidence but rather for weighting positive evidence more heavily. Wheaton (2014) found 
a similar result: his participants were led to disconfirm their hypotheses by ACH but not 
necessarily to weigh evidence properly. In Cheikes et al.’s experiment only those with 
intelligence analysis experience saw a benefit for weighing evidence properly (but 
Cheikes et al. did not test the accuracy of judgments).  Perhaps most importantly, the 
debiasing of participants in Wheaton and Brasfield’s (2009) experiments did not lead to 
higher forecast accuracy. In fact, in Wheaton’s study what mattered most was attaining 
judgment accuracy was when participants either intuitively weighted evidence or had 
instruction on how to weight evidence. For example, Wheaton found some participants 
avoided confirming a favored hypothesis but unless they had addition instruction on 
weighting evidence, they did not see an increase in accuracy.   
 The implication of this finding is that analysts should be taught how to weight and 
assess the credibility of evidence (Wheaton 2014). The importance of weighting sources 
and evidence confirms Tetlock’s (2005, pp. 120-141) finding that the best forecasters are 
those who update their beliefs. Moving forward for the development of analytic 
methodologies, researchers and practitioners need to investigate how evidence 
weighting can be explored to create more valid judgments.  
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5.2.3   Brainstorming Studies 
In total, there were eight Brainstorming studies that had at least moderately strong 
designs. 
5.2.3.1   Henry Lindgren and Fredrica Lindgren (1965)  
The study involved 134 university students in a three-phase experiment: in phase 1 
participants worked alone without instruction in brainstorming; in phase 2 they 
brainstormed in groups; and phase 3 again alone. Three judges rated the response for 
creativity.  Intercoder reliability for the judges was high (Kendall's coefficient of 
concordance was highly significant .76). The results suggest there were significant 
difference between phase 1 and 2 (p=.01). The authors also found no link between culture 
and the effectiveness of Brainstorming.  There was a slight decline in idea quantity and 
quality from phase 1 to 3. 
 
5.2.3.2   Anne Offner, Thomas Kramer, Joel Winter (1996)  
In this study, 180 undergraduate students were randomly selected into nominal 
(noninteracting) and face-to-face collaborative (interacting). Four variables were 
manipulated 1) whether a trained facilitator was present; 2) a group recorder; 3) Periodic 
pauses (interacting groups only); or 4) 5 minute rest periods. The results suggest that 
brainstorming groups with a facilitator outperformed groups without a facilitator but 
these groups did not outperform nominal (noninteracting) groups. Other remedies for 
improving collaborative groups, such as the use of a flip chart, were not effective.  
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5.2.3.3   René Ziegler, Michael Diehl and Gavin Zijlstra (2000) 
 In two experiments involving 120 high school and college students, the authors sought 
to determine the effect of cognitive stimulation, through having group members read 
others’ ideas.  To examine this issue, the authors conducted two similar experiments 
comparing two and four member computer brainstorming groups with and without the 
opportunity to exchange ideas. The results suggest that computer mediated 
communication did not result in any increase in creative idea production. These results 
suggest that using computer mediation might not be effective in improving group 
collaborative creativity. 
 
5.2.3.4   Sally Blomstrom, F. J. Boster, K. J. Levine, E. M. J. Butler, and S. L. Levine (2000)  
207 university students were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions 
resulting in 3 person groups, which included 34 brainstorming and 34 nominal groups. 
Of the 34 brainstorming groups, 11 were given no training in brainstorming, 11 were 
given a seven-minute training session, and 12, a 15-minute training session. Of the 34 
nominal groups, 12 were assigned to the no-training condition, 10 to the seven-minute 
training condition, and 12 to the 15-minute training condition. Nominal groups 
outperformed brainstorming groups in all conditions. Trained groups outperformed 
untrained groups in terms of ideas generated. 
 
 134 
5.2.3.5   Karen Leggett Dugosh, Paul B. Paulus, Evelyn J. Roland, and Huei-Chuan 
Yang (2000)  
To examine the effect of cognitive stimulation, the authors conducted 3 experiments 
which included more than 200 university students randomized into various treatment 
conditions, such as hearing ideas of others via audio recordings. The results of the study 
suggest Brainstormers can be cognitively stimulated as a result of exposure to the ideas 
of others. Two factors were identified that can influence the effectiveness of this 
stimulation: 1) the number of ideas a Brainstormer is exposed to and 2) the amount of 
talking beyond idea expression to which a person is exposed.  
  
5.2.3.6   Henri Barki and Alain Pinsonneault (2001)  
This study examined the quality of ideas created through electronic brainstorming (EBS). 
96 university student participants were randomized into sixteen 6-member established 
groups and sixteen 6-member ad hoc groups participated in the study, each randomly 
assigned to 4 groups: verbal, nominal, EBS anonymous, EBS-non-anonymous. The results 
of the study suggest that nominal brainstorming groups performed similar if not better 
than EBS groups. Other variables that were manipulated, such as the effect of trying to 
“seed” the group with extra ideas, did not have an effect.  
 
5.2.3.7   Nicholas Kohn (2008)  
In 3 experiments involving 160 participants, the author found that when participants 
exchanged ideas in group settings less ideas were explored. In the first experiment the 
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productivity of nominal (noninteracting) and collaborative brainstorming groups were 
compared. Collaborative groups explored less categories of ideas than nominal and it 
appears that the exchange of ideas in collaborative groups led to group conformity. 
Building off this last point in experiment 2, the author found that conformity increases as 
the number of ideas a brainstormer is exposed to increases. In experiment 3, the author 
found that participants systematically exposed to another person’s ideas were more likely 
to conform to the other person’s ideas than those who did not receive any exposure. 
Taking breaks was effective in increasing brainstorming efficiency. 
 
5.2.3.8  Susan Stevens, Courtney Dornburg, Stacey Hendrickson and George Davidson 
(2008)  
The study was an experiment including 69 employees at Sandia Lab working on a real-
world “wickedly difficult” challenge. Employees were randomized into one of two 
groups: collaborative electronic brainstorming or nominal electronic brainstorming. The 
results of the experiment suggest that “individuals performed at least as well as groups 
in terms of number of ideas produced and significantly (p<.02) outperformed groups in 
terms of the quality of those ideas.” Quality of ideas were those rated by two judges as 
original, feasible, and effective, in the task.  
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5.2.4   Brainstorming Discussion 
A lesson of the analytic reform movement has been to improve collaboration between 
agencies and individuals. The message has been so well understood that the IC’s website 
is adorned with the motto: “Collaboration. Commitment. Courage” (Intelligence.gov, 
n.d.). According to Heuer and Pherson (2011, p. xvi) structured analytic techniques are 
enablers of collaboration as the techniques prompt “relevant discussion and, typically, 
this generates more divergent information and more new ideas than any unstructured 
group process” (p. xvi). However, the results of the systematic review suggest there are 
circumstances when structured collaboration in the form of face-to-face brainstorming 
can actually lead to less and lower quality ideas than when analysts work alone then 
collaborate. 
 Across all 8 studies non-interacting, nominal brainstorming groups consistently 
generated more and higher quality ideas. Research suggests that when groups engage in 
face-to-face collaboration they typically struggle as social conformity and pressure limit 
output (Thompson and Wilson 2014). To address this problem, studies in this review 
deployed a variety of tactics including, using electronic conferencing, (Dornburg et al. 
2014; Ziegler, et al. 2000), a facilitator (Offner et al. 1996), and training (Blomstrom et al. 
2000), but none of these enabled groups to outperform noninteracting groups in 
divergent tasks. 
 The implication of this finding is that if analysts wish to use Brainstorming to 
produce more and better ideas, they should work independently and then pool ideas. 
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Attempting to use a face-to-face collaborative group, as suggested in the Tradecraft Primer 
(2009, p.p 27-29) to generate a pool of ideas is unlikely to produce the best outcome, as 
the 8 evaluative of Brainstorming studies unanimously demonstrate. An upshot of this 
finding is that intelligence agencies need to rethink how they conduct collaboration. For 
example, the survey of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the 
previous chapter suggested that most, if not all, structured brainstorming is done 
collaboratively.  
 
5.2.5   Devil’s Advocacy Studies 
In total, there were nine Devil’s Advocacy studies that had at least moderately strong 
designs. 
 
5.2.5.1   Charles R. Schwenk (1984) 
 In this study four methods were tested, one based on expertise, and three dialectical 
methods, including Devil’s Advocacy. Study participants performed a financial 
prediction task. The results of the study suggest the dialectical methods were superior 
when the assumptions in the experimental task were inaccurate. The author also tested 
how task involvement affect performance of each method and found that greater 
involvement by participants led the dialectical methods to outperform the Devil’s 
Advocacy and expertise methods.  
 
 138 
5.2.5.2   David Schweiger, William Sandberg, and James Ragan (1986)  
In the study, 120 MBA students were randomly assigned to four-person groups and 
randomly assigned to 3 methods groups: dialectical inquirer, Devil’s Advocacy, and 
consensus. The dialectical inquirer is similar to Devil’s Advocacy in that it seeks to 
harness conflict, but through a different procedure. Each group was tasked with 
analyzing a business management task.  Groups were rated on the number of 
assumptions explored, quality assumptions, quality of recommendations, and a number 
of other criteria.  Where appropriate these criteria were ranked by judges and an 
acceptable level of intercoder reliability determined. The results of the study suggest that 
dialectical inquiry and Devil’s Advocacy led to higher quality recommendations and 
assumptions than the consensus method.  
 
5.2.5.3   William Sandberg and Paula Rechner (1988)  
120 middle-managers from a Fortune 500 company were randomly assigned to 3 methods 
groups: dialectical inquirer, Devil’s Advocacy, and consensus. Each of the groups was 
tasked with two business management tasks.  The results of the experiment were almost 
identical to Schweiger et al. (1986) experiment: dialectical inquirer and Devil’s Advocacy 
led to higher quality recommendations and assumptions than the consensus method. An 
additional finding was that group experience with the technique improved performance; 
in the second task after gaining experience, groups saw increased quality of decisions.  
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5.2.5.4   Charles Schwenk (1988)  
In the study the authors examined the effect of Devil’s Advocacy on escalating 
commitment. 112 undergraduate business students were randomized into four groups: 
1) a group receiving success feedback where they were informed their choices in a 
scenario led to profit (success feedback); 2) a group informed their choices led to a loss; 
(failure feedback); 3) a group receiving failure feedback along with a recommendation to 
keep investing; and 4) a group receiving failure feedback along with a devil’s advocate 
report questioning their assumptions.  The group receiving the Devil’s Advocacy 
treatment reduced the effects of escalating commitment but the difference with other 
groups was marginal (p= <.10). 
 
5.2.5.5   Charles Schwenk (1989)  
The author conducted a meta-analysis of four studies testing dialectical methods, 
including Devil’s Advocacy: Cosier (1978), Cosier (1980), Schwenk and Cosier (1980), and 
Schwenk (1982) (note: none of these studies were covered elsewhere in this systematic 
review). Combined, these studies included 252 study participants. A comparison of the 
studies suggests that basing decisions on an expert is effective when the experts’ 
assumptions are correct. However, “when the assumptions of the expert are not correct, 
the conflict introduced by both the DA and DI improves decision-making.” 
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5.2.5.6   Audrey Murrell, Alice Stewart, and Brent Engel (1993)  
In this study the authors sought to understand how task type affected the effectiveness 
of Devil’s Advocacy. The study considered three types of tasks 1) additive, where group 
performance is determined by the aggregation of individual effort of all group members; 
2) disjunctive, where the group must select one optimal solution from an array of 
solutions championed by individual group members; and 3) conjunctive, where 
performance of the group depends on the individual contributions of each group 
members holding different information.  101 MBA students were randomly assigned to 
Devil’s Advocacy or consensus methods and then assigned an additive, conjunctive, or 
disjunctive task.  In additive tasks consensus approaches are more effective than Devil’s 
Advocacy as the latter retards decision making in this task type. Both methods are equally 
effective for conjunctive tasks. However, when task structure involves finding a best 
decision from several alternatives (a disjunctive task), Devil’s Advocacy is more effective 
than consensus methods. 
 
5.2.5.7   Lai Tung (1992)  
The author conducted an experiment with 48 groups of 4 members each (192 subjects) to 
compare a consensus-based approach to two different conflict-based methods, Devil’s 
Advocacy and dialectical inquiry. The results of the study suggest that the conflict-based 
methods produce more valid assumptions than consensus methods. However, groups 
using consensus methods perceive their assumptions are stronger than conflict-based 
methods. The upshot of this result is that while methods like Devil’s Advocacy may 
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produce judgments with stronger assumptions, groups may not believe this about their 
judgments.  
 
5.2.5.8    M.A. Quaddus, L,L, Tung, L. Chin, P.P. Seow, and G.C. Tan (1998)  
In this study the authors started from the assumption the group conflict is productive if 
channeled properly. To examine this dynamic they designed a study with 116 students 
randomized into a decision conferencing system either using dialectical inquirer, Devil’s 
Advocacy or consensus approaches.  The results are mixed as the authors found that 
between the three groups there was no difference in terms of conflict generation. Also, 
there were not any differences between groups in terms of the productivity of conflict 
 
5.2.5.9 Lai Tung and Mohammed Quaddus (2001)  
The author examined process level variables such as the type and management 
strategies of conflict, nor the productivity of the conflict resulting from the use of these 
approaches. The study was an experimental design consisting of 37 groups with 5 
members randomized into dialectical inquiry, Devil’s Advocacy or consensus 
approaches.  It was found that Devil’s Advocacy increased productive forms of conflict 
(issue-based conflict) over the other two methods. There was no difference between 
groups in terms of producing unhelpful forms of conflict (interpersonal conflict).  
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5.2.6   Devil’s Advocacy Discussion 
Since the 1970s the IC experimented with competitive analysis. Mitchell (2006, p. 145) 
describes competitive analysis as “exercises that pit analysts against each other in 
debating contests designed ostensibly to produce a superior intelligence product from 
the same pool of raw data. The idea is that ‘‘estimative processes’’ can be sharpened when 
they are driven by the clash of competing ideas in a structured format.” In other words, 
conflict should lead to superior analysis. 
 This systematic review uncovered eight evaluative studies that had at least 
moderately strong research designs for one competitive analysis technique: Devil’s 
Advocacy.  Across nearly all of the studies, conflict-based approaches (which includes 
Devil’s Advocacy) outperformed consensus methods in improving judgment accuracy 
and validating assumptions. The technique might also be able to mitigate escalating 
commitment (Schwenk 1988), which can helpful as it could force analysts to consider 
revising their beliefs in the face of increasing stakes. Task type also mattered for the 
effectiveness of Devil’s Advocacy: when experts have correct assumptions, Devil’s 
Advocacy was not effective (Schwenk 1989). In tasks where groups must select one 
optimal solution from an array of solutions the technique is probably more effective. 
However, when group performance is determined by the aggregation of individual effort 
of all group members, the technique may hamper the decision making process (Murrell 
et al. 1993). One potential problem is that Devil’s Advocacy can lead participants to view 
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the decision process as less satisfying than consensus-based methods, thus leading 
analysts to avoid using the technique (Tung 1992). 
 
5.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The systematic review provided both positive and negative results on the effectiveness 
of structured analytic techniques. In terms of positive results, the techniques were 
effective in more than half of the studies.  In particular, Devil’s Advocacy has a strong 
evidence base and was effective in most applications. However, there is still the question 
of how effective the remaining 6 techniques are, given that they have not been evaluated. 
An unexpected finding was the negative relation between study credibility and reported 
effectiveness; the lower the credibility the greater the reported effect of the technique.  
 While these results provide a general overview of the evidence on the techniques, 
specific findings were extracted and synthesized from the most credible research on 
ACH, Brainstorming, and Devil’s Advocacy. If analysts wish to generate more ideas, the 
results of the Brainstorming studies were unanimous: brainstorm alone then use a 
facilitator or an aggregation mechanism, such as a facilitator or software program, to 
combine ideas. These results are also reflected in the wider literature beyond this review 
examining how face-to-face collaborating groups struggle to be creative. The studies of 
ACH suggested a new direction for research examining the role of evidence weighting. 
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ACH was shown to assist analysts in seeking disconfirming evidence but the technique 
did not address how analysts weighted disconfirming or confirming evidence which 
seems to be more important for attaining judgment accuracy.  Devil’s Advocacy was 
found to be effective in validating assumptions and accuracy compared to groups seeking 
consensus, especially tasks were where groups must select one optimal solution. In tasks 
where groups must work together and each group member contributes, however, the 
technique can obstruct the decision making process by reducing the likelihood that group 
members will contribute to the analysis (Murrell et al. 1993, p. 410). Future research will 
need to address the gaps exposed by this research. In particular, evaluative research is 
needed for the 6 techniques with few evaluative studies to understand the conditions 
under which these techniques are effective.  
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6.0   CHAPTER 6: AN EXPERIMENT OF ANALYSIS OF COMPETING 
HYPOTHESES  
 
The results of the systematic review in the previous chapter point to findings of “what 
works” in intelligence analysis.  One key finding is that face-to-face collaboration can 
limit the number and quality of ideas generated by a group due to social pressure and 
conformity. Also, the research on Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) was 
equivocal; it is not clear if encouraging analysts to disconfirm their favored hypotheses 
will improve judgment accuracy.   There are other areas where there are significant 
knowledge gaps, including the lack of evaluative research on 6 of the 12 techniques and 
research on how cognitive reasoning style may interact with the use of the techniques.  
 This chapter tests the findings from the systematic review on collaboration and 
ACH and expands the knowledge base to include an ancillary technique called Indicators 
of Signpost/Change technique (henceforth: “Indicators”) developed during the Cold 
War for strategic warning (Grabo 2002). The chapter also covers the role of cognitive 
reasoning styles.  Gaps of this kind were addressed using an experiment with 21 graduate 
intelligence and security studies students randomized to roughly equal-sized groups 
using ACH or Indicators.  The participants made estimates of the percentage of chemical 
weapons destroyed by the Syrian government as per the requirements of the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 2118.   
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 The results of the study partially confirmed the finding that face-to-face 
collaboration limits idea quantity: the ACH group saw a decrease in the quantity of their 
ideas and Indicators group saw no change.  The importance of this finding is that without 
a sufficient exploration of hypotheses, analysts will not be able to triangulate their 
judgments as the theory laid in Chapter 2 suggests. Another interesting finding is that 
there was no relation found between confirmation bias—measured by the certainty 
participants had in their hypotheses-- and judgment accuracy. This result supports 
findings from Brasfield (2009) and Wheaton’s (2014) studies. Results from the evaluation 
of Indicators were disappointing as the technique did not improve the rigor or accuracy 
of analysis. The results of this study suggest there is no interaction effect between using 
structured analytic techniques as represented by ACH and Indicators, with cognitive 
reasoning style.  All study participants, regardless of cognitive reasoning style, were 
equally affected by the two techniques.  
 In section 6.1, the experimental task and study hypotheses are described.  In 
section 6.2, the results of the study are presented with a focus on testing the study 
hypotheses.  Section 6.3 moves into more a more in-depth discussion of the results and 
implications for practice and future research. The chapter closes with a re-statement of 
the central arguments and conclusions. 
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6.1  FRAMING THE STUDY 
The study tested four hypotheses using an experiment with 21 graduate security and 
intelligence studies in a simulated intelligence task.  
 
6.1.1   Task Background and Procedures 
In the wake of the Arab Spring in 2011, Syria was rocked by internal violence between 
the authoritarian Assad regime and a mosaic of competing rebel groups.  The resulting 
power struggle is fueling one of the bloodiest conflicts of the 21st century with an 
estimated 76,000 killed in 2014 alone (Gladstone 2015). In August, 2013, the Assad regime 
used rockets tipped with nerve gas against an opposition neighborhood in Damascus, 
Syria’s capital. Casualty estimates vary significantly depending on the source, but range 
from the US’s assessment of approximately 1,500 to a French assessment of 281 killed 
(Nikitin et al. 2013, p. 15).  While this was not the first time the Syrian government had 
used chemical weapons on civilians--it had done so on a smaller scale previously in the 
year50--the scale and visibility of the attack brought intense international attention.  
 In early September, as the US was weighing military options, the Syrian 
government signaled it was willing to seek diplomatic solutions to the crisis.  From these 
early talks, a framework emerged for eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile by 
                                                 
50 For a discussion of previous attacks, see: Mary Beth D Nikitin, Paul K. Kerr, Andrew Feickert. “Syria’s 
Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, September 30, 2013, pp- 11-15, 
available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R42848.pdf 
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joining the Chemical Weapons Convention and working with the Organisation for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).  In late September, United Nations Security 
Council passed Resolution 2118 setting a target of mid-2014 for the removal and 
destruction of Syria’s chemical munitions.  
 In mid-March 2014, an open call for this research was made for study participants 
at University of Pittsburgh’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA). 
Participants were offered a small financial incentive ($20).  Most of the participants were 
first year students (13) and the remainder second year (8).  The average age of participants 
was 25, although 5 did not report their ages.  These results are similar to those from the 
INR study and broadly representative of the demographic profile of the IC towards a 
younger workforce (Immerman 2011; Fingar 2008).  Approximately 60 percent of the 
study participants were male which is almost identical to a 2009 estimate of the IC a whole 
and the results of the survey at INR (47 men and 33 women filled out the survey). In sum, 
the demographic and skill profile of the participants are similar to IC analysts.  
 The 21 participants were randomized into one of the 3 groups using ACH or 3 
groups using Indicators.  All groups conducted a three hour analysis session with a 
facilitator to make judgments regarding Syria’s ability to comply with the destruction 
schedule and fill out a cognitive reasoning style questionnaire. Each participant was 
provided a backgrounder on the Syrian chemical weapons agreement and judgment 
sheets both at the start of the analysis session and after. ACH groups received three hours 
of training on the technique prior to the analysis session.  
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6.1.2   Study Hypotheses 
The experiment addressed four hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Face-to-face group collaboration will reduce the number of hypotheses considered by 
each group  
The review of the medium and high credibility Brainstorming studies in Chapter 
5, suggests that face-to-face collaborative groups limit creativity through social pressure 
and self-censorship. This finding is also echoed in diverse literatures, such as social 
psychology (Thompson and Wilson 2014), forecasting (Armstrong 2006), and was 
recognized in early efforts to develop forecasting techniques (Rescher 1998). Therefore, it 
was expected that the hypotheses participants generate in aggregate before collaborating, 
will be greater than after the number of hypotheses generated after face-to-face 
collaboration, regardless of the technique used. This hypothesis is particularly important 
for ACH because the technique calls for analysts to collaborate in order to generate a full 
set of plausible hypotheses (Heuer and Pherson, 2011, p. 32).  
 
Hypothesis 2: ACH will decrease certainty of the rival hypotheses  
According to the Tradecraft Primer (U.S. Government 2009, p. 14), “Analysts often 
are susceptible to being unduly influenced by a first impression, based on incomplete 
data, an existing analytic line, or a single explanation that seems to fit well enough.” ACH 
is designed to mitigate this effect and force analysts to attend to multiple rival 
hypotheses, thereby decreasing their certainty in a single or small set of hypotheses.  
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Indeed, the systematic review in Chapter 5 provided some evidence that ACH addresses 
this problem (Brasfield 2009; Wheaton 2014). Therefore, it was expected that after using 
ACH participants should have less certainty in a single or a few hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Increased uncertainty of multiple rival hypotheses will not be related to improved 
judgment accuracy  
Brasfield (2009) and Wheaton’s (2014) studies of ACH suggest that leading 
analysts to disconfirm their favored hypothesis may not result in more accurate 
judgments.  
 
Hypothesis 4: An open cognitive reasoning style will be positively correlated with hypothesis 
exploration after using ACH and Indicators  
Tetlock (2005) found that study participants with an open cognitive reasoning 
style were overwhelmed by many rival hypotheses after using Alternative Futures 
Analysis. On the other hand, those with more closed cognitive reasoning styles were not 
likely to consider new hypotheses after using the technique. A similar question is whether 
Indicators or ACH will result in more consideration of more rival hypotheses by those 
with open styles versus those with closed styles. 
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6.2 TESTING THE STUDY HYPOTHESES 
The results of this experiment cohere with many of the findings from the systematic 
review.  There was modest support for study hypothesis 1, that face-to-face collaboration 
reduces group creativity. While the Indicators group saw no change in the number or 
quality of hypotheses generated, the ACH group saw a decrease in the number of 
hypotheses.  However, there was more support for study hypothesis 2 as ACH groups 
did have a reduction certainty surrounding the main hypotheses.  The most striking 
result was that ACH’s assistance in encouraging analysts to not focus on a single 
hypothesis does not improve forecast accuracy.  There was no support for study 
hypothesis 4 that reasoning style interacts with the use of the techniques.  
 
6.2.1   Study Hypotheses 1 and 2: Collaboration and Multiple Rival Hypotheses 
The Indicators groups identified 6 rival hypotheses, which included the lack of 
transparency and ongoing civil war. To measure how much disputation was present, 
participant’s narrative responses were coded for hypotheses, then enumerated, and a 
logarithmic curve was fitted to the distribution (see Chapter 3 for details).  The 
logarithmic curve approximates a distribution of hypotheses that fits most knowledge 
systems. Dunn (2001, p. 10) suggests that the conformity of hypotheses to the distribution 
can be assessed by applying goodness-of-fit procedures with a semi-logarithmic 
transformation. Before using Indicators, the distribution of participants’ judgments 
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closely fit a right-skew distribution observed in knowledge systems of many types. The 
goodness-of-fit measure R2= .950, suggests t a high degree of conformity (95 percent) in 
the group’s hypotheses. In other words, before using the Indicators technique, most 
participants cited the same hypotheses when providing a rationale for their judgments.  
 
Figure 6.1: Indicators group’s hypotheses before using the technique 
 
 
 
After making their initial judgments, the Indicators participants used the 
technique in the experimental task and made their judgments once more. Turning to the 
findings in Figure 6.2, there is mixed support for study hypothesis 1 on the effects of 
group collaboration. After using the technique, participants did not identify new 
hypotheses beyond the original six, but did not see a reduction either.  Interestingly, 
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Indicators seems to have slightly increased uncertainty across the distribution of 
hypotheses which is indicated by the flattening of the distribution and the slight 
reduction in the right-skew. In particular, there seems to have been more doubt in the 
“insufficient time” hypothesis. After using the technique this hypothesis went from the 
most to least cited and it appears that Indicators participants were more inclined to see 
the Syrian government as blocking or delaying the process to their advantage. 
 In summary, the Indicators technique appears to have not increased the number 
of hypotheses considered by the participants and led to a minor decrease in the certainly 
participants had in the central hypotheses.  
 
Figure 6.2: Indicators group’s hypotheses after using the technique 
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The ACH results tell a somewhat different story. Before using ACH, participants 
in this experimental group identified ten rival hypotheses in their judgments (see figure 
6.3).  As with the pretest of the Indicators group, the hypotheses generated by the ACH 
groups before using the technique fit a logarithmic curve well with a R2 value of .941, 
similar to the .95 value of the Indicators groups. Again, these initial pre-test results 
suggest certainty in a few rival hypotheses, specifically in the lack of transparency and 
Syrian delaying being the main hypotheses to explain the outcome of the removal and 
destruction process.   
 
Figure 6.3: ACH group’s hypotheses before using the technique 
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Use of ACH seems to have reduced certainty slightly over Indicators, thus 
providing some support for study hypothesis 2. After using the technique ACH groups 
saw a flattening out of hypotheses as the top three hypotheses received equal support 
from participants (see figure 6.5). The logarithmic curve also fits less well in the posttest 
judgments, with an R2 measure shifting from .941 to .808; this change represents a modest, 
but greater change in pretest to posttest than the Indicators groups (R2= .950 to R2=.847). 
This modest evidence that ACH decreases confirmation of a single favored hypotheses 
coheres with evidence from Cheikes et al. (2004), Brasfield (2009), and Wheaton (2014).   
 Examining the effect of collaboration on creativity, the results support study 
hypothesis 1 that face-to-face collaboration reduces creativity.  In the pretest condition, 
participants identified 10 rival hypotheses, however, after using the technique the 
number dropped to 8.  This is not a large decrease, but the omitted hypotheses after face-
to-face collaboration might have had an impact on participant’s final judgments. For 
example, the hypothesis that Syria’s partial compliance meant that the removal process 
could be completed by the June 30th deadline disappeared from participants’ judgment 
narratives after using ACH.  Greater consideration of this hypothesis might have led 
participants to estimate the number of weapons to be removed and destroyed to be 
higher, and perhaps, more accurate.  
 
Figure 6.4: ACH group’s hypotheses after using the technique 
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6.2.2   Study Hypothesis 3: Hypothesis Disconfirmation and Accuracy 
The final update before June 30th on the chemical weapons removal and destruction 
process was 92 percent (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 2014). 
Therefore, a judgment closer to the 92 percent mark was considered more accurate. Study 
Hypothesis 3 states that there should be no relation between increasing uncertainty and 
accuracy. The findings of this experiment bore out this result. In fact, even though the 
ACH group had less certainty in their hypotheses, their accuracy was slightly lower than 
the Indicators group. Two studies have found a similar result: assisting analysts to 
disconfirm their hypotheses does not necessarily improve forecast accuracy (Brasfield 
2009; Wheaton 2014).  
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 An unexpected and interesting finding was the greater variation in ACH 
judgments compared to those from the Indicators groups. The Indicators groups’ 
judgments cluster closely around 67 to 75 percent as indicated by the boxplot in figure 
6.6, while ACH judgments had much wider dispersion.  One possible explanation for is 
outcome is that focusing on multiple rival hypotheses among ACH groups led to more 
variation in their judgments.  To test this assertion, it was necessary to inspect the pretest 
and posttest judgments for both experimental groups.  
Figure 6.5: Between Groups Comparison 
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The pretest and posttest measures of Indicators groups suggest that the technique 
increased the divergence of judgments, although this difference does not rise to a level of 
statistical significance (F=.172, p=.685) (see figure 6.7 below). Indeed, the means changed 
very little from the pretest to posttest (estimated 72% initially then after using the 
technique dropped to 68%) suggesting that the Indicators technique had little or no effect 
on accuracy. ACH participants also did not see a statistically significant difference 
between pretest and posttest judgments (F=.265, p=.611) with the means changing little 
from the pretest to posttest. Participants estimated 57 percent initially, then after using 
the technique, the average dropped to 55 percent (note: the dark line indicates the 
median, not the mean judgment) (See figure 6.5). The only noticeable change in the 
accuracy measure is that the variation in judgments appears to have increased, or in other 
words, consensus on the number of weapons that would be destroyed seems to have 
decreased after using the technique. The red lines in figure 6.5 highlight this change 
below.  
Figure 6.6: Pretest and Posttest of Indicators 
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Figure 6.7: Pretest and Posttest of ACH 
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6.2.3   Study Hypothesis 4: Interaction effect of the techniques and reasoning styles 
Given the open cognitive reasoning style of the foxes, it was expected they would identify 
a greater quantity of hypotheses. To investigate these variables, the participants were 
divided into those with more open (‘foxes’) and closed (‘hedgehogs’) and the quantity 
and novelty of hypotheses examined.  Whether a hypothesis was considered “novel” was 
determined by where it fell on a distribution of hypotheses generated by foreign affairs 
experts. As with the student participants, experts were asked to make judgments and 
provide rationales. Hypotheses were then coded and aggregated on a cumulative 
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frequency diagram. After the 19th expert the number of rival hypotheses rapidly 
decreased. This result was predicted by Bradford’s law of scattering: after an initial rapid 
increase in new information (see Figure 6.11).  Student participants’ hypotheses were 
considered novel if they fell after the stopping rule.  
 As expected, foxes identified more hypotheses (11) and novel hypotheses (3). 
Interestingly, each of the novel hypotheses suggested the completion of the removal and 
destruction process by the June 30th deadline. For example, one hypothesis was that 
international support would be strong enough that destruction within the deadline was 
possible. Another was that Syria has signaled it would cooperate and therefore the 
process would be completed before the deadline. These novel hypotheses are important 
given that Syria nearly completed the process by June 30th. In short, the novel hypotheses 
were positive in suggesting the process would be completed. 
Figure 6.8: Foxes hypotheses before using a technique 
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Figure 6.9: Hedgehogs hypotheses before using a technique 
 
 
 After using a technique, the uncommon hypotheses almost completely disappear 
from the foxes and hedgehogs’ judgments with only one remaining. As discussed above, 
this result could be due to group conformity narrowing the analysis. Both groups also 
saw a reduction in the number of hypotheses generated. While the hedgehogs began with 
9 hypotheses, the count dropped to 7 after using a technique. Both of the hypotheses 
dropped were novel and related to Syria successfully completing the removal and 
destruction process. Foxes dropped from 11 to 9 hypotheses and also did not include two 
novel hypotheses after using the techniques. These results are interesting because they 
suggest that for both groups, hedgehogs and foxes, the techniques had the effect of 
narrowing the analysis. These results seem to disconfirm study hypothesis 4—both types 
of reasoning styles were equally affected by the techniques.  
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Figure 6.10: Foxes hypotheses after using a technique 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11: Hedgehogs hypotheses after using a technique 
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6.3  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
6.3.1   Face-to-Face Collaboration is a Limiter of Creativity and Next Steps 
In support of study hypothesis 1, face-to-face collaboration led to no improvement in the 
quantity of hypotheses generated in both experimental groups. This result coheres with 
the research on Brainstorming presented in systematic review in Chapter 5 and research 
from a variety of fields, including social psychology (Thompson and Wilson 2014) and 
forecasting (Armstrong 2006), and therefore increases the credibility of the finding that 
face-to-face collaboration reduces creativity.  
 An implication of this finding is that future research will need to peer into the 
black box of group dynamics and structured analytic techniques. While drawing causal 
inferences about group behavior and social conformity was not an aim of this research, 
anecdotal data from the experiment backed this point as some study participants were 
more likely to be active, at times dominating the conversation while others remained 
quiet. Future research will have to delve into this question to tease out the relationship 
between structured analytic techniques, group collaboration, and the potential 
limitations on creative thinking.  In the meantime, and against the grain of common 
wisdom, analysts should eschew face-to-face collaboration at the early, creative phases 
of a project. Instead, analysts should work in nominal groups, where ideas and judgments 
are generated individually and then combined by a group facilitator or mechanical 
aggregator, such as a software program (Armstrong 2006).  
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 Another option is to conduct further research on alternative approaches to 
generate the fullest set of hypotheses possible. In the public policy literature, Dunn (2002) 
developed one is called “Boundary Analysis,” which was used in this study to examine 
experts judgments and determine hypothesis novelty. The first step in Boundary Analysis 
is the specification of the analytic problem. For example, “what are the likely outcomes 
of the Syrian Civil War?” Next, analysts sample data sources that hold hypotheses related 
to the analytic question, in this case different outcomes of the Syrian war. A common 
source of hypotheses can be found in open source documents, such as news reports or 
subject matter experts. As analysts collect hypotheses the set of unique hypotheses will 
initially grow exponentially with each document or expert interviewed then rapidly 
decrease and level-off. This rapid leveling-off is due to Bradford’s Law, an empirical 
regularity that states that after searching a few key sources, the analyst will have attained 
nearly all of unique hypotheses, an almost full set of hypotheses. As discussed above, the 
distribution of hypotheses almost perfectly conformed to Bradford’s Law: after the 19th 
expert nearly all hypotheses had been mentioned. The curved line in figure 6.13 
represents the expected distribution of cumulative unique hypotheses based on 
Bradford’s law and the squiggly line the observed distribution. The fit is nearly perfect 
(R2= .98). After around 20 experts or sources the leveling off hypotheses lets the analyst 
know that there is a nearly full set of hypotheses. 
 
Figure 6.11 Cumulative Frequency of Hypotheses 
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6.3.2   Beyond Confirmation Bias: Evidence Weighting 
Wason’s (1968) pioneering lab experiment found that study participants sought to 
confirm, rather than disconfirm hypotheses.  After Heuer’s landmark Psychology of 
Intelligence Analysis (1999), a fundamental problem, at least in the eyes of intelligence 
reformers, has been to mitigate confirmation bias, or in other words, to try to get analysts 
to try to disconfirm their favored hypotheses.  The systematic review and the results of 
this experiment suggested the technique seems to at least modestly decrease focus on a 
single or small set of hypotheses. This finding was also apparent in the variation in the 
judgments concerning the percentage of weapons to be destroyed by the June 30th 
deadline. However, the experiment supports another finding from the systematic review: 
ACH’s ability to get analysts to disconfirm their hypotheses appears to have nothing to do with 
improving judgment accuracy.  
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 For some intelligence reformers and promoters of ACH, the lack of evidence for 
improvements in accuracy might not be dispiriting. Randy Pherson, a consultant and 
trainer in structured analytic techniques argues that using ACH to make intelligence 
estimates is a “bridge too far” for “98 percent” of analysts.51 While Pherson’s sentiment 
is understandable given the limitations of forming accurate judgments in intelligence 
analysis, improvements are possible. One way that Wheaton (2014) discusses improving 
analysis is training analysts to understand how to weight evidence.  One such example 
that could be applied to techniques beyond ACH, is a source credibility scale for open 
source intelligence, developed at the National Cryptologic School (Norman 2001).52 The 
scale includes 12 items, including whether the source can corroborated by other sources 
and whether the author is reputable, among others. Improving this scale and expanding 
training efforts could be one way to improve the accuracy of intelligence judgments and 
advance the conversation beyond simply avoiding confirmation of a favored hypothesis. 
 
6.3.3   Cognitive Reasoning Style and Structured Analytic Techniques 
In light of the importance of cognitive reasoning styles for accuracy from other research 
(Tetlock 2005), the results for study hypothesis 4 were unexpected.  There a couple 
reasons that might explain why cognitive reasoning style did not have an interaction an 
                                                 
51 Interview with Randy Pherson, Washington, D.C., June 2014. 
52 Norman’s thesis as well as a source credibility scale are available at: 
https://sites.google.com/site/daxrnorman2/analysis 
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effect.  First, the techniques used in this study are different in form and function than 
those used in Tetlock’s study. In his study Tetlock utilized a version of Alternative 
Futures Analysis, an imaginative technique which different from the techniques used in 
this experiment. It is possible, that if this study used a similar imaginative technique, such 
as Brainstorming, the Tetlock’s results might have been replicated. Still, a plausible 
rebuttal is that the hypothesis generating step in ACH should have mimicked 
Brainstorming, thus getting around this limitation.  
 Another possible explanation is the validity of the cognitive reasoning style 
questionnaire used to assess whether respondents were “foxes” or “hedgehogs” from 
Tetlock’s Expert Political Judgment (2005). This magisterial work has been criticized on 
numerous grounds. In fact, Tetlock’s research on political judgment has drawn so much 
comment that an entire issue of Critical Review (2010) was devoted to essays critiquing his 
findings.  Absent from these critiques is an important but mundane element of his 
argument: how do we measure the difference between hedgehogness and foxiness? To 
use psychometric jargon, how do we know that the questionnaire instrument Tetlock 
used to assess reasoning styles was valid? Given the importance of the hedgehog-fox 
scale for his Tetlock’s thesis, it is odd that he does not report validity or reliability 
statistics in the methodological appendix in the sections discussing the cognitive 
reasoning style questionnaire (p. 240 and p. 269). 
 To examine the validity of the cognitive reasoning style questionnaire, participants 
in this study also took the Myers-Briggs type indicator (MBTI) short-form. Then 
participants’ scores were calculated for the judging and perceiving dimension, a 
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dimension of the MBTI that I hypothesized should closely correlate with the hedge-
hog/fox scale. Those closer to the judging end of the scale are individuals who prefer to 
“live in a planned, orderly way, seeking to regulate and manage their lives. [those closer 
to the judging end want] to make decisions, come to closure, and move on” (Myers 1998).  
In other words, the higher the participant scores in “judging” the more hedgehog-like he 
or she should be. Those closer to the perceiving end of the scale tend “to live in a flexible, 
spontaneous way, seeking to experience and understand life, rather than control it.” 
(Myers 1998).  Again, the higher the perceiving score the more fox-like the participant 
should be. Consequently, it is expected that both scales would be correlated. However, a 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to assess the relationship 
between participant’s scores on the MBTI and hedgehog-fox questionnaire. There was no 
statistically significant correlation between the two variables (r=.079, n=24, p=.713). These 
results are surprising because there should be some level of convergence between the two 
measures, thus demonstrating convergent validity of the hedgehog-fox measure. Future 
research will need to explore the validity of foxness and hedgehogness with a larger 
number of participants. 
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6.4  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results of the study partially confirmed the finding that face-to-face 
collaboration limits idea quantity: the ACH group saw a decrease in the quantity of their 
ideas and the Indicators group saw no increase or decrease.  These results cohere with 
results from the systematic review suggesting that face-to-face collaboration is unhelpful 
for encouraging creativity.  To address problem, analysts should work in nominal or non-
interacting groups.  
 Another study hypothesis was that there would be no relation between whether 
participants confirmed a favored hypothesis and forecasting accuracy. The study result 
supports findings from the ACH studies in the systematic review: ACH assisted 
participants to some extent in avoiding focus on a favored hypothesis, but it did not 
improve judgment accuracy. Results from the evaluation of Indicators were 
disappointing. The technique did not significantly improve the rigor or accuracy of 
analysis. The results of this study suggest there is no interaction effect between using 
structured analytic techniques as represented by ACH and Indicators, with cognitive 
reasoning style.  All study participants, regardless of cognitive reasoning style, were 
equally affected by the two techniques. In particular, both those with open and closed 
reasoning styles saw the same narrowing effect on the quality and quantity of 
hypotheses.  This result could be explained by the techniques used in this experiment 
that do not encourage analysts to think of many possible hypotheses (as Tetlock’s 
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experiment required). Future research will be needed examine the construct validity of 
Tetlock’s scale, specifically testing its reliability.  
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7.0   CHAPTER 7: EVIDENCE-BASED PRINCIPLES FOR IMPROVING 
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS  
 
 
 
Research suggests that foreign affairs analysis is weak and even the best experts are 
highly fallible. In fact, the highest performing analysts are accurate less than 35 percent 
of the time (Tetlock 2005). This is problematic for statesmen and intelligence analysts 
alike, trying to make sense of a messy and chaotic world. Structured Analytic Techniques 
are one option for improving foreign affairs analysis. The imperative to use these 
methods was enshrined the Intelligence Reform Act (2004) which mandates analysts use 
the techniques (§ 1017).  This research sought to understand how the techniques have 
been implemented in the IC and make a modest attempt to evaluate a subset of 12 
techniques listed in the U.S. Government’s Analytic Tradecraft Primer (2009). 
  The research is based on semi-structured interviews conducted with 5 intelligence 
experts and a survey of 80 analysts at an IC agency along with follow-up interviews with 
15 analysts. Approximately a third of analysts report never using the techniques on the 
job. The main factors related to the use of the techniques were training in and to a lesser 
extent, perception of the techniques. Although a range of professional opinion holds that 
time pressure is the main reason analysts do not use the techniques, there was not a 
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statistically significant relation between the time pressure under which analysts work 
and their use of the techniques. 
  Questions about effectiveness of the techniques were answered in part by 
employing a “systematic review,” a relatively new but well-accepted methodology of 
synthesizing a large body of research. After reviewing a sample of more than 2,000 
studies of the use of the techniques, the evidence suggests that there is moderate to strong 
evidence affirming the efficacy of using three of the twelve core techniques (these 
techniques are “Analysis of Competing Hypotheses,” “Brainstorming,” and “Devil’s 
Advocacy”). There were three specific findings:  face-to-face collaboration decreases 
creativity, evidence weighting appears to be more important for attaining accuracy than 
seeking disconfirming evidence, and conflict tends to improve the quality of analysis.  
Using a mixed-methods approach the research also employed an experiment with 21 
graduate intelligence studies students, which supported the first two findings of the 
systematic review. 
  The evidence on the implementation and effectiveness of the techniques converge 
on a set of evidence-based principles for improving intelligence analysis covered in 
section 7.1. Each principle is backed up with multiple pieces of evidence from the survey, 
interviews, systematic review, and experiment.  The description of each principle 
includes implications for the IC and opportunities for future research to improve and 
extend the knowledge base on “what works.” The chapter closes with a short summary 
of the main arguments. 
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7.1  EVIDENCE-BASED PRINCIPLES FOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
7.1.1   Training and the Value of Evidence 
Principle 1: Implementing structured analytic techniques requires training analysts in their use 
and providing evidence that the techniques work. The survey and interviews conducted with 
INR analysts suggested that training is moderately correlated with the use of structured 
analytic techniques (chi square=13.593, p=0.001, Cramér's V= 0.412). Another variable 
positively correlated with the use of the techniques, although to a lesser degree, is 
whether analysts perceive the techniques to be effective for improving the rigor of 
analysis (chi square=3.83 p=.049, Cramér's V= 0.225). Other variables cited in the 
literature, such as age of the analysts (chi square= 0.009 p=0.924) and time pressure (chi 
square= 0.616, p=0.735) are not statistically significant relation with the use of the 
techniques.  The finding on time pressure is notable because professional opinion holds 
that analysts are too busy to use the techniques (Heuer 1999, p. 85-86; Folker 2000; Khalsa 
2009).  
 Combined, these results speak to a simple but important truth: the key to 
implementing the techniques is to provide quality training and a compelling reason to 
analysts that they should use the techniques.  As the study suggested, training in the 
techniques is not uniform in the IC, and indeed, almost non-existent in INR. 
Implementing the techniques will require inter-agency collaboration and a willingness to 
explore and consider what constitutes “quality training” and follow through with 
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instruction that translates into practical skills. As the study of INR found, when an analyst 
considered training to be high quality, they were far more likely to use the techniques.   
Still, if the push for training cannot be made in the IC, the new degree granting 
intelligence programs may also play a role. Since the September 11th attacks more than 13 
programs have been founded and some are experimenting with curriculum for teaching 
analytic methodologies, including structured analytic techniques (Crosston and 
Coulthart, n.d.). 
 State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research appears to differ from 
many other agencies because of its, size, culture, and performance. Therefore future 
research should determine the extent to which these variables affect the preference to use 
structured analytic techniques at other, larger agencies such as the Central Intelligence 
Agency and National Security Agency. Future research could examine state and local 
intelligence agencies as well to determine how often techniques are used and why.  The 
survey methodology used in this research could easily be replicated in other agencies and 
follow-up interviews could be used to cross-validate the findings of the statistical 
analysis.  
 Another question for future research is to examine how the techniques are used.  
As the findings of this study suggested, training plays a significant role in whether the 
techniques are used, and presumably, how well they are used.  An anecdotal report from 
some preliminary research done for this project suggested that at some IC agencies the 
techniques are sometimes used to please supervisors rather than to improve analysis. For 
example, one Defense Intelligence Agency analyst reported writing a report then afterward 
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using a technique to reach a predetermined conclusion.53 Understanding how techniques 
are used (or abused) would probably require ethnographic fieldwork and participant 
observation. While access would be difficult to attain, it is entirely possible, as previous 
fieldwork in the IC has ably demonstrated, most notably by Johnston (2005). 
 
7.1.2   Avoid Face-to-Face Collaboration 
Principle 2: In the idea generation phase of a project, analysts should work individually, followed 
by a systematic method to aggregate ideas. Across all eight of the moderate and highly 
credible evaluative studies of Brainstorming, group collaboration limited the quantity 
and quality of ideas. This conclusion was also supported in the ACH experiment. The 
implication of this finding is that if analysts wish to use Brainstorming to produce more 
and better ideas, they should work independently and then pool their efforts using a 
designated, non-partial facilitator. Attempting to use a collaborative group to generate a 
pool of ideas, as suggested in the Tradecraft Primer (2009, pp. 27-29) is unlikely to 
produce the best outcome. More generally, this principle speaks to carefully applying 
collaboration, an area of growing emphasis in the IC (Medina 2008, p. 246).  
 An upshot of this finding is that intelligence agencies need to rethink how they 
conduct collaboration in the idea generation phase of projects. The survey of INR in 
Chapter 4 suggested that most, if not all, Brainstorming is done through face-to-face 
                                                 
53 Interview with DIA analyst, Washington, D.C., May 2013. 
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collaboration.  Survey respondents also reported using a form of semi-structured 
Brainstorming in inter-agency discussion between the Central Intelligence Agency and 
National Intelligence Council.54  Indeed, face-to-face collaboration is common throughout 
the IC for generating ideas and making sense of data (Johnston 2005, p. 5). Armstrong 
(2006) suggests that to improve forecasting accuracy, groups should use alternative 
means of combining ideas. He discusses the value of alternatives such as the Delphi 
method, a round-based communication system that was developed to address group 
dynamics and conformity that reduce creativity.55 While there is some discussion in the 
intelligence literature of the Delphi method and government training materials for this 
technique exist, there are no detailed accounts of it being used in the IC.  
 Beyond these methods, the limits of face-to-face collaboration opens up research 
opportunities for introducing and developing new techniques. One such technique that 
could be adapted for intelligence is Boundary Analysis (Dunn 2001, 2012). As the name 
implies, Boundary Analysis is a technique to determine the analytic ‘boundaries’ of a 
problem, for example, in this case the number of plausible hypotheses. The first step in 
Boundary Analysis is the specification of the analytic problem. For example, “what are 
the likely outcomes of the Syrian Civil War?” Next, analysts sample data sources that set 
forth hypotheses related to the analytic question. A common source of hypotheses can be 
                                                 
54 Interview with INR analysts, Washington, D.C., February 24-26, 2014. 
55 For an extended discussion of Delphi, see:  Linstone, Harold A., and Murray Turoff, eds. The Delphi 
method: Techniques and applications. Vol. 29. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975. 
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found in open source documents, such as news reports. Once the data are compiled, they 
can be mined by coding each unique hypothesis.  
 Future research could validate the technique and refine the procedures. For 
example, the technique has also been used in other intelligence contexts. Coulthart and 
Rickabaugh (2014) applied Boundary Analysis to understand if they could 
retrospectively identify a “black swan” hypothesis in a real-world criminal intelligence 
case. While the technique did not identify the black swan hypothesis, a full set of 
hypotheses was generated that almost perfectly conformed to Bradford’s law. Another 
interesting finding was that almost the entire distribution of hypotheses was mentioned 
within a two week period, while the case documents covered several months of 
speculation by journalists and bloggers. This finding, if replicable in other cases, is 
important because Boundary Analysis could assist analysts using open-source 
intelligence on emerging security threats to narrow and focus their analysis. Future 
research can refine the procedures of Boundary Analysis.  In the aforementioned study, 
the entire extraction and enumeration process required a single coder approximately 8-
10 hours. Adding additional coders could reduce this time and ensure coding reliability 
through calculating simple inter-coder reliability scores.  
 
7.1.3   Focus on Evidence Weighting 
Principle 3: To improve judgment accuracy, analysts must update their beliefs through carefully 
weighting evidence. The experiment in Chapter 6, confirms the findings of Brasfield (2009) 
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and Wheaton (2014), who conclude that ACH assisted participants in avoiding focus on 
a favorite hypothesis, but it did not improve judgment accuracy. The studies on ACH 
from the systematic review suggested a new direction for research examining the role of 
evidence weighting. Wheaton (2014), describing the outcome of his study, concludes that 
“accurate estimates came from analysts who either a) intuitively weighted evidence 
without the help of a decision tool or b) were instructed how to use the decision tool with 
special focus on … evidence weighting.” Wheaton concludes that perhaps the negative 
impact of bias may be less about searching for disconfirming evidence than about 
weighting such evidence, once discovered. The importance of weighting sources and 
evidence confirms Tetlock’s (2005, pp. 120-141) finding that the best forecasters are those 
who carefully updated their beliefs on the basis of new evidence. 
 The implication of these findings is that analysts will need to be trained to think 
beyond disconfirming their beliefs to include evidence weighting.  Currently, the 
approach to teaching ACH and analytic methods generally, seems to be focused on 
seeking to disconfirm hypotheses. For example, the syllabus for a structured analytic 
techniques course offered by a large government contractor notes that it will explore 
“identification of alternative explanations and evaluation of all evidence that will 
disconfirm rather than confirm hypothesis” [emphasis added] (Lockheed Martin n.d.) 
Another syllabus from the National Security Agency states “people seek to confirm the 
first answer to a problem they discover, selectively using evidence to support that 
position” (Moore 2007). Undoubtedly, seeking disconfirming evidence is helpful because 
there appears to be a natural inclination to confirm prior beliefs (Wason 1968) and 
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disconfirmation has a long tradition in the philosophy of science through the work of 
Karl Popper (1953).  The next step is to teach and aid analysts in thinking about how to 
assess the credibility and quality of sources of evidence. 
 One avenue for future research is to  develop instruments or techniques to assist 
in evidence weighting. An example is an open source intelligence credibility scale 
developed at the National Cryptologic School (Norman 2001). The scale is out of date and 
provides no reliability measures so that one analyst may use the scale in a completely 
different way than another. For example, one item on the scale asks whether the author 
is “reputable,” a vague term that is open to wide interpretation. Future research should 
refine this scale and validate it among intelligence analysts. Additionally, future research 
can extend work underway by Tim van Gelder (2009) and others to implement argument 
mapping into the analytic process. Through applying structured forms of argumentation, 
such as the Toulmin argument model (1958), analysts can examine the quality and 
credibility of their analytic judgments.  
 
7.1.4   Harness Conflict Carefully 
Principle 4: Competitive analysis is helpful for improving the rigor and accuracy of analysis under 
certain conditions. Since the 1970s the IC has experimented with competitive analysis.  The 
idea is that ‘‘estimative processes’’ can be sharpened when they are driven by the clash 
of competing ideas in a structured format.” (Mitchell 2006, p. 145). In other words, 
harnessing structured conflict should improve the analytic process and increase the 
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accuracy of judgments, an argument that appears to have its origins in the business and 
management literature (Churchman 1971; Mitroff and Turoff 1973;  Mitroff and Emshoff 
1979). Not surprisingly then, the systematic review found eight evaluative studies from 
the management and business literature that had at least moderately strong research 
designs for one competitive analysis technique: Devil’s Advocacy.  Across nearly all of 
the studies, conflict-based approaches (which includes Devil’s Advocacy) outperformed 
consensus methods in improving judgment accuracy and validating assumptions.  
 The research from the systematic review suggests that there are circumstances 
where the use of conflict is most effective. Conflict inducing techniques appear to most 
improve analysis when experts’ assumptions about the analytic task are invalid. In order 
to manipulate assumptions in these studies, researchers provided control and treatment 
groups using consensus and conflict-based approaches with correct and incorrect 
assumptions about the analytic task. According to a meta-analysis by Schwenk (1984, p. 
306), “when the assumptions of the [task] are not correct, the conflict introduced by 
[conflict approaches] improves decision-making.” Given the vagaries surrounding 
assumptions in intelligence analysis, conflict approaches such as Devil’s Advocacy could 
be helpful.  Task type also mattered for the effectiveness of Devil’s Advocacy: when 
group performance is determined by the aggregation of individual effort of all group 
members, the technique may hamper the analytical process (Murrell et al. 1993).  
Interestingly, while conflict seems to improve analysis, Devil’s Advocacy can lead 
participants to view the analytic process as less satisfying than consensus-based methods, 
thus possibly leading analysts to avoid using the technique (Tung 1992). 
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 The implication of research is that competitive analysis holds great promise for 
intelligence analysis, but efforts must be made to carefully implement techniques. One 
anecdote highlights the problem:  the infamous Team A/Team B on the Soviet Union’s 
military strength and the use of competitive analysis in the lead-up to the Iraq War. 
According to Mitchell (2006,  p. 144) the Iraq exercise was used to subvert “the 
competitive intelligence analysis process, where unofficial intelligence boutiques 
‘stovepiped’’ misleading intelligence assessments directly to policy-makers and undercut 
intelligence community input that ran counter to the White House’s preconceived 
preventive war of choice against Iraq.” Additionally, there are the very real problems of 
implementing conflict-driven techniques, such as Devil’s Advocacy. One Central 
Intelligence Agency analytic methodologist interviewed for this research stated he 
avoided the technique because he felt the larger group would “route” around the devil’s 
advocate.56 Future research should examine how competitive analysis can be fruitfully 
implemented and determinant when the technique has been effective, or counter-
productive.  Similar to the above discussion on understanding how techniques are used 
in the IC, future research could use ethnographic and participant observation methods to 
understand potential barriers in the analytic process.  
 
                                                 
56   Interview with a CIA methodologist, June, 2014. 
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7.2  SEEKING TO BE “APPROXIMATELY RIGHT”: SUMMARY AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 
The eminent statistician John Tukey wrote he would rather be "be approximately right 
rather than exactly wrong." This dissertation attempted to explore the limitations and 
potential correctives of foreign affairs analysis, an area of human endeavor where we are 
often “exactly wrong.” Understanding the extent to which structured analytic techniques 
might improve analysis required not only looking at effectiveness but also the application 
of the techniques in a secretive environment. The result was in-depth interviews with five 
intelligence experts and a survey potentially generalizable to an IC agency—the first of 
its kind publicly available. Effectiveness was assessed with the combination of a 
systematic review sampled from more than 2,000 research studies and a field experiment 
involving 21 graduate intelligence studies students.   
 The findings from this dissertation provided four evidence-based principles. First, 
implementing structured analytic techniques requires training analysts in their use and 
providing evidence that the techniques work. Second, during the idea generation phase 
of a project, analysts should work individually, followed by a systematic method to 
aggregate ideas.  Third, to improve judgment accuracy, analysts must update their beliefs 
through carefully weighting evidence. Lastly, competitive analysis is helpful for 
improving the rigor and accuracy of analysis but under certain conditions and with task 
types.  
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 Combined, the findings and principles lead to a couple recommendations for how 
the IC could increase the probability of being “approximately right”:  
 
 Fund IC centers for analytic excellence.  
There are significant gaps in our understanding how to reliably produce quality 
intelligence analysis. To address this problem, quality research on “what works” needs 
to be increased. The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) has done 
an excellent job stimulating innovative research but their project-based approach to 
funding research should be supplemented by more long-term research initiatives.  A next 
step would be to develop centers for analytic excellence at select universities. Creation of 
these centers is not unprecedented as the IC already funds Intelligence Centers for 
Academic Excellence program (IC-CAE), which are used to increase the diversity of 
human capital available to the IC (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2011). The analytic 
centers for academic excellence could either be added on to existing IC-CAEs or created 
as standalone entities.  
 
  Incorporate evidence into the training process.  
Knowledge generated by evidence-based intelligence analysis needs to be 
implemented into training as it has been done in a variety of fields ranging from medicine 
to law enforcement. As the findings above suggest, training and perceptions of the 
techniques are important for influencing how analysts do their jobs. Perhaps just as 
important, bringing insights from evaluative research into the IC’s training curriculum 
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could help analysts generate higher quality analysis.  For example, the implication of the 
principle on competitive analysis is that analysts should be aware of when to use 
techniques that harness conflict.  The results of one study suggest, in tasks where each 
group member contributes information to create one combined judgment, using a 
technique like Devil’s Advocacy can harm the quality of analysis (Murrell et al. 1993). 
Integrating evidence from evaluative studies can be accomplished by redeveloping and 
updating the curriculum at intelligence training centers.  One way to bring evidence into 
the training curriculum is for the IC to rely on the proposed centers for analytic excellence 
or to use the existing IC-CAE programs to develop curriculum. 
These two recommendations are easily implemented and as Tetlock and Mellers 
(2011, p. 543) note, “The IC does not have to lower the probability of multibillion-dollar 
fiascoes by much to recoup a multimillion-dollar investment.” In other words, meagre 
investments in improving analysis can have a large impact.  Still, funding is one matter 
and improving analysis is another. Future research and reform of the intelligence analysis 
process will need to find ways to push the frontiers further to improve analysis of foreign 
affairs. 
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8.0   METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX A: SURVEY AND INTERVIEW 
PROCEDURES 
 
Intelligence Expert Interviews 
 
5 intelligence expert informants were identified using a snowball sampling 
strategy. 5 respondents did not respond to inquiries. 
 
Each was interviewed with the following protocol:  
 
Confidentiality Statement: My name is Steve Coulthart and I am researching how 
structured analytic techniques are utilized in the intelligence community, such as 
alternative competing hypotheses, red teaming, and alternative futures analysis, among 
others. This interview will require roughly 20-30minutes and address your background 
and expertise with these techniques. Be assured that your responses and those of others 
are entirely confidential.  Your participation is voluntary and you may choose to end the 
interview at any time.   
 
Semi-Structured Questions:  
 
1) Could you start by telling me about your background in intelligence analysis?  
 
2) Since the 2004 Intelligence Reform act, have you seen any changes in the analytic 
 culture of the IC?  
 
3) How often do you think analysts are utilizing structured analytic techniques on 
the job? 
 
4) What factors do you think affect the use of the techniques?  
 
5) Do you think there is variation in the use of the techniques in the IC?  
 
6) How well prepared do you believe analysts are for using structured analytic 
techniques? 
 
 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) Survey  
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An email was sent out to a list-serv at INR in two rounds:  July 28th, 2014 and 
August 8th.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
137 surveys were initiated, including 95 with at least 80 percent or more of the 
questions completed.  Of the 95 responses, 80 respondents could be described as analysts 
under their current or former job titles. 
 
The survey protocol contained the following information and questions:  
 
Confidentiality script: The purpose of this survey is to explore your views as an 
intelligence analyst on analytic tradecraft practices.  I will also be surveying other 
analysts, asking them to complete this brief 3 minute online questionnaire.  The survey 
asks questions about your background as an analyst and your views on such analytic 
tradecraft practices, such as structured analytic techniques.  Please leave your email 
address if you would be willing to participate in a follow-on interview. 
 
There are no foreseeable risks associated with this survey.  I will be pleased to send 
you a summary of the survey results, but be assured that your responses and those of 
others are entirely confidential.  Your participation is voluntary and you may choose not 
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to participate.  The survey is being conducted by Steven Coulthart, a doctoral candidate 
at the University of Pittsburgh.  If you have any questions I can be contacted at (315) 264-
0917 or SJC62@pitt.edu. 
 
Please leave your email address if you would be willing to participate in a follow-
on interview. 
Email (optional): 
 
1) How many years have you been an analyst? 
 -[open-ended] 
 
2) What agency do you work for? 
 -[open-ended] 
 
3) What is your current job title? 
 -[open-ended] 
 
4) On average, how long does it take you to complete an analytic project?  
 -A day or two 
 -A week or two 
 -A month or two 
 -Three months or more 
 
5) Several kinds of “structured analytic techniques” are used by analysts.  These 
include  Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH), link analysis, and red teaming, 
among others. Have you received any training in any of these structured analytic 
techniques? 
 -Yes 
 -No 
 
6) How well would you say the training prepared you to apply these techniques? 
 -Very well 
 -Somewhat well 
 -Not very well 
 -Not well at all  
 
7) How often do you use structured analytic techniques on the job?  
 -Occasionally 
 -Rarely  
 -Never 
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8) To what extent, on average, do you think  structured analytic techniques help 
analysts think in a more effective way (e.g. consider new perspectives, challenge mental 
models, etc) ? 
 -A great deal 
 -A fair amount 
 -A little 
 -Not at all 
 
9) To what extent, on average, do you think  structured analytic techniques help 
analysts be more accurate or "right" in their analytic judgments? 
 -A great deal 
 -A fair amount 
 -A little 
 -Not at all 
 
10) It has been 10 years since major analytic reforms have been put in place (for 
example, under the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act). What do you believe the impact of 
these reforms has been? 
 -[open ended] 
 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research Survey Follow-up Interviews  
 
Confidentiality script: My name is Steve Coulthart and I am researching how 
structured analytic techniques are utilized in the intelligence community, such as 
alternative competing hypotheses, red teaming, and alternative futures analysis, among 
others. This interview will require roughly 15 minutes and address your background and 
expertise with these techniques. Be assured that your responses and those of others are 
entirely confidential.  Your participation is voluntary and you may choose to end the 
interview at any time.   
 
1) How well prepared do you believe analysts are for using structured analytic 
techniques? Have you received training in structured analytic techniques?  
 
2) In your opinion, what is the perceived value of structured analytic techniques 
among the “average” analyst at INR? 
 
3) What factors do you think influence use of structured analytic techniques? 
 
4) The intelligence community appears to be seeing a demographic shift, with an 
influx of younger analysts. Do you think this will have an impact on the use of structured 
analytic techniques? Why or why not? 
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Analysis  
Data were analyzed using non-parametric statistics including chi square tests and 
measures of association for categorical data.  For each of the tests between variables 
categories were collapsed to ensure the cell counts did not drop below the required 5.  
 
Qualitative data were analyzed with qualitative data analysis software to generate 
a set of codes:  
 
 
 
 
 191 
9.0  METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX B: SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
PROCEDURES 
 
Search Keywords and Settings 
 Searched “scenario planning” in lieu of alternative futures analysis, a less 
commonly used term for the technique. Search parameters: did not include 
citations and search terms had to occur in the title in order to narrow the results 
to most applicable studies.  Only English studies were included. Yielded 753 
studies 
 Searched "red teaming" in the title, exclude the terms “automated” 
“computational” and other search terms  to exclude studies focused on non-
analytic red teaming. Only English studies were included. Did not include 
citations. Yielded 21 research studies 
 Searched "Team B" in the title , exclude the terms “automated” “computational” 
and other search terms  to exclude studies focused on non-analytic Team B. Only 
English studies were included. Yielded 17 research studies 
 Search "analysis of competing hypotheses" in the title. Search parameter: do not 
include citations. Only English studies were included. Yielded 20 research 
studies. 
 Search “brainstorming.” Search parameters: did not include citations, patents, 
and search terms had to occur in the title in order to narrow the results to most 
applicable studies.  Only English studies were included. Yielded 838 studies.  
 Other techniques did not yield results: Key Assumptions Check, Quality of 
Information Check, High-Impact/Low-Probability, Indicators of 
Signpost/Change, “What If?” Analysis, and Outside-In Thinking 
 
Randomized Stratified Sampling Procedure (scenario planning is used as an example): 
 
STEP ONE: Define the population: all studies returned by the search terms (see STEP 
THREE) 
 
STEP TWO: Choose the relevant stratification: Stratification is based the assumption that 
the most cited studies will be listed in the top 20% (“highly relevant articles”) and less 
relevant in the remaining 80%. See Beel and Gipp 2009 for an empirical test of this claim.  
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STEP THREE: List the population: the list of the population is available only with the 
entering of the Google search (note this list may change daily). The population is 753 
studies generated by the search terms “scenario planning.” Search parameters: did not 
include citations and search terms had to occur in the title in order to narrow the results 
to most applicable studies.  Only English studies were included. 
 
STEP FOUR: List the population according to the chosen stratification: The first 8 pages 
of results (20 studies per page) is 20% of the population. The remaining 80% contains the 
rest of the results.  
 
STEP FIVE: The sample size was set by using a calculator: assuming a population of 797 
(the number of returned results), a 95% confidence level and a margin of error of 10%, the 
sample is 86 
 
 STEP SIX: Calculate a proportionate stratification: 
Will need 17 highly relevant articles (from the top 20%) 
Will need 69 less relevant articles  (from the bottom 80%) 
 
STEP SEVEN: Sample and download articles: Using a random number generator to select 
two sets of numbers page number and study position. For example, if there are pages 
possible and there are 20 studies per page, the randomly generated number 220 would 
require downloading the study from the 20th position on page 2.  
Following this process 86 articles were downloaded 
 
Excluded Studies and Reasons 
 
Total studies excluded: 213 (46 included) 
 
Total time required: 10 hours 
 
To be included the study must have ALL of the following criteria:  
 1) The author provided some report, verbal or numerical of the technique on some type 
of outcome.  
 
 2) Made some attempt to evaluate a specific, identifiable instance of the  technique. As a 
result, hypothetical reports (e.g. “ACH could be helpful to  intelligence analysts…”) 
were excluded 
 
In addition to the above criteria, studies were also excluded on the following traits: 
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 Was a book—only articles and shorter manuscripts were considered for 
logistical reasons (2 studies) 
 Describes how to use the technique in an application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness (95 studies) 
 Discusses issues related to the use of the technique (36 studies) 
 Duplicates a previous observation (e.g. multiple studies covered the IC Team 
A/Team B exercise from the 1970s). In these cases, the study with the stronger 
design (operationalized by the study’s MSMS score) was selected, if designs 
were identical the first sampled study was included. (4 studies) 
 Excluded studies looking at educational outcomes, such as creative writing 
skills. While these outcomes are of partial interest, they are not closely related 
to outcomes related to intelligence analysis (6 studies) 
 Proposes an improvement or modification of the technique-but no evaluation 
(13 studies) 
 In another language (not available in English) (1 study) 
 Was the comparison of one variation of a technique against another (28 studies 
compared one variation of a technique against another ) 
 Technique addressed in study was not one of those included in this study as 
defined in the Tradecraft Primer  (27 studies) 
 
 
 
List of excluded studies and criteria:  
Title Authors Technique Year Exclusion Reason 
The Banach-
Barkelew 
Brainstorming Book. 
WJ Banach, 
AH Barkelew 
Brainstorming 1976 Book  
Brainstorming: 
Techniques for New 
Ideas 
TR Cory Brainstorming 2003 Book  
From Tradecraft to 
Profession 
Aldric 
Ludescher 
ACH 2010 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application (coporate security\) 
Estimating rural 
Pashtun settlement 
population in 
Arghandab district, 
Zabul 
Kevin Stofan ACH 2009 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application (geospatial 
intelligence) 
Envisioning the 
future of 
E Oteros-
Rozas, B 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2013 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
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transhumant 
pastoralism through 
participatory 
scenario planning: a 
case study in Spain 
Martín-López, 
CA López 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
Extension 
Facilitated Scenario 
Planning to Direct a 
Preferred 
Agriculture Future 
JE Rowntree, 
MR Raven, JP 
Schweihofer, 
DD Buskirk 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2012 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
Searching for the 
Essence of Red 
Teaming: Linearity 
Overcoming 
Rationality Toward 
Sensemaking 
JW Bell Red Teaming 2010 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
SCENARIO-BASED 
CONTRACTS: 
USING SCENARIO 
PLANNING AND 
VALUATION 
METHODS TO 
MANAGE RISK IN 
ALTERNATIVE 
DELIVERY 
METHODS 
AA Amekudzi Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2005 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness  
Scenario planning 
for simulation-
based probabilistic 
risk assessment 
Hamed Nejad Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2005 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness  
Utilising scenario 
planning in the 
transport industry 
JH Nell Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2003 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness  
Red Gaming in 
Support of the War 
on 
JH Moore, JB 
Whitley, RL 
Craf 
Red Teaming 2004 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness  
Red Teaming: A 
Means to Military 
Transformation 
John Sandoz Red Teaming 2001 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness  
Red dawn: The 
emeRgence of a Red 
Teaming capabiliTy 
in The canadian 
foRces 
M Lauder Red Teaming 2009 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness  
Scenario Planning as 
a Management Tool 
for Sustainable 
Aquaculture 
W Jimma, D 
Adjei-
Boateng, N 
Van Vosselen 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
nd Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
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evaluation of effectiveness 
(Aquaculture) 
Scenario Planning: 
The Future of Bosch 
Projects as Seen 
Through the Sugar 
Industry Lens 
MA Madiba Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2010 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(Bosch projects) 
Remembered 
Futures 
Adam Cowart Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2011 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(business planning) 
Dealing with the 
uncertainties of 
environmental 
change by adding  
Phillip Walsh Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2005 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(business planning) 
Scenario planning 
for climate change 
adaptation 
SS Moore, NE 
Seavy, M 
Gerhart 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2013 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(climate change) 
What if? Future Seas 
Scenario Planning 
and the 
Establishment of a 
Marine Reserve 
Network 
Hammish 
Rennie 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2009 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(climate change) 
Scenario planning 
for climate strategies 
development by 
integrating group 
Delphi, AHP and 
dynamic fuzzy 
cognitive maps 
RBS Dolinšek Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2010 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(climate change) 
Land Use-
Transportation 
Scenario Planning in 
an Era of Global 
Climate Change 
K 
Bartholomew, 
R Ewing 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2008 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(climate change) 
SCENARIO 
PLANNING AS 
PART OF A 
REGIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION 
INNOVATION 
STRATEGY 
C Abbott, P 
Chan 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
nd Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(construction) 
Scenario planning 
for construction 
companies 
R Soetanto, CI 
Goodier, SA 
Austin, ARJ 
Dainty 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2007 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
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evaluation of effectiveness 
(construction) 
Using scenarios to 
develop crisis 
managers 
Jason Moats, 
Thomas 
Chermack, 
Larry Dooley 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2008 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(disaster planning) 
Planning and 
Executing Scenario 
Based Simulation 
Exercises: 
D Van 
Niekerk, C 
Coetzee, D 
Botha 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2014 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(disaster planning) 
Scenario modelling 
as a tool for 
planning 
sustainable urban 
energy systems 
S Ben Amer Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2014 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(energy) 
Imagining 
catastrophe: 
Scenario planning 
and the striving for 
epistemic security 
U Tellmann Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2009 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(finance) 
Scenario Planning 
for Building Coastal 
Resilience in the 
Face of Sea Level 
Rise 
K McNamee, 
E Wisheropp, 
C Weinstein 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2014 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(flooding) 
Portfolio design for 
investment 
companies  
Payam 
Hanafizadeh, 
Abolfazl 
Kazazi and 
Azam Jalili 
Bolhasani 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2011 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(forecasting for Iran business) 
Meeting the China 
challenge: Some 
insights from 
scenario‐based 
planning 
Richard Weitz Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2001 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(geopolitics) 
Scenario Planning of 
Handheld Device 
Y Lin Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2008 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(handheld devices) 
Team 7: Applying 
automated red 
teaming in a 
maritime scenario 
K Lin Red Teaming nd Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(harbor defense) 
Save the Children 
UK: Southern Africa 
Alan 
Whiteside, Su 
Erskin 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2002 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
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scenario planning 
paper 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(HIV/disease) 
The President has no 
clothes: the case for 
broader application 
of Red Teaming 
within Homeland 
Security 
AB Nettles Red Teaming 2010 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(homeland security) 
Mapping of future 
Medical Universities 
program: scenario 
planning approach 
A Allami, RQ 
Barqi 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
nd Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(hospitals) 
Exploring Scenario 
Planning Processes 
Fm Pastor Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2009 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness (in 3 
companies) 
Scenario planning 
for the future of 
reference 
Sarah Barbara 
Watstein 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2003 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(information sciences, 
reference) 
Modeling a Policy 
for Managing Polio 
Vaccine in Japan: 
Scenario Planning 
based on System 
Dynamics 
, K Hiyosh Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
nd Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(Japanese Polio situation) 
Black swans to grey 
swans: revealing the 
uncertainty 
AJ Masys Red 
Teaming/Alternativ
e Futures Analysis 
2012 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness (law 
enforcement) 
An Initial 
Conceptualization 
of Virtual Scenario 
Planning 
Rochell 
McWhorter 
and Susan 
Lynham 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2014 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(leadership) 
Scenario planning 
for libraries 
Stuart 
Hannabuss 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2001 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(libraries) 
Scenario planning 
for a library future 
Steve 
O'Conner, 
Leonie Blair, 
Brenda 
Mconchie 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
1997 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(libraries) 
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Exploring the 
Future of Digital 
Reference through 
Scenario Planning 
S Nicholson Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2003 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(library science) 
Scenario Planning 
and Evaluation of 
Pricing Strategies in 
the Portuguese Bulk 
LPG Market 
C Capelo, JF 
Dias 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2004 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(liquid petrol gas) 
Analysis of 
Competing 
Hypothesis for 
Investigating Lone 
Wolf Terrorists 
Lisa Kaati, 
Pontus 
Svenson 
ACH 2011 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(Lone Wolf terrorism) 
Planning Future 
Technology 
Strategies Using 
Patent Information 
Analysis and 
Scenario Planning 
JH Yoon, SC 
Cho 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2012 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(patents) 
Managing Gas 
Assets through 
Simulation and 
Scenario Planning 
Vannan, Mani, 
and Will 
Glass-Husain 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
1999 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(petrol industry) 
Using scenario 
planning in public 
health: anticipating 
alternative futures 
JA Neiner, EH 
Howze, ML 
Greaney 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2004 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(public health) 
Scenario analysis 
and strategic 
planning: practical 
applications for 
radiology practice 
Frank James 
Lexa, Stephen 
Chan 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2012 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(radiology) 
A Scenario Planning 
Report for 
Kinnexxus 
Federico de 
Silva Leon, 
Max Dunn, 
Hans Eberle 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2010 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(senior issues) 
INTEGRATION OF 
SCENARIO 
PLANNING AND 
DECISION TREE 
ANALYSIS FOR 
NEW PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT: A 
CASE STUDY OF A 
SMARTPHONE … 
JZ Wu, KS 
Lina, CY Wub 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2015 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(smart phones) 
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Scenario planning 
2020 for Southern 
African economic 
empowerment 
M Siwale Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2007 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(South African economy) 
which ways can 
scenario planning 
contribute to the 
management of 
Dutch professional 
football clubs in case 
of relegation 
Niels Wigbold Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2013 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(sports) 
An Evaluation of 
Scenario Planning 
for Supply Chain 
Design 
Yishai 
Boasson 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2000 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(supply chains) 
Scenario Planning 
after Digital 
Switchover in S. 
Korea: The Use of 
Futures Wheel 
JS Oh Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2009 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(technology) 
Post Mission Red 
Teaming the Details 
of the Devil 
C Matherly Red Teaming 2013 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(terrorism) 
Red Teaming the 
Red Team 
G Akins Red Teaming 2013 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(terrorism) 
Using scenario 
planning to identify 
potential impacts of 
socio-demographic 
change on aspects of 
domestic tourism 
demand in 
Queensland in 2021 
PS Glover Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2006 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(tourism) 
Scenario‐based 
multiple criteria 
analysis for 
infrastructure policy 
impacts and 
planning 
Matthew 
Schroeder and 
James 
Lambert 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2011 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(transportation) 
Whether malevolent 
or negative, 
creativity is relevant 
to terrorism 
prevention: Lessons 
Keith James 
and Damon 
Drown 
Red Teaming 2008 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness 
(trucking and terrorism)-
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from 9/11 and 
hazardous material 
trucking 
provides pilot study but no 
report on effectiveness 
Decision making 
under extreme 
uncertainty: 
blending 
quantitative 
modeling and 
scenario plannin 
Peter Kennedy 
and Robert 
Avilia 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2013 Describes how to use the 
technique in a particular 
application but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness-it 
provides lesson learned but no 
clear evaluation or report of the 
IMPACT of the technique 
Detecting Deception 
by Analysis of 
Competing 
Hypotheses _ 
C Elsaesser, FJ 
Stech 
ACH 2003 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Measuring Evidence 
During Criminal 
Defense 
Investigations 
Through Analysis of 
Competing 
Hypotheses (ACH) 
JL Pennington ACH 2012 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
A Multinomial‐
Dirichlet Model for 
Analysis of 
Competing 
Hypotheses 
KA Duncan, 
JL Wilson 
ACH 2008 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Midway Revisited: 
Detecting Deception 
by Analysis of 
Competing 
Hypotheses 
FJ Stech, C 
Elsaesser 
ACH 2007 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
The missing link of 
crime analysis: a 
systematic approach 
to testing competing 
hypotheses 
M Townsley, 
M Mann, K 
Garrett 
ACH 2011 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Applications of 
Analysis of 
Competing 
Hypotheses on 
Frontier Defense 
Intelligence 
Analysis 
XIN Yongtao ACH 2008 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Developing the Next 
Generation of 
Scenario Planning 
Software 
E Mueller, P 
lanning Softw 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
nd Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Exclusion 
Brainstorming 
QR Code Brainstorming nd Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
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Brainstorming J Smolík, P 
Papiežová 
Vejvodová 
Brainstorming 2013 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Brainstorming in the 
College Classroom 
WF Wetzler Brainstorming 1962 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Effect of 
Brainstorming 
Strategy on 
development the 
critical reading skills 
of French Language  
W Al-Adl Brainstorming 2014 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Webstorming: 
Brainstorming in the 
Web 
L Tarouco, S 
Amoretti, R 
Keller, S 
Garrido 
Brainstorming 2003 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Brainstorming as a 
prewriting activity 
V Pfotenhauer Brainstorming 1982 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Reaching consensus 
through electronic 
brainstorming. 
KA Scordo Brainstorming 1996 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
WordPlay: A table-
top interface for 
collaborative 
brainstorming and 
decision making 
S Hunter, P 
Maes 
Brainstorming 2008 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Proceedings 
Proceedings of 
Brainstorming 
Session of 
Brainstorming 
Session of 
Brainstorming 
Session 
A Pramanik Brainstorming 2011 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Active 
Brainstorming:‐A 
systemic and 
systematic approach 
for idea generation 
JE Kasser Brainstorming 2009 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Spiking Retina and 
Brainstorming 
M Ebner Brainstorming nd Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Integrating TRIZ 
with value 
engineering: 
DW Clarke Brainstorming 1999 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
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discovering 
alternatives to 
traditional 
brainstorming and 
the selection and use 
of ideas 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Active 
Brainstorming:-A 
systemic and 
systematic approach 
for idea generation 
JE Kasser Brainstorming 2009 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Enhancing English 
Learning through 
Brainstorming 
H Houston Brainstorming nd Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Devil’s Advocacy 
and the board: A 
modest proposal 
CR Schwenk Devils Advocacy 1989 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Decision making 
models, Devil’s 
Advocacy, and the 
control of corporate 
crime 
MB Metzger, 
CR Schwenk 
Devils Advocacy 1990 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Devils Advocacy Tw Roby Devils Advocacy 1998 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Devil’s Advocacy 
and Dialectical 
Inquiry: Antidotes 
to Groupthink 
F Lunenburg Devils Advocacy 2012 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Devil’s Advocacy 
and patient choice 
S Gallivan, M 
Utley 
Devils Advocacy 2004 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness  
Combining 
MMOWGLI Social 
Media 
Brainstorming with 
Lexical Link 
Analysis 
Y Zhao, D 
Brutzman, DJ 
MacKinnon 
Brainstorming 2013 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness (general) 
Reading, thinking, brainstorming, 
writing and planning took place 
separately. Then sharing,  
Brainstorming 1991 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness (general) 
he Role and Status of 
DoD Red Teaming 
Activiites 
T Gold, B 
Hermann 
Red Teaming 2003 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness (general) 
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Red Teaming the 
Terrorist Threat 
J Sinai Red Teaming 2003 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness (general) 
The use of red 
teaming in the 
corporate 
environment: A 
study of security 
management, 
vulnerabilities and 
defence 
G Lane, D 
Brooks 
Red Teaming 2008 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness (mining) 
Three decision-
making aids: 
brainstorming, 
nominal group, and 
Delphi technique. 
AR McMurray Brainstorming 1994 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness (nursing) 
Does quantity 
generate quality? 
Testing the 
fundamental 
principle of 
brainstorming 
AM Adánez Brainstorming 2005 Describes how to use the 
technique in an application but 
provides no evaluation of 
effectiveness (nursing) 
Learning from the 
future through 
scenario planning 
Michael J 
Blyth 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2005 Describes how to use the 
technique in general 
applications 
Scenario Planning: 
Investing in 
Consciousness 
D Pfenninger Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
1998 Describes how to use the 
technique in general 
applications but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness  
Directions in 
scenario planning 
literature–A review 
of the past decades 
Varum, 
Celeste 
Amorim, and 
Carla Melo 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2010 Describes how to use the 
technique in general 
applications but provides no 
evaluation of effectiveness  
Decision Driven 
Scenario Planning 
for Process-Level 
Interventions 
TJ Chemarck, 
TD Payne 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
nd Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Scenario Planning: 
An Innovative 
Approach to 
Strategy 
Development 
Maree 
Conway 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2004 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
The Use and Value 
of Scenario Planning 
JF Cardoso, 
MR Emes 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2014 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Tailoring scenario 
planning to the 
company culture. 
David Mason Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2003 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Plausibility and 
Probabilty in 
Scenario Planning 
Rafael 
Ramierz and 
Cynthia Selin 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2014 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
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Mapping Public and 
Private Scenario 
Planning 
Jay Ogilvy 
and 
Erik Smith 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2004 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Exploring client 
scenarios associated 
with scenario 
planning 
O Freeman, 
HM Pattinson 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2010 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Decision making 
and planning under 
low levels of 
predictability: 
George 
Wright, Paul 
Goodwin 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2009 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Designing for the 
subconscious 
RK Minas Brainstorming 2014 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
A Physical Artifact 
for Moderating and 
Analyzing 
Brainstorming 
Sessions 
C Kakoulli Brainstorming 2011 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Brainstorming Does 
Work for Agile 
G Wilkstrand Brainstorming 2012 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Quit Brainstorming 
and start Q-
Storming® 
J Dager Brainstorming 2011 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Brainstorming Is 
Not Very Creative 
J Baumgartner Brainstorming nd Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
“But That Actually 
Happened!” 
Exploring the 
Speech Genre of 
Brainstorming 
J Herbert Brainstorming 2013 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Conducting 
Creativity 
Brainstorming 
Sessions in Small 
and Medium-Sized 
US Murthy Brainstorming nd Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Making group 
brainstorming more 
effective 
VR Brown, PB 
Paulus 
Brainstorming 2002 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Brainstorming 
revisited: a question 
of context 
T Rickards Brainstorming 1999 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
On creativity: A 
brainstorming 
session 
U Bröckling Brainstorming 2006 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Beta versus VHS 
and the acceptance 
of electronic 
brainstorming 
technology 
AR Dennis, 
BA Reinicke 
Brainstorming 2004 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Conducting 
Creativity 
US Murthy Brainstorming 2009 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
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Brainstorming 
Sessions in Small 
and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises 
Brainstorming: An 
Act of Creativity in 
Vocational and 
Technical Education 
Curriculum in 
Nigerian Secondary 
Schools 
SO 
Gbolagade, ES 
Adegoke 
Brainstorming 2014 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Brainstorming a 
Backchat 
D Somerville Brainstorming 2004 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
The Persistence of 
Brainstorming 
MAM Gobble Brainstorming 2014 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Brainstorming: 
Experiences from 
two thousand 
teams. 
JD 
Antoszkiewic
z 
Brainstorming 1992 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Fifth Brainstorming 
Week on Membrane 
Computing 
A Romero-
Jiménez, A 
Riscos-Núnez 
Brainstorming 2007 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
IdeaGens: A Social 
Ideation System for 
Guided Crowd 
Brainstorming 
J Chan, S 
Dang, P 
Kremer, L 
Guo 
Brainstorming 2014 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
DEVIL’S 
ADVOCACY IN 
MANAGERIAL 
DECISION‐
MAKING 
CR Schwenk Devils Advocacy 1984 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Socratic strategies 
and Devil’s 
Advocacy in 
synchronous CMC 
debate 
A Walker Devils Advocacy 2004 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Diversity, 
eccentricity, and 
Devil’s Advocacy 
CR Schwenk Devils Advocacy 1998 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
The Red Teaming 
Essential 
C Matherly Red Teaming 2013 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Reflections from a 
Red Team Leader 
Susan Craig Red Teaming 2007 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
The “Red Team” 
Forging a 
Malone, 
Timothy G. 
and Reagan E. 
Schaupp 
Red Teaming 2002 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
Red Teaming for 
Law Enforcement 
Michael 
Meeham 
Red Teaming 2007 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique 
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Perceptions of 
brainstorming in 
group 
WC Rowatt, K 
Nesselroade 
Brainstorming 1997 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique (perception 
of the technique) 
Reflective Inquiry in 
the Virtual 
Brainstorming of 
Writing Tasks 
CK Man Brainstorming nd Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique/Study 
lacks counterfactual condition 
Drivers and 
outcomes of 
scenario planning 
T J. Chermack, 
K Nimon 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2013 Discusses issues related to the 
use of the technique--reasoning 
styles 
Water Demand 
Projection in 
Distribution 
Systems Using a 
Novel Scenario 
Planning Approach 
M Cabral, D 
Loureiro, A 
Mamade, D 
Covas 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2014 Duplicates a previous 
observation  
The comparative 
effectiveness of 
dialectical inquiry 
and Devil’s 
Advocacy 
DM 
Schweiger, PA 
Finger 
Devils Advocacy 1984 Duplicates a previous 
observation  
Re‐examining the 
Team A‐Team B 
exercise 
RC Reich Team A/Team B 1989 Duplicates a previous 
observation  
TEAM B: THE 
TRILLION 
DOLLAR 
EXPERIMENT.  
A Cahn Team A/Team B 1993 Duplicates a previous 
observation  
The Speaking 
Ability of the 
Eleventh Grade 
Students of SMA 1 
Mejobo Kudus in 
the Academic Year 
2011/2012 Taught 
by Using Round 
Robin 
Brainstorming 
I Faizah Brainstorming 2012 Educational outcome 
THE ROLE OF 
BRAINSTORMING 
AND CLUSTERING 
IN WRITING A 
COMPOSITION  
M SELVIANA Brainstorming 2007 Educational outcome 
The Use of 
Brainstorming to 
Improve the Writing 
Ability in Recount 
Text of the Tenth 
Grade  
EW Suryani Brainstorming 2012 Educational outcome 
THE EFFECT OF 
APPLYING 
M Fransisca, Z 
Zainuddin 
Brainstorming 2012 Educational outcome 
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BRAINSTORMING 
TECHNIQUE ON 
THE  
The Effect of Using 
Brainstorming 
Strategy in 
Developing 
Creative Problem 
Solving Skills  
BA Al-khatib Brainstorming 2012 Educational outcome 
COMPARISON OF EFFECTIVENESS 
OF THE THREE METHODS OF 
BRAINSTORMING, SYNECTICS 
AND DEDUCTIVE ON 
INCREASING CREATIVE 
THOUGHT IN … 
Brainstorming 2010 Educational outcome 
ACH0: A Tool for 
Analyzing 
Competing 
Hypotheses 
Lance Good, 
Jeff Shrager, 
Mark Stefik, 
Peter Pirolli, 
and Stuart 
Card 
ACH 2004 Proposes an improvement or 
modification of the technique-
but no evaluation 
Deception Detection 
by Analysis of 
Competing 
Hypotheses 
Frank J. Stech 
and 
Christopher 
Elsaesser 
ACH 2005 Proposes an improvement or 
modification of the technique-
but no evaluation 
DECIDE™ 
Hypothesis 
Visualization Tool 
Diane Cluxton 
and Stephen 
G. Eick 
ACH 2005 Proposes an improvement or 
modification of the technique-
but no evaluation 
Extending Heuer’s 
Analysis of 
Competing 
Hypotheses Method 
to Support Complex 
Decision Analysis 
Marco 
Valtorta, 
Jiangbo Dang, 
Hrishikesh 
Goradia, 
Jingshan 
Huang, and 
Michael 
Huhns 
ACH 2005 Proposes an improvement or 
modification of the technique-
but no evaluation 
Analysis of 
Competing 
Hypotheses using 
Subjective Logic 
Simon Pope, 
Audun Jøsang 
ACH 2005 Proposes an improvement or 
modification of the technique-
but no evaluation 
Transformative 
Scenario Planning 
Adam Kahane Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2013 Proposes an improvement or 
modification of the technique-
but no evaluation 
Scenario planning 
with integrated 
quantification 
J Luis 
Cordeiro, S 
Hirsch, P 
Burggraf, C 
Daheim 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2013 Proposes an improvement or 
modification of the technique-
but no evaluation 
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Normative scenario 
approach: a vehicle 
to connect 
adaptation planning 
and development 
needs in developing 
countries 
L Bizikova, L 
Pintér, N 
Tubiello 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2014 Proposes an improvement or 
modification of the technique-
but no evaluation 
Using Prospective 
Vision and Multi-
Criteria Decision 
Analysis with 
Scenario Planning. 
Carlos Gomes, 
Francisco 
Simoes, 
Helder Costa 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
nd Proposes an improvement or 
modification of the technique-
but no evaluation 
Effective Scenario 
Composition for the 
Revelation of Blind 
Spots in Critical 
Infrastructure 
Protection Planning 
WJ Tolone, 
SW Lee, WN 
Xiang, RK 
McNally 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
nd Proposes an improvement or 
modification of the technique-
but no evaluation 
Brainstorming: 
Consensus Learning 
in Practice 
D 
Plewczynski 
Brainstorming 2009 Proposes an improvement or 
modification of the technique-
but no evaluation 
Take five for better 
brainstorming 
S Thiagarajan Brainstorming 1991 Proposes an improvement or 
modification of the technique-
but no evaluation 
Co-BrainSystem: 
Supporting 
brainstorming to 
enhance 
collaborative work 
in educational 
environments 
J Herbert Brainstorming 2013 Proposes an improvement or 
modification of the technique-
but no evaluation 
Synectics and 
brainstorming 
determinations of 
the ideative fluency 
of Nigerian 
adolescents 
JO Akinboye Brainstorming 1980 Relevant-but full text only in 
French (abstract was in English) 
From Cultural 
Diversity To Group 
Creativity 
HC Wang Brainstorming 2011 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Idea generation in 
brainstorming and 
turn-taking groups 
R Manning Brainstorming 1998 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Acquisition of 
brainstorming 
behavior: 
differential effects of 
model status and 
symbolic  
OH Revels Brainstorming 1980 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Efiects of 
Communication 
A Miura Brainstorming 2003 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
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Medium and Goal 
Setting on Group 
Brainstorming 
Descriptive 
Evidence from 
Audit Practice on 
SAS No 
JL Gissel, KM 
Johnstone 
Brainstorming 2007 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Make Your Lacture 
Interesting with 
Discussion and 
Brainstorming 
Methods 
JR Sonwane Brainstorming nd Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
A Study of the 
Influence of 
Participants' 
Experience to the 
Brainstorming 
CS HSU, CD 
CHEN, LJ 
HWANG, SA 
KAO 
Brainstorming nd Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
The Future of 
Electronic 
Brainstorming 
S Gauvin, MC 
Roy 
Brainstorming 1998 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Personality, process, 
and performance in 
interactive 
brainstorming 
groups 
AU Bolin, GA 
Neuman 
Brainstorming 2006 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Idea production in 
nominal and virtual 
groups: does 
computer-mediated 
communication 
improve group 
brainstorming? 
R Ziegler, M 
Diehl, G 
Zijlstra 
Brainstorming 2000 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Process structuring 
in electronic 
brainstorming 
AR Dennis, JS 
Valacich, T 
Connolly 
Brainstorming 1996 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
The remote 
associates test as a 
predictor of 
productivity in 
brainstorming 
groups 
GB Forbach, 
RG Evans 
Brainstorming 1981 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Making Group 
Brainstorming More 
Effective: 
Recommendations 
From an Associative 
Memory Perspective 
Z Yun Brainstorming 2010 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Interpersonal 
perception and 
group 
FM Jablin, RL 
Sorenson, DR 
Seibold 
Brainstorming 1978 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
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brainstorming 
performance 
Research frn 
Electronic 
Brainstorming 
W Kanliang, X 
Youmin, W 
Yingluo 
Brainstorming 1994 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Effects of gesture-
based avatar-
mediated 
communication on 
brainstorming and 
negotiation tasks 
CS Ang, A 
Bobrowicz, P 
Siriaraya, J 
Trickey 
Brainstorming 2013 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Effects of" 
brainstorming" 
instructions on 
creative problem 
solving by trained 
and untrained 
subject 
SJ Parnes, A 
Meadow 
Brainstorming 1959 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Creative 
supergroups: Group 
performance as a 
function of 
individual 
performance on 
brainstorming tasks 
WK Graham, 
PC Dillion 
Brainstorming 1973 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
AUDIT PARTNER 
LEADERSHIP 
TONE AND 
PROFESSIONAL 
SKEPTICISM IN 
FRAUD 
BRAINSTORMING 
S Dennis, KM 
Johnstone 
Brainstorming 2014 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Groupgarden: 
supporting 
brainstorming 
through a 
metaphorical group 
mirror on table or 
wall 
S Tausch, D 
Hausen, I 
Kosan, A 
Raltchev 
Brainstorming 2014 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Asynchronous 
distance education 
forum-
Brainstorming vs. 
Snowballing: a case 
study for  
KPM Xenos Brainstorming 2009 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
An Audit Partner-
led Field 
Intervention in 
Fraud 
Brainstorming 
S Dennis, KM 
Johnstone 
Brainstorming 2014 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
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Participant-driven 
GSS: Quality of 
Brainstorming and 
Allocation of 
Participant 
Resources. 
JH Helquist, 
EL Santanen, J 
Kruse 
Brainstorming 2007 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Benchmarking bio-
inspired designs 
with brainstorming 
in terms of novelty 
of design outcomes 
S Keshwani, 
TA Lenau, SA 
Kristense 
Brainstorming 2013 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Experiential effects 
of dialectical 
inquiry, Devil’s 
Advocacy and 
consensus 
approaches 
DM 
Schweiger, 
WR Sandberg 
Devils Advocacy 1989 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Effects of Devil’s 
Advocacy and 
dialectical inquiry 
on decision making 
CR Schwenk Devils Advocacy 1990 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Journ+A184:G184al 
Article 
RL Priem, KH 
Price 
Devils Advocacy 1991 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Structuring Conflict 
in Individual, Face‐
to‐Face, and 
Computer‐
Mediated Group 
Decision Making 
JS Valacich, C 
Schwenk 
Devils Advocacy 1985 Study is comparison of a 
variation of the technique 
Confirmation Bias in 
the Analysis of 
Remote Sensing 
Data 
Paul Lehner, 
Leonard 
Adelman, 
Robert 
Distasio, 
Marie Erie, 
Janet Mittel, 
Sherry Olson 
ACH 2009 Technique addressed in study 
was not one of those included in 
this study as defined in the 
Tradecraft Primer   
SPURS: A 
framework towards 
Scenario Planning 
for Unexpected 
events, Response, 
and Startle using 
research, horror 
films, and video 
games 
J BARNETT, 
BLW WONG, 
R 
ADDERLEY, 
M SMITH 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2013 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study 
Locating monitors 
in water distribution 
systems: Red team-
blue team exercise 
WM 
Grayman, A 
Ostfeld, E 
Salomons 
Red Teaming 2006 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study 
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Straw persons and 
Devil’s Advocacy 
T Mehigan Devils Advocacy 1988 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
Deconstruction as 
Devil’s Advocacy: A 
Shavian Alternative 
RF Dietrich Devils Advocacy 1986 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
Royal tombs and 
preterhuman 
ancestors: a Devil’s 
Advocacy 
D Henige Devils Advocacy 1977 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
The Devil’s 
Advocacy: When 
and why inhaled 
therapies for 
tuberculosis may 
not work 
AB Yadav, AK 
Singh, RK 
Verma, M 
Mohan, AK 
Agrawal 
Devils Advocacy 2011 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
“Could God be 
Temporal?” A 
Devil’s Advocacy 
J King‐Farlow Devils Advocacy 1963 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
B. Short description 
of the research 
projects of Team B 
J 
SCHOUKENS
, RIK 
PINTELON, Y 
ROLAIN 
Team A/Team B nd Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
Final Report-Team B 
Navigation 
J Moore, D 
Baird, K 
Sugimoto 
Team A/Team B 2003 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
Encouragement 
Through 
Community: An 
Ethnographic Study 
of Team B 
L Reeves Team A/Team B 2015 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
Team B-BAM! G Botteon, K 
Gursahaney 
Team A/Team B nd Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
CS 692 RPE 7 
Position Paper: 
Team B 
K Cerar, AM 
Seto, J Zarnett 
Team A/Team B nd Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
LibGuides Sandbox 
for Library Schools. 
2014 SLIS 758 TEAM 
B. Home. 
F TU, K 
Holder, E 
Evans 
Team A/Team B 2014 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
Jenna Cooley 
Forestry-Team B 
Samantha Holly 
L Terango Team A/Team B nd Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
ME 402-TTI 
Compressor-Team B 
S Crouch, D 
Sharpe, C 
Odell, F Ragin 
Team A/Team B 2010 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
Cornwall Outdoors 
hosts team b 
C Council Team A/Team B 2012 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
B. Short Description 
of the Research 
Projects of Team A 
N 
DEBLAUWE, 
Team A/Team B Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
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LEO VAN 
BIESEN 
Team B E Yamova - Team A/Team B 2014 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
Team B. Site within 
the Boundaries of 
Shchedrina, 
Sarafanovskaya, 
Detskaya, 
Napolnaya and 
Barrikad Streets 
I Afanasieva Team A/Team B 2014 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
Energizing 
commitment to 
change in a team-
building 
intervention: A 
FIRO-B approach 
GH Varney, RJ 
Hunady 
Team A/Team B 1978 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
B-Human team 
description for 
robocup 2008 
T Röfer, T 
Laue, A 
Burchardt, E 
Damrose 
Team A/Team B 2008 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study  
Illusion of Devil’s 
Advocacy: How the 
Justices of the 
Supreme Court 
Foreshadow Their 
Decisions during 
Oral Argument, The 
S Schullman Devils Advocacy 2004 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study (describes 
physical red teaming) 
Second public 
hearing of the 
National 
Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United 
States 
Bogdan 
Dzakovic 
Red Teaming 2003 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study (describes 
physical red teaming) 
Planning of strategic 
innovation aimed at 
environmental 
sustainability 
PJ Partidario, J 
Vergragt 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2002 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study (describes 
statistical brainstorming, could 
not determine what this 
technique is) 
Using Scenario 
Planning to Inform 
Pedagogical Practice 
in Virtual Worlds in 
Schools: 
Collaboration and 
Structure 
CA Bonfield, 
KJ Burden 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2012 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study (describes 
statistical brainstorming, could 
not determine what this 
technique is) 
TRIGGERING 
STUDENT 
CREATIVITY 
THROUGH 
J Solana-
Gutierrez, MD 
Bejarano-
Carrión 
Brainstorming 2012 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study (describes 
statistical brainstorming, could 
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STATISTICAL 
BRAINSTORMING
–AN  
not determine what this 
technique is) 
The effects of 
scenario planning 
on perceptions of 
conversation quality 
and engagement 
J Veliquette, 
LM Coons, SL 
Mace, T 
Coates 
Alternative Futures 
Analysis 
2012 Technique addressed not one of 
the 6 in this study--appears to 
be related to scenarios as a 
statistical tool 
 
Assessing Studies 
The 46 evaluative studies were examined for reported effect of the technique and quality 
of evidence 
 
Studies were assessed by examining the reported effect of the technique on rigor and 
accuracy. Each study was coded as followed and classified as effective or ineffective: 
 
Effectiveness was based on the reported impact of the technique on rigor and accuracy:  
 
 Rigor :  Analysis is rigorous when it is “in-depth” This criterion is called 
“coherence” because rigorous analysis coheres to a set of standards 
 Examples: questioning the reliability of sources, considering multiple hypotheses 
 
 Accuracy : Analysis is accurate when there is a high degree of correspondence 
between the analytic judgment and what happened in the external world 
 
Next each study was evaluated on the credibility of the evidence. Using a modified 
version of the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale.  The modification was the addition of  
a category for meta-analyses: 
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10.0   METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENT PROCEDURES 
 
Participant Selection 
The study population was security and intelligence studies students at the Graduate 
School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA) at the University of Pittsburgh. 
Participants were notified of the experiment via list-serv, solicitation during class time, 
and fliers posted around GSPIA. Upon completion of the experiment, participants 
received a small monetary incentive ($20). Prior to the experiment, a pilot test was 
conducted with three participants to test and refine the experimental materials and 
procedures.  
 
Experimental Task 
21 participants volunteered for the experiment and were randomized into two groups: 
using Indicators or Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH).  These groups were 
further broken down into analytic “teams” of 3-4 students. Given the greater ease of using 
Indicators only the ACH group received instruction in how to use the technique. A 3 hour 
ACH workshop was held to cover the rationale and to practice using the technique: 
 
Outline for Alternative Competing Hypotheses Training  
 
1) Housekeeping: Questionnaire/Verbal consent form   
 
2) Module 1: Logic of ACH  
– 1.1 What is ACH and why use it? 
– 1.2 Components of ACH 
– 1.3 Knowledge check #1 
 
3) Module 2: ACH procedures  
– 2.1 How do you use ACH?  
– 2.2 PARC Software with a  simple interactive example  
– 2.3 Knowledge check 
 
4) Lunch break  
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5) Module 3: “Who killed Benazir Bhutto?”  
 
  
Participants were given a questionnaire throughout the workshop to ensure they 
understood the rationale and how to use the technique. The class score was an 82 percent, 
suggesting a moderate level of comprehension.  
 
Analytic teams were then given a date for their team to participant in the analytic 
experiment. During the three hour experiment, a facilitator (the author) used a protocol 
for Indicators and ACH. The following is the Indicators protocol: 
 
 
Facilitator Guide: Indicators 
 
1) Introduction of Research: 
“Thank you for taking part in this research.  Over the next 3 hours we will be 
conducting an analytic task simulating how analysis is conducted in the intelligence 
community. We will take a 10 minute break at the halfway point.  
 
All data will be kept confidential on a password protected computer. Your 
participation is voluntary. Throughout the process I, the facilitator, will assist in 
structuring the conversation and managing time. 
 
The purpose of this activity is to determine the likelihood Syria will meet the deadline 
set by Security Council Resolution 2118, for completed chemical weapon disarmament 
by June 30th, 2014. Currently, 30% of the weapons have been destroyed” 
 
2) Documents: “Please look through these background articles over the next few 
minutes. [Distribute documents, hand out judgment sheet #1 after articles have been 
read then collect after each is filled out] 
*[Begin Recording]* 
 
4) Generate: “Now we will begin our analysis. We will start by determining the factors 
that could affect compliance with the chemical weapons agreement. [go around the 
room with each participant providing an idea, list all barriers on whiteboard, spend no 
more than 50 minutes] 
 
5) Refine: “Now we will review all of our ideas and see if any can be combined or 
eliminated” [go through each factor and ask if it should be combined with another idea 
or eliminated, spend no more than 15min] 
 
6) Break: [10 minute break] 
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7) Ranking Importance: “What barriers do you think are most important? Now we will 
group them into three categories: very important, somewhat important, and not 
important. [Spend no more than 30 minutes ranking each item by going around the 
room and asking for consensus] 
 
8) Assessing Likelihood:  “Now we will attempt to determine which of the most likely 
factors:  very likely, somewhat unlikely, and not likely. [Spend no more than 30 minutes 
ranking each item by going around the room and asking for consensus] 
 
9) Final assessment: “Please take a few minutes to record what you think will be the 
outcome of the Syrian chemical weapons agreement.” [Pass out judgment sheets]  
 
 
The ACH protocol differs slightly:  
 
 
Facilitator guide- Analysis of Competing Hypotheses 
 
1) Introduction of Research: 
“Thank you for taking part in this research.  Over the next 3 hours we will be 
conducting an analytic task simulating how analysis is conducted in the intelligence 
community. We will take a 10 minute break at the halfway point.  
 
All data collected will be kept confidential on a password protected computer. Your 
participation is voluntary. Throughout the process I, the facilitator, will assist in 
structuring the conversation and managing time. 
 
The purpose of this activity is to determine the likelihood Syria will meet the deadline 
set by Security Council Resolution 2118, for completed chemical weapon disarmament 
by June 30th, 2014.  
 
2) Documents: “Please look through these background articles over the next 10 
minutes. [distribute questionnaire, documents, open PARC software, hand out 
judgment sheet 1 after articles have been read then collect after each is filled out] 
*[Begin recording]* 
 
3) Begin Analysis: “Now we will begin with the analysis. We will begin by listing the 
simple hypotheses” [ask for simple hypotheses, should take no more than a minute] 
 
4) Evidence: What pieces of evidence would confirm or disconfirm these two 
hypotheses? Remember you may use evidence from your own experience and/or the 
provided documents.” [Go around room gathering evidence, write on board, spend no 
more than 20 minutes listing evidence] 
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5) Refine Evidence: “Now we will review all of our pieces of evidence and see if any 
can be combined or eliminated” [go through each factor and ask if it should be 
combined with another piece of evidence or eliminated, spend no more than 15min] 
 
6) Break: [10 minute break] 
 
7) Assess Diagnosticity:  “Now we will assess the diagnosticity of each hypothesis. 
Where there is disagreement we will take a simple vote to determine the diagnosticity 
and a flag will be placed to indicate disagreement.  [Begin, at upper left cell and work 
through each hypothesis. Spend no more than 50 minutes assessing diagnosticity] 
 
8) Assess Sensitivity: “Consider each piece of evidence. Are there any pieces of 
evidence that if altered would dramatically change the result?  
 
9) Assess result: “What are/is the most credible hypotheses/hypothesis? Could we 
eliminate any/one?”  
 
10) Final assessment: “Please take a few minutes to record what you think will be the 
outcome of the Syrian chemical weapons agreement.” [Pass out judgment sheets, spend 
no more than 10 minutes]  
 
 
At the beginning of the simulation, participants were   presented with a map of Syria 
dated two months prior which included the rebel positions and chemical weapons sites, 
a timeline of key events, and the UN resolution. After examining these documents for 10 
minutes, participants filled out a judgment sheet and then the same judgment sheet after 
using ACH or Indicators: 
 
 
Name: ____________________________________        Date: ____________ 
 
1) What percentage of Syrian government-held chemical weapons will be destroyed by 
June 30th? (Currently, 30% of the weapons have been destroyed)   
 
_______% 
 
2) What is your confidence your judgment for #1? (circle) 
 
High—Moderate—Low 
 
3) What do you think the likelihood is that virtually all of Syrian government-held 
chemical weapons will be destroyed by the deadline, June 30th, 2014? (circle) 
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Almost Certainly—Probably/Likely-—Even Chance—Unlikely—Remote 
 
 
4)  Provide a rationale for your answer for #3: 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The rationales were next coded. Below is an example of how data was coded. Each 
narrative was analyzed for any hypotheses that the participant cited that might have an 
impact on the outcome of the disarmament process: 
 
Respondent 
ID 
Narrative Hypotheses 
2001 Based on the evidence I saw in the 
previous papers handed out, I believe the 
Syrian government is in no rush to 
destroy all the chemical weapons, 
[indiscernable] incompetent and slow. As 
long as they are [indiscernable] will not 
be [indiscernable] 
-Intentional slowdown-Syria 
 
 
2002 The deadline has been pushed back 
repeadtedly [sic], and leaders on the 
outside--Russia and western nations-- are 
collaborating to end the problem; limited 
transparency. I think Syria's chemical 
weapons program will be eradicated, but 
will happen after 6/30/2014 
-International cooperation- the West  
-Limited transparency 
 
2003 To this point, the process has not 
remained on schedule-if the destruction 
process takes 90 days after removal, they 
would need to remove an additional 60% 
immediately to be successful  
-Insufficient time to reach goal  
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